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ABSTRACT 
The existence of the rhino is under serious threat. South Africa has 
experienced a dramatic increase in rhino poaching since 2008. With the 
current trend of poaching, rhino in South Africa will soon become extinct. The 
current strategies to protect rhino have proved to be ineffective. 
The common view is that rhino poaching is morally wrong, and associated 
with greed and evil intentions and that rhino poaching must be stopped; 
however, there are two schools of thought regarding two main approaches (in 
association with current strategies) to be used in order to stop or limit 
poaching. 
The first school of thought supports the CITES ban on international trade in 
rhino horn, and believes that rhino poaching can only be stopped by 
eliminating demand (the “conventional approach”). The second school of 
thought is in favour of the legalisation of international trade, and argues that 
any solutions to the rhino poaching problem must address the underlying 
economic forces. This is called the sustainable approach. 
The research aimed to investigate the effectiveness of the ban on 
international trade in rhino horn, as well as the viability of legalising 
international trade. The effectiveness of the current strategies was also 
investigated. 
A qualitative research design was used, and eighteen participants were 
selected in order to obtain information by means of semi-structured interviews 
and questionnaires. A literature review was also conducted, for the purpose of 
v 
 
evaluating the responses of participants, and also for the purpose of validity 
and reliability. 
The findings indicated that the scales tip in favour of a well-managed, 
legalised trade, inter alia, to make funds available to rhino owners, rhino 
custodians and the government, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to 
reduce the reward and increase the risk to the poacher. 
Findings also indicated that a legalised trade cannot be implemented in 
isolation; it goes hand in hand with increased security and improved law 
enforcement, while strategies such as dehorning and translocation still have a 
role to play. 
Finally, findings also indicated that communities need to be involved in the 
sustainable use approach. These communities are currently excluded from 
the benefits derived from the neighbouring protected areas, thereby making 
them susceptable to being recruited as poachers. 
 
Keywords 
Anti-trade, CITES, community conservation, CoP, legal trade, poaching, pro-
trade, rhino, sustainable use, trade ban, TRAFFIC. 
 
 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION         ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS        iii 
ABSTRACT          iv 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS      xii 
GLOSSARY          xvii 
LIST OF FIGURES         xix 
LIST OF TABLES         xx 
LIST OF APPENDICES        xxii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1  BACKGROUND       1 
1.2  JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY    10 
1.3  PROBLEM STATEMENT      12 
1.4  RESEARCH QUESTIONS     14 
1.5  OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY     14 
1.6  CHAPTER OUTLINE OF THESIS    15 
1.7  SUMMARY        16 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  INTRODUCTION       17 
2.2  LEGAL POSITION PERTAINING TO THE  
PROTECTION OF RHINOS     17 
2.2.1  National legislation      17 
vii 
 
2.2.1.1 Framework Environmental Legislation: 
The National Environmental Management  
Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA)       19 
2.2.1.2 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity 
Act 10 of 2004 (NEMBA)       19 
2.2.1.3 Moratorium on the national trading in rhino horn  23 
2.2.1.4 The National Environmental Management Laws  
Amendment Act 14 of 2013 (NEMLA)    25 
2.2.1.5 Other measures on a national level    26 
2.2.1.5.1 Biodiversity management plan for black rhino  26 
2.2.1.5.2 National Strategy for the Safety and Security  
of Rhinoceros Populations in South Africa   26 
2.2.1.5.3 Integrated strategic management    28 
2.2.1.5.4 Rhino Issue Management (RIM)    29 
2.2.1.5.5 Committee of inquiry      30 
2.2.2  International legislation      32 
2.3  OWNERSHIP OF WILD ANIMALS    35 
2.4  THE IMPORTANCE OF WILDLIFE CONSERVATION 39 
2.4.1  Wildlife and environmental values    39 
2.4.2  Why should species be saved?    42 
2.5  POACHING IN SOUTH AFRICA     45 
2.5.1  Why did poaching in South Africa increase after 2008? 47 
2.5.2  The poacher       49 
2.5.3  Mozambique’s role in rhino poaching   55 
2.5.3.1 Hot pursuit        57 
2.6  EFFECTIVENESS OF CERTAIN  
STRATEGIES TO PREVENT/STOP POACHING  58 
viii 
 
2.6.1  DNA profiling       59 
2.6.2  Dehorning        60 
2.6.3  Poison (horn treatment)      62 
2.6.4  Translocation       64 
2.6.5  Law enforcement       65 
2.6.6  Demand reduction      72 
2.6.7  Technology        75 
2.7  SUSTAINABLE USE      76 
2.7.1  Hunting as a form of sustainable use    79 
2.7.2  Community conservation     82 
2.7.3  Tourism (wildlife tourism)     86 
2.7.4  Can the “sustainable use” approach save the  
South African rhinos?      88 
2.8  COMPARATIVE EXAMPLES     93 
2.8.1  Elephant        93 
2.8.2  Vicuña        94 
2.8.3  Prohibition of alcohol in the United States   96 
2.8.4  Deer industry in New Zealand     97 
2.9  THE CITES BAN ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE  
IN RHINO HORN       98 
2.10  THE VIABILITY OF LEGALISING INTERNATIONAL  
TRADE IN RHINO HORN      101 
2.11  SUMMARY        119 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1  INTRODUCTION       120 
3.2  RESEARCH DESIGN      120 
3.3  DATA COLLECTION STRATEGIES    124 
ix 
 
3.3.1.  Interviews        124 
3.3.2  Desk-based study/literature review    129 
3.4  SAMPLING        131 
3.5  LIMITATIONS       135 
3.6  DATA ANALYSIS       136 
3.6.1  Strengths and limitations of qualitative content  
analysis        139 
3.6.2  The process of qualitative content analysis   140 
3.7  VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY     143 
3.7.1  Introduction to the concepts of validity and reliability 143 
3.7.2  Testing validity and reliability in this research  145 
3.8  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS     147 
3.9  SUMMARY        148 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1  INTRODUCTION       149 
4.2  CATEGORIES       151 
4.2.1  Reasons for the increase in rhino poaching  151 
4.2.1.1 Poor law enforcement      153 
4.2.1.2 Moratorium on domestic trade     164 
4.2.1.3 Money driven (lucrative business)    167 
4.2.1.4 Increased demand       168 
4.2.1.5 Socio-economic reasons      170 
4.2.2  Concurrent strategies      171 
4.2.2.1 Dehorning        172 
4.2.2.2 Poisoning of the horn      176 
4.2.2.3 Translocation       179 
4.2.2.4 Increased security       181 
x 
 
4.2.2.5 Demand reduction       187 
4.2.3  CITES trade ban       190 
4.2.4  Possible solutions      193 
4.2.4.1 Sustainable use       193 
4.2.4.1.1 Legal trade        196 
4.2.4.1.1.1 Arguments by anti-trade supporters    196 
4.2.4.1.1.2 Arguments by pro-trade supporters    213 
4.2.4.1.1.3 Community conservation      223 
4.3  SUMMARY        225 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1  INTRODUCTION       226 
5.2  OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY     227 
5.3  METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS   228 
5.4  RESEARCH PROBLEM      229 
5.5  CONCURRENT STRATEGIES     233 
5.5.1  Dehorning        233 
5.5.2  Poisoning of the horn      234 
5.5.3  Translocation       234 
5.5.4  Increased security      234 
5.5.5  Increased demand      235 
5.6  CITES Trade Ban       236 
5.7  SUSTAINABLE USE      236 
5.7.1  Legal trade        237 
5.7.1.1 Will South Africa be in a position to find a trading  
partner?        237 
5.7.1.2 Will South Africa be in a position to regulate a  
system of legal trade nationally and internationally?  237 
xi 
 
5.7.1.3 Will it be possible to keep illegal rhino horn  
out of the legal market?      238 
5.7.1.4 Will legal trade of rhino horn have other negative  
impacts on the conservation and well-being of 
the species?        238 
5.7.1.5 Will South Africa be in a position to meet demand  
in rhino horn on a continuous basis?    239 
5.7.2  Conclusion regarding pro-trade arguments   239 
5.7.3  Community conservation     241 
5.8  RESEARCH QUESTIONS     241 
5.9  SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUSION    247 
5.10  RECOMMENDATIONS      249 
5.11  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 252 
5.12  RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION     253 
5.13  CHAPTER SUMMARY      253 
LIST OF REFERENCES        254 
GOVERNMENT REPORTS       281 
LAW REPORTS         281 
 
xii 
 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
ADMADE Administrative Management Plan for Game Management 
Areas 
AFRSG African Rhino Specialist Group 
CAMPFIRE Communal Areas Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources 
CBNRM  Community Based Natural Resource Management 
CBP   Captive Breeding Programme 
CITES  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
   of Wild Fauna and Flora 
CoP   Conference of the Parties 
CPA   Criminal Procedure Act 51 0f 1977 
C.s.   Ceratotherium simum 
CSO   Central Selling Organisation 
D.b.   Diceros bicornis 
DEA   Department of Environmental Affairs 
DNA   Deoxyribonucleic acid 
DNPWM  Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management 
xiii 
 
DPCI   Directorate of Priority Crime Investigations 
EC   Eastern Cape Province (South Africa) 
EIA   Environmental Investigation Agency 
EMI   Environmental Management Inspector 
EWT   Endangered Wildlife Trust 
FS   Free State Province (South Africa) 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GMPO  Greater Mekong Programme Office 
GP   Gauteng Province (South Africa) 
GTA   Game Theft Act 105 of 1991 
HSI   Humane Society International 
ICDP   Integrated Conservation Development Project 
IFAW   International Fund for Animal Welfare 
IMC   Inter-Ministerial Committee 
IPZ   Intensive Protection Zone 
IRF   International Rhino Foundation 
IUCN   International Union for Conservation of Nature 
KNP   Kruger National Park 
xiv 
 
KZN   KwaZulu-Natal Province (South Africa) 
LEMA   Limpopo Environmental Management Act 7 of 2003 
LIM   Limpopo Province (South Africa) 
MAP   Mapungubwe National Park 
MET   Ministry of Environment and Tourism (Namibia) 
MNP   Marakele National Park 
MOU   Memorandum of Understanding 
MP   Mpumalanga Province (South Africa) 
MTPA   Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency 
NC   Northern Cape Province (South Africa) 
NEMA  National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
NEMBA National Environment Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 
2004 
NEMLA National Environmental Management Laws Amendment 
Act 14 of 2013 
NEMPAA National Environment Management: Protected Areas Act 
57 of 2003 
NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation 
NW   North West Province (South Africa) 
xv 
 
NWCRU  National Wildlife Crime Reaction Unit  
OSCAP  Outraged South African Citizens Against Rhino Poaching 
PHASA  Professional Hunters’ Association of South Africa 
RhODIS  Rhino DNA Index System 
PPF   Peace Parks Foundation 
PROA   Private Rhino Owners Association 
RIM   Rhino Issue Management 
RMA   Regulated Market Approach 
SAHGCA South African Hunters and Game Conservation 
Association 
SANParks  South African National Parks 
SAPS   South African Police Service 
SRI   Save the Rhino International 
TAC   Technical Advisory Committee 
TCM   Traditional Chinese Medicine 
TCP   Traditional Chinese Pharmacopoeia 
TOPS   Threatened or Protected Species 
TraCC  Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center 
xvi 
 
TRAFFIC  Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network 
UAV   Unmanned aerial vehicle 
WC   Western Cape Province (South Africa) 
WESSA  Wildlife and Environmental Society of Southern Africa 
WRSA  Wildlife Ranching South Africa 
WWF   World Wide Fund for Nature 
WWF-ARP  WWF- African Rhino Program 
 
xvii 
 
GLOSSARY 
Anti-trade: In this thesis it refers to people or organisations which do 
not support legal trade in rhino horn. 
CITES: An international agreement between states (governments) 
to ensure that international trade in wild animals and 
plants does not threaten their survival (Hanks, 2015a). 
Community conservation: Conservation which allows neighbouring 
communities to benefit from the conservation 
activities (Els & Bothma, 2010). 
CoP: The main decision-making body of CITIES and 
comprising all its member states (Duffy, 2010). 
Dolus eventualis: Latin for “intention imputed because of an awareness of 
possibility (since the result, though not intended, is 
foreseen as a possibility) (Hiemstra & Gonin, 1992). 
Offtake: Removal of rhino by means of legal hunting. 
Occupatio: Latin for “appropriation of ownerless property” (Hiemstra 
& Gonin, 1992). 
Pachyderm: A group of large mammals that includes elephants, 
rhinoceroses and hippopotamuses (Cambridge advanced 
learner's dictionary, 2013). 
Poaching: Illegal hunting of any animal (Duffy, 2010). 
xviii 
 
Pro-trade: In this thesis it refers to people and organisations which 
support a legal trade in rhino horn. 
Range: Area or country where a specific species of rhino occurs. 
Rei vindicatio: Latin for “recovery of property by the owner from any 
person in possession of it” (Hiemstra & Gonin, 1992). 
Res nullius: Latin for “belonging to no one” (Hiemstra & Gonin, 1992). 
Sustainable use: The use of wildlife without jeopardising the continued 
survival of species (Duffy, 2000). 
Traditio:  Latin for “delivery” (Hiemstra & Gonin, 1992). 
TRAFFIC: The leading non-governmental organisation working 
globally on trade in wild animals and plants in the context 
of both biodiversity conservation and sustainable 
development (Hanks, 2015a). 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Rhinos are the most threatened large mammal species in the world (Brebner, 
2013:31). All five species of rhino have been subjected to human exploitation 
in the past, and are consequently threatened with extinction. 
In Africa, rhino numbers originally dropped because of hunting, until 
conservation measures were implemented; subsequently, rhinos have been 
poached for their horn. Africa has lost approximately 100,000 rhinos since 
1970. In South Africa alone, more than 4,000 rhinos have been lost since 
2000. The numbers of one of the African species – the black rhino, Diceros 
bicornis, fell from 100,000 in 1960 to 5,000 in 2013. Another African species – 
the northern white rhino, Ceratotherium simum cottoni, declined from 2000 in 
1970 to a single population of 17 in 1984, down to six (6) in 2014 (‘t Sas-
Rolfes, 1997a:1-2). The estimated number of white and black rhino in Africa is 
shown in Table 1.1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Table 1.1: Estimated white and black rhino numbers by subspecies and 
countries as at October 2013. 
Countries, 
Subspecies, 
and Range 
White Rhino Black Rhino 
C.s. 
cottoni 
C.s. 
simum 
Total Trend D.b. 
bicornis 
D.b. 
michaeli 
D.b. 
minor 
Total Trend 
(northern) (southern)   (south- 
western) 
(eastern) (southern- 
central) 
  
Angola     1   1  
Botswana  185 185 Up   9 9 Up 
Kenya 4 390 394 Up  631  631 Up 
Malawi       26 26 Up 
Mozambique  1 1 Down      
Namibia  524 524 Up 1,750   1,750 Up 
South Africa  18,933 18,933 Up 208 68 1,792 2,068 Stable 
Swaziland  84 84 Stable   18 18 Up 
Tanzania      100 27 127 Up? 
Uganda  14 14 Up      
Zambia  10 10 Up   27 27 Stable 
Zimbabwe  284 284 Down   424 424 Down 
2012 Total 4 20,425 20,429 Up 1,959 799 2,323 5,081 Up 
2010 Total 4 20,160 20,164  1,920 740 2,220 4,880  
Source: Milliken, 2014:15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
In Asia, the Javan rhino, Rhinoceros sondaicus, and the Sumatran rhino, 
Dicerorhinus sumatrensis, were mainly eliminated through habitat loss, 
although poaching also played an important role. The Indian rhino (greater 
one-horned rhino), Rhinoceros unicornis, has been facing a drop in numbers 
due to habitat loss, hunting and poaching. 
Asian rhinos are at enormous risk. The Javan rhino historically roamed from 
north-eastern India through Myanmar, Thailand, Combodia, Laos, Vietnam, 
and Indonesia. In 2015, there were just 63 Javan rhinos left in the wild. The 
Sumatran rhino population was estimated at fewer than 100 individuals in 
2015, located in small pockets in Sumatra and Kalimantan in Indonesia. The 
species was officially declared extinct in the wild in Malaysia in 2015. 
Approximately 3,500 Indian rhinos remain in Nepal and north-eastern India 
(World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 2015). 
Although there is no scientific proof of its medicinal value, rhino horn is highly 
prized in traditional Asian medicine. Rhino horn carvings are increasingly 
being used as prestige gifts among the wealthy elite. Almost all rhino horn 
sourced from Africa continues to be sold to countries in East and Southeast 
Asia for use in traditional Asian medicine, and to Yemen for making jambiya 
(traditional dagger) handles. China, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, South Korea and Vietnam have all been implicated as having a role 
in the illicit trade in horn coming from Africa, with particular concern over the 
increasing and highly organised role of Vietnamese nationals since 2004. 
WWF-SA and TRAFFIC’s Greater Mekong Programme Office (GMPO) 
conducted research in Vietnam in 2013. This research surveyed 720 people in 
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Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. It was found that buyers and users of rhino horn 
primarily consider it a status symbol to be given to family members, business 
colleagues or people in positions of authority (WWF, 2013). 
Other rhino products are also in demand for traditional Asian medicine, with 
two incidents recorded in South Africa during 2004, involving the attempted 
export (by Vietnamese nationals) of rhino genitals and dried intestines 
(Milledge, 2007:98). At one time, the Calcutta Zoo found a ready market for 
small bottles of urine from their captive Indian rhino (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 
1982:31). 
According to ‘t Sas-Rolfes (1997b:26), a series of events in the Middle East 
precipitated a rhino conservation crisis. By the late 1970s, CITES had started 
to become operational, and in 1975 the white rhino and the three Asian 
species were listed on CITES Appendix I. The black rhino was moved to 
Appendix I in 1977. Since 1994, the South African population of white rhino 
has been downlisted to Appendix II, and this has allowed trade in live animals 
and trophy hunting. The implication of the aforementioned Appendices will be 
explained in section 2.2.2. 
The rhino trophy hunting market has encouraged increased private sector 
investment in live rhino production and expansion of habitat in South Africa in 
the last 20 years. White rhino numbers in South Africa were estimated at 
approximately 20, 170 animals in December 2012 (Emslie, 2012:6). In South 
Africa, rhino farming was seen as an economic venture to provide for the 
growing trophy hunting industry. Since the increase in poaching, the risks 
outweigh the economic incentives involved in rhino farming. Increasing risks, 
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and costs related to protection, together with declining incentives, led to some 
private owners looking to get rid of their rhino. 
Vietnam and China have experienced an increase in demand in recent years; 
consequently, the price of rhino horn has increased. In 2013, the price of rhino 
horn increased to $60,000 per kilogram. According to a report  compiled by 
the Dalberg Global Development Advisors (WWF/Dalberg, 2012:11) rhino 
horn is more valuable, on the black market, than diamonds and cocaine, and 
poaching is seen as a far less risky criminal operation than the drug trade. 
Criminal networks keep plundering wildlife, with little regard for the 
consequences. Illegal wildlife trade is therefore a low-risk business with high 
returns.  
As with tiger products and abalone, the involvement of powerful and influential 
criminal cartels such as the Mafia, the triads and Yakuza, presents a real 
problem for enforcement of international regulations such as the CITES trade 
ban. Criminal networks that deal in drugs and people trafficking were attracted 
by the wildlife trade, because of the low risk compared with that of drug 
trafficking (Duffy, 2010:118).  
Rhino horn commanded such high prices that dealers viewed buying horn as 
an investment, and the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) reported in 
the early 1990s that 10 tonnes of horn were stockpiled in China and Taiwan 
(Duffy, 2010:119). It appeared that dealers were trying to cash in on the high 
prices of rhino horn by making it scarcer through stockpiling. The poachers, 
most of the time poor locals, are usually the only ones caught, leaving the 
masterminds and their network safe and operational. 
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These high profits led to the establishment of well-organised international 
poaching cyndicates, which deploy advanced technologies ranging from night 
vision scopes to darting equipment and helicopters, to carry out their mission. 
Poachers have intensified their search for rhino horn, driven by growing 
market demands in Asia. 
These poachers have also recruited pseudo-hunters, including Vietnamese 
citizens and Thai prostitutes, as well as Czech and Polish nationals, as a 
means of exporting rhino horn to Vietnam. South Africa has since stepped up 
its response by suspending the issue of hunting permits to Vietnamese 
nationals, in April 2012. 
The sharp rise in the price of rhino horn even causes theft from museums and 
private premises. According to Milliken and Shaw (2012:10), at least 65 rhino 
horns have been stolen from public displays in South Africa, and a minimum 
of 46 horns have been taken from European institutions. In April 2014, 40 
horns worth more than R160 million were stolen from the offices of the 
Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency in Nelspruit, Mpumalanga. A rise in 
the number of antique rhino horn objects and trophies sold through auction 
houses, has also raised concerns about the final destination of the items. 
The current rate of growth in the number of rhinos exceeds the number of 
deaths, but at the current rate of poaching, rhinos will, in the near future, slide 
into a negative growth rate, and eventually face extinction. 
As rhinos become increasingly threatened, increasing levels of human 
intervention are required to protect them. The escalation in poaching has 
exposed the weaknesses of current rhino protection measures. It is a simple 
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but undeniable fact that if there were no demand for rhino horn, there would 
be little or no rhino poaching. Controlling the illegal supply of horn through 
anti-poaching measures is a very expensive strategy, and its long-term 
effectiveness is threatened by declining budgets (Emslie & Brooks, 1999:25). 
In practice, declining government grants have tended to particularly threaten 
capital and operational budgets. Apart from affecting field conservation efforts, 
inadequate operational and capital budgets are demoralising for staff working 
in the field (Emslie & Brooks,1999:33). Under such circumstances, by helping 
to support operational programmes and capital purchases, donor agencies 
can play a critical role in helping to keep many of the successful rhino 
conservation areas a success. The Howard Buffett Foundation, for instance, 
has recently donated R255 million towards rhino conservation. This is a three-
year initiative to combat rhino poaching in the KNP (Thakuli, 2014:9). 
While demand for rhino horn has been the underlying cause of the declining 
rhino population, poverty, corruption, civil wars, lack of institutional capacity 
and inadequate government expenditure have all facilitated poaching. 
Species conservation is typically implemented either through the designation 
of protected areas, or through regulations to protect vulnerable or important 
species. However, in the developing world, resource constraints greatly limit 
the ability of governments to implement conservation legislation (Rowcliffe, De 
Merode & Cowlishaw, 2004:2631). 
During the 1970s, and throughout the 1980s, rebel forces fighting against their 
respective governments in Mozambique and Angola are also reported to have 
killed pachyderms in large numbers, in order to finance their military 
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operations. Africa’s recent spate of civil wars have been the source of 
automatic weapons and ammunition used by the poachers (Thomson, 
1992:27). 
In the decade 1970 to 1980, consumption levels in the major consumer 
markets appeared to be less than the amount of horn leaving Africa. 
According to Emslie and Brooks (1999:29), this led to the theory that some 
horn wholesalers and middlemen may have been stockpiling rhino horn as a 
speculative investment. Such activity may have been based on the 
assumption that, as rhinos became rare (or extinct), supplies of horn would 
decrease, allowing massive increases in the price of existing illegal horn 
stocks. 
The current poaching crisis in South Africa has provoked a great deal of 
debate about the best way to stop poaching and save African rhino 
populations, as well as what approach, or combination of approaches, ought 
to be adopted to ensure that rhino population numbers continue to grow. 
Private owners of rhino are also developing a range of increasingly innovative 
approaches to make rhinos less attractive to poachers and end-users, 
including dehorning, as well as introducing dye or even poison into the rhino 
horn. These methods have limited applicability and sizeable cost implications. 
Rhino numbers in the rest of Africa have declined to such an extent that South 
Africa holds about 93% of the African population of white rhino, and an 
estimated 36% of all black rhino (Endangered Wildlife Trust, 2013a:9). Figures 
compiled by the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) (Table 1.2) show 
a dramatic increase in poaching over recent years: 
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Table 1.2: Rhino (black and white) poaching statistics: South Africa.  
Source: South Africa. Department of Environmental Affairs, 2015:n.p. 
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As far as the black rhino is concerned, there are three subspecies indigenous 
to South Africa: 
- the southern-central black rhino, Diceros bicornis minor, which 
also occur in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Tanzania.  
- the eastern black rhino, Diceros bicornis michaeli, which occur in 
the Addo Elephant National Park. 
- the south-western black rhino, Diceros bicornis bicornis, which  
also occur in Namibia, Kenya and Tanzania. 
As far as the white rhino is concerned, South Africa has one subspecies, 
namely the southern white rhino, Ceratotherium simum simum. This 
subspecies also occurs in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and out-of-range 
Kenya, Zambia and the Ivory Coast.  
When the poaching impact in South Africa is considered in terms of the two 
rhino species, white rhinos have been more affected. Although white rhinos 
are far more numerous in South Africa than black rhinos, losses are 
proportionally higher. Black rhinos form more than 9% of all rhinos in South 
Africa, yet account for only 4.5% of the deaths recorded from 1990 to 30 April 
2012 (Milliken & Shaw, 2012:72).  
1.2 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
Rhino poaching has become a serious international concern, particularly in 
the conservation fraternity. Rhinos are threatened with extinction, because 
they are being poached for their horn. The common view is that rhino 
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poaching is morally wrong, and associated with greed and evil intentions (‘t 
Sas-Rolfes, 1990:1). 
Society is in general agreement that rhino poaching must be stopped; 
however, there are two schools of thought regarding two main approaches 
(usually in association with certain other techniques) to be used, in order to 
prevent rhino poaching. 
The first school of thought refers to those who believe that the rhino horn 
trade is wrong, and therefore has to be stopped. This can only be achieved by 
eliminating demand, mainly through the restrictions on trade. This attitude 
towards the problem, which is the same as that which motivated the ivory ban 
in 1989, is referred to by ‘t Sas-Rolfes (1993:8) as the “conventional 
approach”. 
The second school of thought follows an alternative approach, and sees the 
overexploitation of biological resources as the result of underinvestment, and 
argues that any solution to the rhino poaching problem must address the 
underlying economic forces driving the process (‘t Sas-Rolfes, 1993:9). This 
point of view is also referred to as "sustainable use". The promoters of this 
school are in favour of legal trade in rhino horn. In South Africa, the Cabinet 
has approved the development and submission of a proposal, by the 
Department of Environmental Affairs, to the Seventeenth Conference of the 
Parties of CITES, in 2016, to be held in South Africa, to lift the ban on 
international rhino horn trade and introduce it in a regulated format. 
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Supporters of each school have raised various arguments in favour of their 
preferred school of thought, and against the other. This issue will be dealt with 
in the literature review in Chapter 2.  
The focus of this study is on an investigation of the aforementioned 
approaches – more specifically, the viability of the alternative approach, as, at 
first sight, it seems that the trade ban is no longer effective. 
The possibility of legalising national (domestic) trade in rhino horn (within 
South Africa) has already been investigated by the South African Department 
of Environmental Affairs (DEA) (Taylor, Brebner, Coetzee, Davies-Mostert, 
Lindsey, Shaw & ‘t Sas-Rolfes, 2014), hence the purpose of this study is to 
investigate the viability of legalising the international trade in rhino horn, and 
to comment on, as well as add some value to, the arguments already raised 
by the experts and other roleplayers, in this regard. 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Growth in the market demand for rhino horn threatens to outpace the potential 
rate of supply; hence market prices should continue to rise. This makes rhino 
horn worthy of the attention of entrepeneurs who engage in rhino horn trade. 
Rising prices could induce speculative buying and stockpiling. This, in turn, 
inevitably leads to more poaching. 
Various strategies and techniques are currently in place to help combat the 
onslaught on rhino in South Africa, including the following: 
- Dehorning 
- Treatment of the horn with poison/chemical substance 
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- More intensive law enforcement/increased security 
- Translocation 
- Demand reduction 
Although the aforementioned strategies contribute towards addressing the 
poaching problem to a certain extent, the root of the problem (the increasing 
demand and illegal supply) is not being attended to, leading to an escalation 
in rhino poaching.  
Keeping in mind the high levels of rhino poaching – not only in South Africa, 
but also in other countries in Africa, it seems that the trade ban imposed by 
CITES is not effective any longer. Different circumstances prevail today, from 
those of ten to twenty years ago.  The CITES ban on trade is being criticised 
by rhino owners and conservationists as being ineffective, and the horn has 
become worth more than the animal itself. The attention of illegal traders has 
shifted from buying horn domestically, and moving it out of South Africa 
illegally, to poaching rhino domestically and moving the horn out of South 
Africa illegally – but, in this case, leaving the animal dead.  
At the 2016 meeting of CITES, the delegates of the member countries will 
have to decide whether or not to legalise international trade. The onus will be 
on the supporters of the sustainable use approach to prove that trading of 
rhino horn will unequivocally work, and that the lifting of the ban on 
international rhino horn trade will not be detrimental to rhino populations, and 
will do away with poaching and illegal trade. The promotors of this approach 
will need a two-thirds majority. 
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The problem statement of this research is therefore the following:  
“Despite the ban on international trade in rhino horn, poaching of rhino has 
increased. Poaching syndicates have capitalised on the CITES ban”.  
As long as there is a demand for rhino horn, effective means of supplying it 
without killing the animal, needs to be developed. 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
According to De Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport  (2011:323), research 
questions form the backbone of the qualitative design. It is important that the 
research questions, conceptual framework, design and methods, are 
compatible. 
The research questions in this thesis are as follows: 
- Does the CITES ban on international trade in rhino horn provide 
an effective measure to stop or prevent poaching? 
- Can the lifting of the ban on international trade in rhino horn 
discourage poaching and save the rhino from extinction? 
- How can legal trade be regulated internationally? 
1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The objectives of the study are as follows: 
1.5.1 To discuss the following topics: 
1.5.1.1 The legal position, with regard to poaching of rhinos in South 
Africa. 
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1.5.1.2 The legal position regarding ownership of rhinos in South Africa  
1.5.1.3 Sustainable use 
1.5.2 To evaluate the effectiveness of the following strategies to prevent or 
stop poaching: 
1.5.2.1 DNA profiling 
1.5.2.2 Dehorning 
1.5.2.3 Poisoning/chemical treatment of the horn 
1.5.2.4 Law enforcement 
1.5.2.5 Demand reduction 
1.5.2.6 Translocation 
1.5.3 To investigate the following: 
1.5.3.1 The effectiveness of the ban on international trade in rhino horn 
1.5.3.2 The viability of legalising international trade in rhino horn 
1.6 CHAPTER OUTLINE OF THESIS 
The research study is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
Chapter 3: Research methodology 
Chapter 4: Results and discussion 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and recommendations 
1.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented information pertaining to the different species of rhino 
worldwide, as well as the numbers of the different species still alive in the wild 
in certain countries. Reasons for the decline in numbers are also given. The 
problem statement, research questions and objectives of the study, are also 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the necessary information to understand the context of 
the topic of this research project. 
The legal position regarding the protection of rhinos in South Africa, as well as 
the importance of wildlife conservation will be discussed. 
The concept of poaching and the effectiveness of certain strategies to 
stop/prevent poaching will be investigated. 
Different views on sustainable use, the viability of legalising international trade 
in rhino horn and the effectiveness of the CITES ban on international trade in 
rhino horn will be discussed. 
2.2 LEGAL POSITION PERTAINING TO THE PROTECTION OF RHINOS 
The legal position regarding wild animals is also closely related to 
“ownership”, which will be dealt with in section 2.3. 
The regulation of wild animals in South Africa has three concurrent sources: 
international treaties and agreements, national legislation and provincial 
ordinances. While each operates in a somewhat different sphere, they also 
overlap and strongly influence one another (Strydom & King, 2014:395). 
2.2.1 National legislation 
In terms of section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 
108 of 1996 (South Africa, 1996a), everyone has the right – 
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(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-
being; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and 
future generations, through reasonable legislative and other 
measures that – 
  (i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
  (ii) promote conservation; and 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of 
natural resources while promoting justifiable economic 
and social development. 
According to Glazewski (2005:68), the environmental right, and other rights 
relevant to environmental concerns, ought to be seen against the backdrop of 
international trends and developments, including “soft law” developments. 
Many of these international soft law declarations, conventions and other 
instruments allude to the environmental and related rights now contained in 
the Constitution. 
In South Africa, nature conservation has historically always been under the 
purview of the provinces. The Constitution respects this historical position by 
stipulating that “nature conservation, excluding national parks, national 
botanical gardens and marine resources” is a matter of concurrent national 
and provincial competence. 
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2.2.1.1 Framework Environmental Legislation: National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) (South Africa, 1998a) 
NEMA was passed in November 1998, and came into force on 29 January 
1999 (South Africa, 1999). NEMA contains an extensive list of principles that 
apply throughout the Republic to the actions of all the organs of state that may 
significantly affect the environment. Section 2(4)(a)(vi) states that “the 
development, use and exploitation of renewable resources and the 
ecosystems of which they are part do not exceed the level beyond which their 
integrity is jeopardised”. 
2.2.1.2 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 
2004 (NEMBA) (South Africa, 2004a) 
NEMBA was promulgated in June 2004, and most of its provisions came into 
force with a Government Notice published in the Government Gazette of 1 
September 2004 (South Africa, 2004b). 
The overall purpose of NEMBA, as set out in the preamble and the objectives 
section, is as follows: 
- The management and conservation of South Africa’s biodiversity 
and its components. 
- The protection of species and ecosystems that warrant national 
protection. 
- The sustainable use of indigenous biological resources. 
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- The fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from 
bioprospecting, including indigenous biological resources. 
- The establishment of a South African National Biodiversity 
Institute. 
To achieve the abovementioned objectives, the Minister may, in terms of 
section 9(1)(a), publish norms and standards in the Government Gazette, 
including those for the management and conservation of the country’s 
biodiversity and its components, or for the restriction of activities which impact 
on biodiversity. 
Chapter 1 of NEMBA provides that the Act gives effect to conventions 
affecting biodiversity; this would include CITES. 
Chapter 4 of NEMBA focuses on the protection of threatened and protected 
ecosystems and species. The purpose of Chapter 4 is to do the following: 
- Provide for the protection of ecosystems that are threatened or 
in need of protection to ensure the maintenance of their 
ecological integrity. 
- Provide for the protection of species that are threatened or in 
need of protection to ensure their survival in the wild. 
- Give effect to South Africa’s international obligations under 
agreements regulating international trade in “specimens” of 
endangered species, such as CITES. 
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- Ensure that the utilisation of biodiversity is managed in an 
ecologically sustainable way. 
The Minister may, in terms of section 56(1), publish in the Government 
Gazette a list of “critically endangered species”, “endangered species”, 
“vulnerable species” and “protected species”. Activities involving these listed 
species are either restricted, or in some cases prohibited, in terms of section 
60(1). 
The Threatened and Protected Species regulations (TOPS), published in the 
Government Gazette of 16 April 2013 (South Africa, 2013a), apply to the 
carrying out of restricted activities, including specimens of species that have 
been listed in terms of section 56 of NEMBA as threatened or protected 
(South Africa, 2013a). 
Both the black and white rhino are included on the list of threatened or 
protected species, in terms of section 56(1) of NEMBA: 
- Black rhino, Diceros bicornis – Endangered species: indigenous 
species facing a high risk of extinction in the wild in the near 
future, although it is not a critically endangered species; and 
- White rhino, Cerathotherium simmum – Protected species: 
indigenous species of high conservation value or national 
importance, that requires national protection (South Africa, 
2004a). 
According to the Endangered Wildlife Trust (2013a:15), these species may 
have a different classification in the provincial legislation, but this does not 
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affect their national classification. Where provincial legislation provides for 
less stringent measures, with regard to rhino, than stipulated in national 
legislation, the national legislation will apply. 
Enforcement of the provisions of NEMBA and its subsidiary legislation is 
shared across various tiers of government. More specifically, it comes within 
the jurisdiction of the Environmental Management Inspectorate, a network of 
national, provincial and local government officials. The Inspectorate enjoys 
broad enforcement powers, including inspection, search, seizure and powers 
of arrest, as well as the administrative authority to issue compliance notices. 
In order to curb pseudo-hunting of rhinos, norms and standards for the 
marking of rhinos and rhino horn, and for the hunting of rhino for trophy 
hunting purposes, were published in the Government Gazette of 20 July 2009 
(South Africa, 2009a). This notice was replaced by a later notice published in 
the Government Gazette of 10 April 2012 (South Africa, 2012). 
The latter makes provision for new norms and standards, according to which 
all live rhinos sold and transported have to be microchipped. All rhino horns, 
regardless of how they were acquired, have to be microchipped within five 
days. In addition to the microchips, if the horn, or part of it, is more than 5 
centimetres in length, the issuing authority is required to mark it with indelible 
ink. This information is currently kept and updated in a national database. The 
new norms and standards also state that when live rhinos are darted in order 
to be moved, samples of the horn and blood have to be collected for DNA 
sampling. 
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Regarding trophy hunting, in addition to the application for a hunting permit, 
applicants have to submit proof of membership of a hunting association 
recognised by the applicant’s country of residence, a curriculum vitae 
indicating the applicant’s experience, proof of previous experience in hunting 
an African species, and a copy of the applicant’s passport. A hunter can only 
hunt one white rhino for trophy purposes within a 12-month period. 
The horns, together with the rest of the trophy, have to be transported by a 
duly authorised person directly to the taxidermist or similar facility, to be 
processed and prepared for export. 
2.2.1.3 Moratorium on the national trading in rhino horn 
Currently, the domestic trade in rhino horn and derivatives are prohibited, in 
terms of a national moratorium published in the Government Gazette of 13 
February 2009 (South Africa, 2009b), in an attempt to stop rhino horn bought 
legally in the domestic market, being exported illegally. 
At the Rhino Summit in October 2010, hosted by the Minister of Water and 
Environmental Affairs, the Department agreed to commission a feasibility 
study to determine the viability of the legalisation of trade in rhino horn in 
South Africa (Taylor et al., 2014:7). These authors came to the following 
conclusion:  
South Africa should not lift the national moratorium at the present 
time. However, it should immediately start developing a secure 
national electronic permitting system to bring non-compliance issues 
under control. This must be linked to a rhino database that includes 
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rhino horn stockpile and DNA profile information. Private rhino 
owners must be incentivised to continue protecting rhinos during this 
period. 
According to the team who investigated the implications of lifting or not lifting 
the national moratorium, the following would be the implications of the lifting of 
the moratorium (Taylor et al., 2014): 
(i) Lifting the national moratorium may lead to laundering of illegal 
rhino horn into legal trade, and leakage of rhino horn into the 
illegal international market. 
(ii) Lifting the national moratorium may tarnish South Africa’s 
international conservation reputation. 
(iii) Lifting the national moratorium may result in/lead to compliance 
and enforcement challenges. 
(iv) Lifting the national moratorium may send conflicting messages to 
CITES about South Africa’s position on trade. 
(v) Lifting the national moratorium will do little to reduce poaching. 
The implications of not lifting the national moratorium would be as follows 
(Taylor et al., 2014:85):  
(i) The incentive to poach rhinos will remain high. (This seems to be 
a contradiction in the findings of these authors.) 
(ii) Protecting rhinos may become financially unsustainable and lead 
some private rhino owners to de-stock. 
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(iii) Live-sale prices of rhinos may decrease, and reduce the 
incentive to protect them. 
(iv) Storing rhino horn will become an increasing security risk for 
private owners. 
(v)  Private rhino owners may consider taking legal action against 
the South African government. 
(vi) Illegal activities might be perversely stimulated rather than 
reduced. 
The aforementioned implications could also apply to lifting or not lifting the 
ban on international trade in rhino horn. 
2.2.1.4 The National Environmental Management Laws Amendment Act 
(NEMLA) Act 14 of 2013 
NEMLA is aimed at strengthening the regulatory and enforcement 
requirements, to prevent the abuse of the permitting system. It was 
promulgated in 2013 (South Africa, 2013d), and is the first of a two-part piece 
of legislation dealing with management of the environment. 
NEMLA ensures that even a person who has knowledge of a crime being 
committed, can be charged and convicted of the offence. In terms of NEMLA, 
any specimens in transit through the country must have the necessary 
documentation. This will help to prevent the movement of illegal specimens. 
NEMLA will also strengthen the regulatory and enforcement provisions in the 
hunting industry. It allows the Minister to limit the number of permits that can 
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be issued, in order to protect the species. An issuing authority will, in future, 
be able to suspend, defer or refuse a permit. 
2.2.1.5 The South African Government’s strategies to protect rhino 
2.2.1.5.1 Biodiversity Management Plan for Black Rhino 
The Biodiversity Management Plan for Black Rhino in South Africa was 
published in the Government Gazette of 25 January 2013 (South Africa, 
2013b). This plan forms part of the South African government’s efforts to 
ensure the survival of South Africa’s rhino population. The 10-year (or short- 
term) conservation goal is to achieve an average South African meta-
population growth rate for the two sub-species of black rhino, of at least 5% 
per annum. The plan further states that protection remains a key activity to 
minimise rhino losses from illegal activity, through effective law enforcement, 
improved labour relations and effective criminal investigation and prosecution, 
as well as the securing and monitoring of rhino horn stockpiles. 
2.2.1.5.2 National Strategy for the Safety and Security of Rhinoceros 
Populations in South Africa 
This strategy was adopted in 2010, by the Department of Environmental 
Affairs (2011). The strategy was necessitated by a drastic increase in the 
number of incidents of rhino poaching in South Africa, and the continued 
leakage of certain horn stocks into the international illegal trade. The strategy 
is applicable to all relevant law enforcement and conservation agencies, as 
well as private land owners, non-governmental bodies, and communities 
involved in the management of rhino populations.  
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The purpose of the strategy is to provide guiding principles to inform decision-
making processes, strategic planning, and operations, aimed at reducing the 
effects of poaching on rhino species, as well as to ensure the successful 
arrest, conviction and sentencing of poachers, illegal traders and crime 
syndicates operating locally, nationally, regionally and internationally.  
The purpose is to also provide better control and monitoring of rhino horn 
stockpile management, and to promote improved management of the 
conditions under which rhino may be legally hunted. 
The strategy sets out to inform strategic planning and critical intervention 
aimed at the following: 
- Implementing an immediate action plan aimed at mitigating the 
current escalation in the poaching of rhino and the illegal trade in 
rhino horn. 
- Securing the shared commitment of government (at national and 
provincial level), private land owners, local communities and 
international stakeholders, as well as the necessary financial and 
manpower resources and political will to implement this policy. 
- Supporting the establishment of a national coordination structure 
for information management, law enforcement response, 
investigation and prosecution. 
- Developing an integrated and coordinated national information 
management system for all information related to rhino species, 
in order to adequately inform security-related decisions. 
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- Investigating proactive security measures aimed at facilitating 
regulated and controlled international trade in rhino species and 
associated by-products. 
According to a media statement by the DEA, on 6 August 2014 the South 
African government decided on integrated strategic interventions for the 
management of rhinoceros in South Africa (Department of Environmental 
Affairs, 2015a). 
2.2.1.5.3 Integrated Strategic Management 
In order to address the growing poaching problem, the South African 
government decided to implement a more vigorous integrated strategic 
management approach, aimed at reducing the threat to rhinos, as well as 
improving the biological management of the species. The integrated 
interventions adopted by the government are as follows: 
- Compulsory interventions, which include proactive anti-poaching 
initiatives, the implementation and improvement of actionable 
intelligence, as well as the introduction of responsive legislation 
and policy amendments to address rhino poaching. 
- The increase in the rhino numbers through, for example, 
translocation to low risk areas, as well as range- and population 
expansion. 
- International and national collaboration and cooperation. During 
2013 and 2014, the DEA concluded several Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs) with Mozambique, Vietnam and the 
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People’s Republic of China. The DEA is also working with the 
Peace Parks Foundation (PPF), the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF) and the Security Cluster, on a project to be driven by the 
Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre (TraCC). 
The TraCC project involves looking at the concept of "following 
the money”, in order to crack syndicate enterprises by analysing 
relevant information to detect and trace funds and monies used 
in rhino poaching activities (Department of Environmental Affairs, 
2015a). 
- Long-term sustainability measures. The long-term sustainable 
solutions are linked to the creation of alternative economic 
opportunities for communities bordering on protected areas, 
creating incentives to promote/facilitate rhino ownership, and the 
consolidation of rhino populations across different land uses in 
South Africa, including national, provincial, private and 
communal land. 
2.2.1.5.4 Rhino Issue Management (RIM) 
RIM was set up in 2012 to help the development of a common understanding 
of the main issues concerning the protection and sustainable conservation of 
rhino. The team investigated rhino conservation, safety and security, as well 
as rhino commerce and trade. RIM compiled a report in 2013 (Department of 
Environmental Affairs, 2013:29), and recommended the re-establishment of 
legitimate trade in rhino horn, as well as the preparation of an immediate 
application to CITES based on the following: 
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- Banning trade has not reduced poaching in the face of increased 
demand. 
- Rhino do not need to die for the horn to be harvested. 
- State-owned horn can be sold to improve wild rhino protection, 
and to contribute to conservation budgets. 
- South Africa should control all sales, using an appropriate 
model, and protecting against predatory buying tactics. 
- South Africa should use, as part of its application to CITES and 
as part of its lobbying process, the first econometric 
“Rhinonomics” model. 
- South Africa should remove the moratorium on domestic trade. 
- Demand side management strategies should be agreed on with 
consuming nations. 
2.2.1.5.5 Committee of Inquiry investigating the feasibility of trading  
in rhino horn 
On 10 February 2015, the Minister of Environmental Affairs introduced the 
Committee of Inquiry tasked with investigating the feasibility of trade in rhino 
horn (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2015b). Due to the technical 
nature of the issues to be discussed by the Committee, a Technical Advisory 
Committee (TAC) has been established. The TAC, comprising the directors-
general of the departments of the ministries represented in the Inter-
Ministerial Committee (IMC), will facilitate the processes, and ensure that both 
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technical and strategic matters are adequately addressed before reports 
and/or recommendations are submitted to the IMC for consideration. 
The 21-member committee would report to the IMC before the end of 2015. 
The committee comprises a cross-section of stakeholders from both the public 
and private sectors – leaders in their field who have been selected based on 
their extensive expertise. This includes representatives from law enforcement 
agencies, SANParks, the scientific community, the immigration service, the 
revenue service, the conservation industry, private wildlife owners and 
community organisations, as well as NGOs and traditional leadership. 
The Committee has to investigate, evaluate, report, and make 
recommendations relating to a diverse set of key areas, inter alia: 
- Incentivising the trade and possession of rhino as a live 
commodity, by developing an enhanced understanding of current 
forms of investment, drivers and incentives. 
- Strategic, targeted, culturally sensitive demand management 
initiatives. 
- If trade was to be an option, the potential models/mechanisms 
for trade, and criteria/conditions had to be established. Issues to 
be considered included models – strictly controlled trade, i.e. 
once-off sale of stockpiles; government-to-government trade or 
more open regulated trade; sources of specimens to be traded; 
the benefits and risks associated with the different options; 
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possible trade partners and the criteria to be met by these 
states; conditions; and, finally, the financial mechanisms. 
- The response/change in the market; implications; and the 
mechanisms to respond to that change (demand and supply 
issues and the anticipated changes if trade is introduced, 
interventions enhanced or new interventions implemented, and 
the measures/interventions to manage or respond to these 
changes). 
- The socio-economic impact and potential benefits to 
communities, farmers, conservation authorities and rhino and 
elephant conservation, including the economic opportunities for 
communities from wildlife management, and the risks posed by 
wildlife trafficking – e.g. infiltration of criminal elements in 
communities. 
- The criticisms or concerns relating to trade, and the means to 
address them. 
- Engagement strategies for the various role players involved, with 
a special focus on communities.  
The first stakeholder meeting was held from 25 to 27 March 2015. 
2.2.2 International legislation 
In terms of section 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
the sources of international law are the following: 
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(a) International conventions (treaties) 
(b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law 
(c) The general principles of law recognised by civilised nations 
(d) Judicial decisions 
Treaties are usually seen as the primary source, while custom is the 
secondary source (Dugard, 2005:27). Treaties can be multilateral (binding 
many states) or bilateral (between two states only). Treaties do not become 
part of the law of the country, without legislative transformation.  
According to Kidd (2008:43), there are three principal ways of doing this: 
(i) The treaty document as a whole is included in an Act of 
Parliament. 
(ii) The treaty may be included as a schedule to a statute. 
(iii) An Act may give the  executive power to bring a treaty into effect 
in the law of the country, by means of a proclamation in the 
Government Gazette. 
An international treaty or convention is not binding in South Africa until it has 
been enacted into the law of the country by one of the aforementioned means. 
If South Africa is a party to the treaty, it will be bound on the international 
plane. 
Regulations in terms of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity 
Act 10 of 2004, were published in the Government Gazette of 5 March 2010 
 
 
34 
(South Africa, 2010), whereby CITES regulations were finally incorporated into 
South African legislation. 
The black rhino is listed under Appendix 1, and may therefore not be traded 
internationally, except under exceptional circumstances. However, during the 
13th Conference of the Parties (CoP) held in March 2005, a resolution was 
passed through which South Africa obtained permission to hunt five black 
rhino bulls per annum for trophies, and that these trophies were to be 
exported to the hunters’ countries of residence (Endangered Wildlife Trust, 
2013a:2). 
Since 1994, the white rhino has been listed under Appendix 2, with the 
following annotation:  
For the exclusive purpose of allowing international trade in live 
animals to appropriate and acceptable destinations. All other 
specimens shall be deemed to be specimens included in Appendix 1 
and the trade in them shall be regulated accordingly.  
International trade may therefore take place, but only for the offtake of rhino 
through sport hunting by foreign nationals, and the export of live rhino to 
appropriate and acceptable destinations. All other rhinos are still listed in 
Appendix 1, which means that no international trade may take place. In other 
words, the commercial international sale of rhino horn is prohibited 
(Endangered Wildlife Trust, 2013a:2). 
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2.3 OWNERSHIP OF WILD ANIMALS 
Economic use of wildlife may be for commercial, market-related, economic 
activities, or for subsistence purposes. In the modern world, there is 
considerable emphasis on the commercial aspect of economic activity 
(Tisdell, 2002:51). Consequently, if economic use is to provide an incentive for 
the conservation of wildlife or nature, those responsible for its conservation 
must be able to make a profit or economic gain from it. Whether they can do 
so will be determined by their property rights in wildlife. 
Before 1991, all wildlife in South Africa was treated by law as res nullius or un-
owned property. To reap the benefits of ownership from a wild animal, it had 
to be killed, captured or domesticated. This created an incentive to harvest, 
not protect, valuable wild species. Even if a game rancher paid for a rhino, the 
rancher could not claim compensation if the rhino left his property or was 
killed by a poacher (‘t Sas-Rolfes, 2011b:3). 
The common law classification of wild animals as res nullius presents 
problems that are not adequately dealt with by legislation or judicial 
interpretation of South African law. The fact that wild animals are regarded as 
res nullius means that, save in the exceptional case where someone has 
acquired ownership of them, there are no private law remedies available to 
citizens when wild animals are killed, captured or injured. The common law 
crimes of theft and malicious damage to property are also not applicable. 
Consequently, wild animals would be without any legal protection if it were not 
for specific legislation for their conservation (Rabie, 1996:132). 
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A further consequence of the common law is that, in the absence of 
contractual arrangements concluded for the establishment and management 
of Transfrontier Parks (for instance), or the removal of fences between 
protected areas and private land providing otherwise, wild animals roaming 
out of protected areas, and across international boundaries or onto private 
land not actually, or deemed to be, owned by the State or any other person, 
become res nullius when they stray from the protected areas to private or 
foreign land. These animals fall outside the control of the State, will form part 
of the property rights of private landowners, or be subjected to the laws of the 
neighbouring countries, and would therefore be capable of falling within the 
ownership rights of neighbouring goverments or neighbouring landowners, as 
the case may be. These animals will be at risk of being lost to the State 
(Hopkinson, Van Staden & Ridl, 2008:492). 
When land that is formally protected and managed as a protected area, or as 
part of a protected area, under national or provincial conservation legislation, 
is awarded to private individuals or communities under the land restitution 
process currently under way in South Africa, and such land is de-proclaimed 
as protected area land, the wild animals occurring on such land, if not 
removed by the State prior to de-proclamation, will become res nullius. As 
such, they will form part of the private property rights of the new landowners 
and will be lost to the State (Hopkinson et al., 2008:493). 
It seems, therefore, that one of the foundations of South Africa's legal system, 
the common law, is not compatible with the  South African Constitution, is 
rooted in socio-economic conditions of ancient Eurocentric culture that no 
longer has relevance in a modern South Africa, but, nevertheless, plays a 
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dominant role in the legal relationship between wild animals and society 
(Hopkinson et al., 2008:530). None of the provincial ordinances or provincial 
legislation refers to the ownership of wild animals – which is accordingly left to 
the common law (Glazewski, 2005:377). 
The common law principles regulating the acquisition and loss of ownership of 
wild animals on private game farms, were radically modified by the 
recommendations of the South African Law Commission, following its 1988 
investigation into the acquisition and loss of the ownership of wild animals in 
South Africa. The investigation followed calls by various bodies and persons 
for more effective protection for game farmers. The Law Commission’s 
recommendations provided the basis for the Game Theft Act 105 of 1991 
(GTA), which came into operation on 5 July 1991 (South Africa, 1991). The 
Act regulates the ownership of a certain class of wild animal referred to as 
“game”. Section 1 of the GTA defines “game” as all game kept or held for 
commercial or hunting purposes, including the meat, skin, carcass, or any 
portion of the carcass of the game. 
It appears from section 2 of the GTA that the rei vindicatio and, in appropriate 
circumstances, also the action for trespass, may be instituted against a 
poacher who has entered land against the wishes of the landowner. The GTA 
further provides, in section 3, that any person who enters another person’s 
land with the intent to steal game, or to dispose or lure away game from the 
land, is guilty of an offence, and in order to assist the prosecution, the 
accused, if caught, is presumed to have had the intention to commit these 
offences.  
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Section 7 of the GTA provides that a court, upon the conviction of a person for 
theft of game, or malicious damage to property where the property is game, 
must draw the attention of the complainant to the provisions of section 300 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) (South Africa, 1977), in terms of 
which the court may award a sum of money to a complainant as 
compensation for any damage suffered by them as a result of the actions of 
the accused.  
Magistrates’ courts were originally powered to award higher compensatory 
fines, where game was involved, than the maximum limits laid down in section 
300 of the CPA. It is submitted by Terblanche (1999:488) that the section 300 
procedure is aimed mainly at two situations. The first is where most of the 
evidence which will be necessary to prove a civil claim, has been adduced in 
the course of a criminal trial, and a separate civil matter will mostly amount to 
a duplication. The second is where the injured party is indigent and naive, and 
is unlikely ever to actually institute a civil action. Beyond these two situations, 
it is submitted that the criminal court should leave the matter to a proper civil 
action. 
According to Van der Merwe and Blackbeard (2003:346), reservations have 
been expressed with regard to the exact scope of the main provisions of the 
GTA. In addition to the fact that the game which escapes from an enclosed 
camp does not become res nullius again, the common law principles with 
regard to occupation have been changed in the following respects: 
(i) Firstly, in contrast to the rule of common law confirmed by the 
South African case law, that a hunter who has caught wild 
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animals in contravention of wildlife statutes still becomes the 
owner of his or her quarry, the GTA now allocates the ownership 
of such game to the person from whose land it was caught. 
(ii) Secondly, whereas formerly a hunter (poacher) who caught 
game on another person’s land, without the latter’s permission, 
would still become the owner of the game, subject to being sued 
for trespass under the GTA, ownership of the game is allocated 
to the owner of the land from where it was caught. 
Economic use of wildlife, particularly commercial use of species, may be 
favourable to survival of wildlife, but need not be. This depends upon the 
nature of property rights and the economic profit that can be obtained from 
using a species commercially (Tisdell, 2002:55). 
2.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF WILDLIFE CONSERVATION 
2.4.1 Wildlife and environmental values 
Legislation reflects human decision regarding what is acceptable for the 
society in which one lives. Attitudes to wildlife also reflect the culture and 
society of which one is a product. Fuggle and Rabie (2005:250) give the 
following example: Some people might view the death of the last disease-
bearing tsetse fly with joy, while to others the same occurrence might evoke 
concern because it will pose a threat to wildlife from domestic stock colonising 
new areas. Yet both groups will probably fail to mourn the loss of another 
species of animal (the tsetse fly) to the world. 
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Wildlife conservation is, according to Bailey (1984:9), a social process 
encompassing both lay and professional activities that define and seek to 
attain “wise use” of wildlife resources, and maintain the productivities of 
wildlife habitats. Wildlife includes all free-ranging vertebrates in their naturally 
associated environments. Other definitions of wildlife are much broader, and 
may include all plants and animals in wild ecosystems (Bailey, 1984:5). 
There are many opinions on what uses are wise, and these opinions change 
as national, state or local priorities are buffeted by surpluses and scarcities, 
and by crises such as unemployment, poverty and war. 
An environmental crisis, such as species extinction, is one of the most 
important problems currently facing society. How society deals with this 
problem largely depends how the relationship with nature is perceived (nature 
in this sense includes environment as well as wildlife). Is nature viewed as 
property for society to use, or does nature have intrinsic value, value aside 
from its usefulness to humans? 
Environmental ethics was given a central place in debate among scientists, 
regarding how people extend ethics to the natural environment. According to 
Kortenkamp and Moore (2001:261), environmental ethics is based on the idea 
that morality ought to be extended to include the relationship between 
humans and nature. The ethics discourse is not only related to the level of 
private decisions on environmental issues, as is the case in various lifestyle-
orientated approaches about choices at the individual level. It also includes 
the broader realm of positions taken with regard to societally aggregated 
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decision-making. All decisions have ethical aspects, although the forms and 
degrees may differ (Svedin, 1998:299). 
There are a number of ways to understand an extension of moral 
consideration to nature. For example, is the extension individualistic or 
holistic? In other words, are individual plants and animals given moral 
consideration, or is morality only extended to whole species or ecosystems?  
Another distinction is whether the extension is rights based or responsibility 
based. In other words, does nature have the right to be protected, or do 
humans simply have a responsibility to protect nature? Perhaps the most 
important distinction is whether the moral extension is anthropocentric or 
ecocentric, because this determines what the focus of the environmental ethic 
is – either humans or nature. 
Anthropocentrism considers humans to be the most important form of life 
(Kortenkamp & Moore, 2001:262). Using this ethic, it would be considered 
wrong to kill all rhino because rhino horn contains potential cures for human 
diseases. Sometimes, the moral choices are difficult when an endangered 
species can supply a direct benefit to humanity. Few people would not utilise 
the last members of a species if the alternative was extinction, nor would most 
people shrink from sacrificing them for medical purposes. 
In an ecocentric ethic, nature has moral consideration because it has intrinsic 
value – value aside from its usefulness to humans (Kortenkamp & Moore, 
2001:262). Using this ethic, one could judge that it would be wrong to kill all 
rhinos because it would cause the extinction of the species. This is also 
referred to as the right of species to exist (Elredge, 2001:48). That animals 
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have intrinsic rights and should be protected against abuse, is a notion 
widespread in society. 
The problems pertaining to conservation are not merely related to ethics or 
morality. Humans are part of nature, and are subject to the same unchanging 
ecological laws as are all other species on the planet. All species have a right 
to exist. The ecological processes that support the integrity of the biosphere 
and its many species, landscapes and habitats, are to be maintained. 
The well-being of future generations is the social responsibility of the present 
generation. The present generation should therefore limit its consumption of 
non-renewable resources to the level that is necessary to meet the basic 
needs of society. 
Variety in ethical and cultural outlooks towards nature and human life is to be 
encouraged by promoting relationships that respect and enhance the diversity 
of life, irrespective of the political, economic or religious ideology dominant in 
society. This means that sustainable living practices and sustainable 
utilisation of natural resources should be a binding global ethic and 
responsibilty. Sustainable use will be discussed in more detail in section 2.7. 
2.4.2 Why should species be saved? 
Most sensitive human beings will care about, and mourn, the loss of a 
species. However, only relatively few will realise that the upcoming 
disappearance of a prominant endangered species is not merely a single 
tragedy, but symptomatic of a planetary catastrophe that is bearing down on 
society (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1982:6). 
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Within a given habitat, all wildlife have individual specific living requirements, 
yet all wildlife is interdependent on, and acting with, its physical and living 
environment. The addition or removal of a single species from that habitat 
may create reactions. The evaluation of these reactions according to either 
"harmful” or “beneficial”, is a human concept, and only applicable if the 
changes are human induced. Species extinction is a natural part of the 
evolutionary process. Due to human activities, however, species and 
ecosystyms are more threatened today than ever before in recorded history. 
According to Moulton and Sanderson (1999:168), five major extinctions 
occurred in the past: the Ordovician, 440 million years ago, the Devonian, 365 
million years ago, the Permian, 250 million years ago, the Triassic, 210 million 
years ago, and the Cretaceous, 65 million years ago. 
The earth is currently faced with a mounting loss of species that threatens to 
rival the five mass extinctions of the geological past. The previous mass 
extinctions were due to natural causes. According to Elredge (2001), the sixth 
extinction is patently a human-caused event, and can be divided into two 
phases. Phase one began when the first modern humans began to disperse 
to different parts of the world about 100,000 years ago. Phase two began 
about 10,000 years ago with the invention of agriculture. Agriculture 
represents the most profound ecological change in the entire 3,5 billion year 
history of life. With this invention, humans did not have to (a) interact with 
other species for survival, and so could manipulate other species for their own 
use; and (b) adhere to the ecosystem’s carrying capacity, and could 
overpopulate in the process. 
 
 
44 
According to Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1982:6), there are three prime arguments for 
the preservation of species: 
(a) The first is that simple compassion demands their preservation. 
This argument is based on the notion that other products of 
evolution also have a right to existence, and that the needs and 
desires of human beings are not the only basis for ethical 
decisions. 
(b) The second is that other species should be preserved because 
of their beauty, symbolic value or intrinsic interest – the 
argument from an aesthetics point of view. 
(c) The third is basically economic: other species provide direct 
benefit to Homo sapiens, and should be preserved for that 
reason. 
The past hundred years have seen an unprecedented level of species 
disappearance across the globe, including 90 mammals and 17 birds – not 
due to climate change, earthquakes, tsunamis or meteorites, but by the hand 
of man (Walker & Walker, 2012:37). 
Africa is often said to have escaped the massive extinctions experienced by 
North America, Europe and other parts of the world, and to have a “pre-
Pleistocene fauna”. It did, however, suffer losses. The African plains game 
presently contains only about 60% of the genera of large mammals 
encountered in Africa. 
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Before the turn of the nineteenth century, South Africa witnessed the 
extinction of several species of mammals. The most famous was the quagga, 
Equus quagga quagga. The so-called Cape lion, Panthera leo melanochaitus, 
a subspecies, became extinct in the Cape around 1858 – and also in Zululand 
in 1865. The blue buck, Hippotragus leucophaens, is believed not to have 
survived beyond 1800. Since then, both species of rhino, the bontebok, 
Damaliscus dorcas, and the Cape mountain zebra, Equus zebra zebra, have 
nearly been added to the list (Walker & Walker, 2012:41-42). 
2.5 POACHING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
'Poaching' is defined as follows in the Cambridge Advanced Learner’s 
Dictionary (2013): “To catch and kill animals without permission on someone 
else’s land”. According to Duffy (2010:83), poaching, at its most basic, is the 
illegal hunting of any animal, whether banned by the State or by private 
owners of wildlife. 
Poaching can be divided into two main categories: 
- Subsistance poaching, whereby local people take small numbers of 
animals for food. Subsistence poaching is used only to meet the 
food needs of local communities, and is usually a continuation of the 
historical practice of using certain types of wildlife for food. 
- Commercial poaching, where organised crime units take large 
numbers of animals for monetary gain. Commercial poaching is 
often presented as a tale of ignorance, greed, mass killing of 
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wildlife, and linkages to the international illegal trade (Duffy, 
2010:87). 
The focus of this research is on commercial poaching. 
The word 'poaching' is generally used to include a number of criminal offences 
– for instance, illegal hunting, sale and purchase of game, catching of game 
under certain circumstances, and the poisoning of game. The word 'poaching' 
will not even appear on the charge sheet in a criminal case. 
Traditionally, nature conservation and hunting (including illegal hunting) has 
been effected by virtue of the Orange Free State Nature Conservation 
Ordinance 8 of 1969 (South Africa, 1969), the Natal Nature Conservation 
Ordinance 15 of 1974 (South Africa, 1974a), the Cape Nature and 
Environmental Conservation Ordinance 19 of 1974 (South Africa, 1974b) and 
the Transvaal Nature Conservation Ordinance 12 of 1983 (South Africa, 
1983).  
Besides the ordinances, several of the former black states enacted their own 
nature conservation legislation. It has already been stated that the 
Constitution determines that nature conservation falls within the legislative 
competence of the provinces. Although in some of the new provinces 
(Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo) new provincial legislation has 
been enacted, the relevant provincial ordinances are still in force in some of 
the other provinces. 
Mpumalanga passed the Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998 
(South Africa, 1998b), which is a refinement of the previously applicable 
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Transvaal ordinance. The nature conservation legislation in the former 
homelands of Bophuthatswana and KaNgwane has also been repealed by 
this Act. 
The position in Limpopo was particularly complex, because of the need to 
consolidate the laws and institutions of four previous homelands which existed 
in the area, namely Lebowa, Venda, Gazankulu and KaNgwane, as well as 
the Transvaal Ordinance. This was done in the form of the Limpopo 
Environmental Management Act 7 of 2003 (South Africa, 2003), which 
replaces the previous legislation. 
Provincial legislation (ordinances) is applicable if an offence is committed on 
private land or a provincial nature reserve. Should an offence be committed in 
one of the national parks, the perpetrator will be charged in terms of section 
57(1) of NEMBA. 
The perpetrator can also be charged in terms of the Trespass Act 6 of 1959 
(South Africa, 1959), the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 (South Africa, 
2000), the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 (South Africa, 1968), the 
Animal Protection Act 71 of 1962 (South Africa, 1962) and the Riotous 
Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 (South Africa, 1956).  
2.5.1 Why did poaching in South Africa increase after 2008? 
Taylor et al. (2014:55) mention four reasons why South Africa did not 
experience increased poaching before 2008: 
- Firstly, South Africa did not have large rhino populations before 
1980, rendering it unattractive as a potential rhino poaching country 
 
 
48 
simply because rhinos were rare. However, as rhino numbers 
outside South Africa dropped below 10,000 during the 1980s, they 
would have become increasingly hard to locate, while the growing 
rhino population in South Africa would have made rhinos easier to 
find. South Africa had a structured conservation programme that 
was well funded from ecotourism revenues and government funds, 
and this, together with a strong history of military and conservation 
expertise, resulted in anti-poaching deterrents that were more 
effective here, than anywhere else in Africa. 
- Secondly, key consumer markets in Asia, including China and 
Taiwan, took measures in the 1990s to restrict domestic sales in 
rhino horn medicines, because the United States (U.S.) threatened 
to apply sanctions. 
- Thirdly, there is the possibility that consumer nations in Asia, 
particularly China, had large stockpiles of rhino horn throughout the 
1990s, and may have been able to meet their needs without 
obtaining new horns. 
In 2007, TOPS regulations under NEMBA (South Africa, 2004a) placed 
stricter provisions on hunting threatened or protected species in South 
Africa. The poaching surge started in 2008. In 2009, the norms and 
standards for trophy hunting were implemented, placing restrictions on 
trophy hunting, and making it harder to obtain horns from pseudo-
hunts, hence 2010 witnessed another spike in poaching – as shown in 
Figure 2.1: 
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Figure 2.1: Rhino poaching statistics: South Africa. Source: Department of 
Environmental Affairs, 2015a:n.p. 
The aforementioned were not the only reasons for the increase in poaching: 
the increase in demand also played a role. 
2.5.2 The poacher 
According to Terblanche (1999:172), people commit crime because that 
element which inhibits other people to commit crime, is absent in the offender 
at the moment when the crime is committed. There can be many reasons for 
the absence of this element; it often happens because the offender’s 
inhibitions are diminished through poverty.  
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Organised crime is a different matter altogether. People heading such 
organisations or collections of people are motivated by greed alone, and 
operate seemingly without conscience. Not all people involved in organised 
crime fall into this category, however. The small cog in such an organisation’s 
wheels, who are involved only to a limited extent, in order to earn some 
livelihood, are not necessarily of the same disposition.  
The initiatives of the legislature in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 
of 1998 (South Africa, 1998c) and the Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996 
(South Africa, 1996b) should be welcomed in principle. People involved in 
organised crime deserve different treatment from that of occasional criminals. 
However, it is important that the correct people be targeted (Terblanche, 
1999:173). 
According to a report by the secretariat of CITES (CITES, 2013:5), there are 
five layers to poaching: 
- Level 1: Poaching individual/groups 
- Level 2: Local: receivers/couriers 
- Level 3: National: couriers/buyers/facilitators 
- Level 4: National: exporter 
- Level 5: International: consumer/receiver/buyer 
At the first level there are several types of poacher. There is the traditional 
poacher who lives nearby, has excellent bush skills, and often has military 
training. According to Eloff (2012:57), the race profile of 55 perpetrators who 
were arrested in the Kruger National Park (KNP) were 96% black and 4% 
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white, and all were male. The group was a combination of 40% Mozambican 
and 60% South African citizens. The age profile percentages were 41% (20-
29 years), 41% (30-39 years) and 18% (40 years and older). The age sample 
was taken from 22 perpetrators. At the same level there are wildlife industry 
poachers: park rangers, veterinarians, pilots, game capture operators, 
pseudo-hunters, game farm managers and owners. The horn is worth more 
than the rhino, making it worthwhile to hunt (illegally) one's own rhinos. 
According to a report compiled by the U.S. Department of State (Fenio, 
2014:12), it may be appropriate to include a Sub-level 1. This level would 
include those community members who are not directly involved in poaching 
itself, but provide others with assistance of some sort. 
Investigation complexity differs significantly between Level 1 and Level 5. 
According to the CITES report (CITES, 2013:5), current enforcement activities 
in rhinoceros range states address criminal syndicate members from levels 1  
to 3 relatively effectively. These individuals are often easily replaced, and the 
threat to rhinos will continue to exist for as long as enforcement activities do 
not address the driving force behind these individuals (levels 4 to 5). 
Between 1 January 2012 and 16 October 2012, South African authorities 
arrested a total of 207 offenders involved in illegal trade in rhinoceros horn. 
Table 2.1 reflects the different levels of criminal activity with which these 
suspects were associated. Organised crime syndicate members on levels 4 
and 5 are often located in consumer countries, beyond the reach of 
enforcement authorities in range countries. 
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Table 2.1:  Arrests in South Africa from 1 January 2012 to 16 October 2012 at 
each level of the criminal chain. 
Levels in the criminal chain Number of suspects arrests 
Level 1 (Poachers) 179 
Level 2 (Receivers/couriers) 10 
Level 3 (Couriers/buyers/facilitators) 18 
Level 4 (Exporters) 0 
Level 5 (Consumers/Receivers/Buyers) 0 
 Total: 207 
Source: CITES, 2013:5. 
Historically, African wildlife poachers were recruited from local communities 
living in close proximity to protected areas, some of which were disputed as 
former communal land areas where subsistence hunting had often occurred 
until recently. Overlapping with this, another typical poacher profile concerns 
former military personnel, police officers or game scouts, all of whom would 
have had specialised training to develop tracking or shooting skills (Milliken & 
Shaw, 2012:74). The involvement of game rangers in poaching gives cause 
for concern. It represents abuse of an official position, and should be regarded 
as an aggravating factor.  
The following are examples of how South African courts have dealt with 
similar situations in the past: In S v Small 1983 2 PH H34 (O) the Court of 
Appeal confirmed a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment on a prison warder 
who assisted prisoners in escape. According to the court, the warder’s crime 
amounted to an act of treason against the service of which he was a member. 
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In S v Ndlovu  1983 2 PH H172 (A) it was held that the fact that an employee 
provided information to prospective thieves or robbers, which induced or 
facilitated the commission of the crime, constituted an aggravating factor. 
A new kind of poacher has also become an integral part of the equation, 
especially in game ranch areas in the provinces: the game industry insider. 
The use of modern heavy-calibre rifles, dart guns, immobiliser drugs and 
helicopters, clearly represents a completely “new face” in terms of rhino 
poaching (Milliken & Shaw, 2012:75). 
African nationals charged with rhino crimes in South Africa were 
predominantly South African and Mozambican citizens, although some 
Zimbabweans and a small number of Congolese citizens have also been 
charged. Asian nationals charged with rhino crimes in South Africa have been 
predominantly Vietnamese, though mainland and overseas Chinese, 
Malaysian and Thai citizens have also been involved. Those of African origin 
arrested were typically  involved in levels 1 and 2 activities. Some South 
African nationals have also been arrested at level 3 for activities at a national 
level, relating to the illegal possession of, and trading in, rhino horn. Asian 
nationals have mostly been charged with illegal purchase, possession and 
trading in rhino horn, predominantly filling the Level 3 or Level 4 courier or 
exporter role in the trade chain (Milliken & Shaw, 2012:96).  
Eloff (2012:60) has identified two theories pertaining to poaching: the Rational 
Choice Theory and the Routine Activity Theory. 
The Rational Choice Theory applies in describing the more organised 
criminal. The theory argues as follows: 
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- What is the risk? (adding corruption and low conviction rate and 
challenging juridical system = fairly low risk) 
- Personal injury versus reward (a perpetrator can be shot by a 
law enforcement official) 
- Arrest or imprisonment (receiving a five-year sentence, but only 
serving one year, is not a real deterring factor). 
The Routine Activity Theory applies more to the impulsive runner on the 
ground – the actual poacher. For this theory, 'routine activity' means any 
commonly occurring social activity that provides for basic needs when social 
disorganisation occurs. Three factors come into play when analysing rhino 
poaching as per the Routine Activity Theory: 
- The motivated offender who is hungry and poor, and who is 
presented with an opportunity to make some money 
- A suitable target being available 
- The absence of a capable guardian, in the form of poor border 
patrols, low conviction rates, and rhino as free walking wildlife. 
The research by Fenio (2014) highlights that different poaching mentalities 
appear to exist:  
One person may poach out of ignorance about conservation, or 
because he feels he has no other choice (even if he deems it 
morally wrong), because he is in a dire situation and must 
accommodate his family. Another may do so because of peer 
 
 
55 
pressure, or because he has been threatened to join because of his 
tracking skills, or perhaps he did it once and then became "sucked 
in". Others may poach because they experience a sense of 
fulfillment, a life purpose, from being able to provide in an otherwise 
impoverished region, while still others may enjoy the thrill (and 
money) that comes from risky behaviour. And finally, there are those 
who have received the taste of the financial payoffs and simply do 
not want to stop. These mentalities can also certainly overlap, 
depending on the person. 
2.5.3. Mozambique’s role in rhino poaching 
The majority of rhinos killed in South Africa are poached in the KNP, which 
shares a long border of 360 km with Mozambique – where most of the 
poachers come from. Poachers from Mozambique are able to illegally slip 
across the border into the KNP, and even if the KNP rangers are able to 
detect them, they are unable to carry out a “hot pursuit” once the poachers 
have crossed the border back into Mozambique. 
Two decades of civil conflict left Mozambique’s conservation ethics in chaos. 
Rhinos became extinct in Mozambique for the second time. Despite 
impressive growth statistics, the country remains mired in poverty, and there 
are many individuals willing to risk their lives to earn money through poaching.  
A number of steps have been taken in order to solve the poaching problem on 
the eastern boundary of the KNP, but to no avail. South Africa signed an 
agreement with Mozambique on 17 April 2014, in terms of which the two 
countries would work together in order to fight poaching. Mozambique has set 
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up a foundation to work with the South African government to establish a 
special anti-poaching force to help develop commercial projects whereby local 
residents can benefit from conservation work. Poaching was previously 
regarded as a misdemeanour with no strict penalties, but was reclassified in 
2012 as a crime. In April 2014, a law was passed in order to impose heavy 
penalties of up to 12 years' imprisonment on anyone convicted of poaching. 
An elite, highly trained National Anti-Poaching Unit has been formed. The 
Mozambican government has passed a decree creating a flexible, state-
owned agency similar to that of SANParks (SANParks, 2012). 
According to Michler (2012), villages within the province of Gaza have 
become havens for poachers. Using the villages as a base, the poachers 
make their way into the KNP. Even if arrests are made, a whole set of new 
challenges presents itself, as anyone, from anti-poaching rangers through to 
police and prison officials to prosecutors, may be corruptible. The first move 
made by whoever is apprehended, is to offer money – the amount depending 
on who has been caught and by whom. For the Mozambican government, the 
most worrying aspect is the involvement of the defence and security forces in 
poaching incidents. 
In a study conducted in 2012 (Eloff, 2012:59), many illegal crossing points 
between the KNP and Mozambique were identified. A specific point has been 
monitored since 2006. No activity was identified for the years 2006, 2007 or 
2008; however, in 2009 and 2010, illegal cross-border activity was observed. 
This area was near a cluster of rhino poaching incidents. 
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South Africa has committed R24.9 million from the R252 million Swedish and 
Dutch Postcode Lottery donations secured by the Peace Parks Foundation, to 
Mozambique, to aid anti-poaching efforts. This will assist with the 
implementation of counter-trafficking measures, improvement of 
communication networks, training and capacity building of field rangers, 
provision of vital operational equipment, deployment of sniffer dogs, and 
community awareness projects (SANParks, 2014a). 
According to Thomson (2006:77), the general poverty of Africa’s rural people 
is the most important missing ingredient in every argument that purports to 
pinpoint the cause of poaching. Poverty pulls human communities down to the 
basic physiological level of Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs scale, and it 
forces people to do anything in order to survive. This is a long-term solution; 
hence, another strategy to deter people from these communities to rely on 
poaching, will have to be devised. They will rely on poaching as long as there 
is a demand for illegal rhino horn. 
2.5.3.1 Hot pursuit 
At present, law enforcement officers (rangers and police) do not have the 
power to chase poachers across the Mozambique border, following the killing 
of rhinos in the adjacent KNP. Once a poacher has crossed the border, he 
has effectively escaped. 
Although the National Police Commissioner (SAPS) has confirmed that hot 
pursuit has been added to the arsenal available to South African law 
enforcement for use against poachers (Helfrich, 2014), there seems to be no 
clarity on this statement. It appears to be a "gentleman’s agreement" – a kind 
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of verbal agreement among members of the South African Development 
Community (SADC) that when suspects cross borders, contact first has to be 
made with law enforcement across the border to obtain an escort to conduct 
their pursuit or investigation. There have been calls for formalisation of this 
process, and it has apparently been escalated to a SADC subcommittee. 
Such a formal agreement will outline the protocols. 
According to Bean (2015), there is legal precedent to justify a move into 
Mozambique, namely – 
(a) "The sovereign rights of the RSA under international law allows 
the RSA to exercise “proportional force” across borders and 
inside Mozambique in order to prevent: 
i) the wholesale massacre of South Africa’s endangered 
species within South Africa by criminals based inside 
Mozambique; and 
ii) to prevent the incursion into the RSA of armed personnel 
who are willing to kill any South African citizen who tries 
to stop their poaching activities." 
2.6. EFFECTIVENESS OF CERTAIN STRATEGIES TO PREVENT/STOP 
POACHING 
Controlling the illegal supply of rhino horn through anti-poaching measures is 
a very expensive strategy, and its long-term effectiveness is threatened by 
declining budgets. 
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2.6.1 DNA profiling 
Rhino horn consists mostly of keratin, calcium and melanin, and grows 
continuously. The horn includes cells which contain nuclear DNA, allowing the 
identification of individuals and matching of horns and carcasses through DNA 
analysis (Lindsay & Taylor, 2011:9). 
The Rhino DNA Index System (RhODIS) is a project that was instituted by the 
Veterinary Genetics Laboratory at the University of Pretoria, in order to help 
with the plight of the rhinos. The laboratory is collecting DNA samples of 
rhinos across the country, in order to create a database using the unique DNA 
profile of individual rhinos. The goal is for all rhinos to be on the system, with 
the aim of deterring poachers and assisting in forensic prosecutions (Rhino 
DNA Index System, 2014). 
The South African DEA introduced amendments to the norms and standards 
for sample collection and identification of live and poached rhinos, under 
NEMBA – which requires that samples be collected from all poached rhinos, 
and from other rhinos that are immobilised, which have to be submitted to the 
laboratory for inclusion on the RhODIS database. 
DNA profiling enables law enforcement agencies to combat poaching by 
scientifically linking evidence such as rhino horn and equipment used in the 
removal of horn, to specific poaching events, in order to ensure greater 
success in identifying and convicting the criminals responsible. 
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2.6.2 Dehorning 
Rhino horn is potentially a renewable/sustainable resource. It can be 
painlessly removed, and regrows at a rate of 25mm to 66mm per year, with a 
mean of 50,5mm. The anterior horn of young adult (8-25 years) white and 
black rhinos exhibits an intrinsic growth rate of 59,8mm per year (Pienaar, 
Hall-Martin & Hitchins, 1991:104). 
Rhino dehorning has been used historically as a tool to reduce the threat of 
poaching in parts of Southern Africa. The main aim of dehorning is to reduce 
the potential profit to poachers, and thus greatly reduce their incentive to kill 
rhino (Emslie & Brooks, 1999:67). Dehorning is contentious, due to 
uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of the method at reducing poaching, 
and due to potential veterinary impacts and adverse effects on the 
behavioural ecology of rhinos. A recent study by Lindsay and Taylor (2011) 
found that dehorning was not necessarily a disincentive to poach. 
According to Du Toit (2011:13), poaching pressure on a particular population 
is likely to be a function of the following equation: 
    Reward to poacher (illegal sale of horn) 
Poaching pressure = -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Risk to poacher (of being arrested or killed) 
Dehorning reduces the amount of horn that the poacher can obtain by killing a 
rhino, and, thereby, the payment that he receives from the sale of the horn. 
Strong anti-poaching efforts to maintain risk to the poacher are essential, 
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since, if the risk he faces is low, he will accept a low reward; therefore, he will 
still poach dehorned rhinos. 
Data from the Lowveld conservancies in Zimbabwe (Table 2.2) indicates that 
the mortality rate is indeed lower among dehorned than among horned rhinos.  
Table 2.2:  Relative losses of horned versus dehorned rhinos to poaching in 
the Zimbabwe Lowveld conservancies: 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of horned rhinos 322 269 269 303 
Number of dehorned rhinos 72 105 72 57 
Horned rhinos lost to poaching 24 51 62 13 
Dehorned rhinos lost to poaching 3 19 3 3 
% of horned rhinos poached 7.5% 18.9% 23.0% 4.3% 
% of dehorned rhinos poached 4.2% 18.1% 4.2% 5.3% 
Source: Lindsay & Taylor, 2011:20. 
According to Du Toit (2011:15), if a rhino owner is dehorning without 
understanding the threat, he will dehorn in the false hope of stopping 
poaching, whereas if the rhino owner is dehorning to put off poachers in the 
immediate future, then it is a management tool which might buy some time 
and resources to effectively protect the rhino. 
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Milner-Gulland, Beddington and Leader-Williams (1992) considered whether 
dehorning acts as a suitable deterrent to poachers. Using a model of optimal 
harvest frequency, they concluded that a profit-maximising manager will not 
dehorn rhinos frequently enough to deter poaching. 
For some smaller populations in vulnerable areas, dehorning is an option that 
can be considered, provided law enforcement is always a critical part of any 
protection strategy. Dehorning on its own, without law enforcement, does not 
work (Duffy, Emslie & Knight, 2013:17). 
2.6.3 Poison (horn treatment) 
In an attempt to curb poaching, some rhino owners pressure-inject rhino horns 
with poison and dye, designed to indicate that the horn is contaminated and 
that it will make the end-user seriously ill. 
This method entails the treatment of the rhino horn while the animal is under 
sedation, infusing it with an indelible dye that contaminates the horn. The dye 
is mixed with a compound of ectoparasiticides which serve to protect the rhino 
from ticks and other parasites that spread infection. The compound is toxic to 
humans but safe for animals. A full DNA sample is also harvested from the 
rhino, and three matching identification microchips are inserted – one per 
horn, and a third on the animal (Rhino Rescue Project, 2014). 
Ethical and practical concerns have been raised that innocent people could be 
poisoned after unwittingly ingesting affected horn, and that black market 
dealers will find ways to disguise the dye (e.g. by bleaching the horns) or 
simply cut out the affected parts of the horn. 
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The effectiveness of such treatments has not been satisfactorily 
demonstrated. Instead, according to Duffy et al. (2013:17), evidence, to date, 
from a number of recovered treated horns that have been sectioned, shows 
that the dye (and presumably also the poison) has failed to penetrate the 
treated horns, suggesting that this treatment is ineffective. According to 
Ferreira (2014:113), investigators dissected treated horns, and discovered 
that the pink dye concoction was nowhere to be seen. 
Should a person die because of ingesting affected horn, and the horn be 
traced back to a specific rhino belonging to a specific owner, the owner could 
probably face criminal charges. Murder, for instance, is the unlawful and 
intentional causing of the death of another human being. The elements of the 
crime are therefore (a) causing the death (b) of another person (c) unlawfully 
and (d) intentionally. 
The requirements mentioned in (a), (b) and (c) speak for themselves, and 
need no further discussion. Of special importance  is the requirement of 
intention. This requirement is satisfied not only if X has direct intention (dolus 
directus) to kill Y, but also if he merely foresees the possibility of Y being 
killed, and reconciles himself to this possibility (dolus eventualis) (Snyman, 
2002:423). The following example can be used to illustrate the 
aforementioned: X, a rhino owner, wants to deter poachers by poisoning his 
rhino’s horn. He foresees the possibility that somebody might be killed when 
ingesting the horn. He proceeds with poisoning the horn, indifferent as to 
whether somebody will be killed or not. If it happens, in the eyes of the law X 
has the intention to kill somebody. 
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2.6.4 Translocation 
Translocation entails the relocating of rhino, to create rhino strongholds in 
other areas, in order to ensure that the broader population continues to grow. 
The purpose is to translocate rhinos into manageable areas where patrol 
efforts can be concentrated and where poachers run a high risk of detection 
and/or capture (Emslie & Brooks, 1999:33). 
SANParks has begun with the relocation and auction of a limited number of 
white rhinos from the KNP (SANParks, 2014b). The aim is to restimulate 
growth in large protected areas, while creating new rhino strongholds.  In this 
way, SANParks will be able to offset the effects of poaching in the short- and 
medium-term, while expanding rhino range and improving the overall 
population size. 
It will also include the relocation of rhinos from high-risk zones to zones of 
lower risk in the KNP, as well as to other national parks.  It is clear from 
regular surveys that rhinos are found in different densities across the KNP.  
Poaching pressure is also uneven across the KNP landscape.  Some areas 
are relatively free of recorded poaching incidents, while others are hard hit by 
poachers (SANParks, 2014b).  Increasing births and decreasing death rates, 
through a relocation exercise, could stimulate growth in large protected areas, 
and maximise growth in rhino strongholds. 
In the last quarter of 2014, 56 rhino were moved out of poaching hotspots, 
and translocated from certain areas within the KNP to an Intensive Protection 
Zone (IPZ), as well as to other more secure areas. In addition, approximately 
100 rhino were translocated to neighbouring states during 2014, through both 
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private partnerships and government initiatives (Department of Environmental 
Affairs, 2015a).  
An organisation titled, “Groupelephant.com,-ERP”, is sourcing rhino in South 
Africa for export to Texas, where they believe the rhinos will be safer than 
anywhere else in Africa, and where it will be much cheaper to secure the well-
being of the rhinos (Van Hoven, 2015). 
2.6.5 Law enforcement 
Effective law enforcement responses to rhino-related crimes are, according to 
Milledge (2007:100), important for two main reasons.  Firstly, they help to 
reduce to a minimum the quantity of rhino horn flowing onto the illegal market. 
Secondly, effective enforcement is important in reducing the impact of illegal 
activity on rhino populations. 
Successful arrest is the first, and perhaps the most critical, step in the judicial 
process.  The high rate of successful arrests in 2012 was, according to 
Milliken and Shaw (2012:95), attributable to increased intelligence activities, 
as well as better communication and collaboration between different 
government departments, as well as an indication that networks developed 
between law enforcement bodies are starting to show results. 
South Africa’s focus has, in the past, been largely on reactive strategies.  It 
would be more constructive if poachers could be halted before they come 
anywhere near rhinos.  This will only come about through an increased focus 
on improved intelligence collection, its analysis, and the resultant 
implementation of strategically focused activities (Department of 
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Environmental Affairs, 2013:17). South Africa’s management plan for black 
rhino also points to the critical importance of better intelligence systems to 
prevent poaching, rather than relying on prosecutions after a rhino has been 
killed (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2013:20). 
The use of specialist wildlife investigators and prosecutors can help to ensure 
that criminals are tracked down, arrested, charged, and successfully 
prosecuted.  The use of expert witnesses to convince the court of the 
seriousness of the crime committed can also contribute towards the 
appropriate sentencing of offenders.  According to Emslie and Brooks 
(1999:69), in a number of South African cases where expert witnesses 
appeared for the prosecution, sentences of those convicted were significantly 
increased, and a precedent was set of high sentences for rhino crimes. 
The use of DNA forensics in cases of illegal trade in rhino horn has already 
proved to be effective.  DNA evidence has been used successfully in a 
number of rhino-related cases in South Africa. 
The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) of South Africa is a key partner in 
the criminal justice system, playing a critical role in ensuring that perpetrators 
of rhino crimes are charged and held responsible for their criminal actions 
(Milliken & Shaw, 2012:92). 
Unless the sentences passed reflect the seriousness of rhino crimes, 
penalties are unlikely to act as a deterrent.  Once a precedent for effective 
sentencing is set, it becomes easier to obtain more substantial sentences 
when required.  A jail sentence is more of a deterrent than a fine. In S v Zinn 
1969 2 SA 537 (A) it was stated by Rumpff JA that, when imposing a 
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sentence, “what has to be considered is the triad consisting of the crime, the 
offender and the interests of society”. By 'crime' is meant, especially, the 
consideration that the degree of harm, or the seriousness of the violation, 
must be taken into account (retributive theory). By 'criminal' is meant, 
especially, that the personal circumstances of the offender – for example, the 
personal reasons which drove him to the crime, as well as his prospects of 
one day becoming a law-abiding member of society again, must be taken into 
account (reformative theory). By 'the interests of society' is meant either that 
society must be protected from a dangerous criminal (preventive theory), or 
that the community must be deterred from crime (theory of general 
deterrence), or that the righteous indignation of society at the contravention of 
the law must find some expression (retributive theory) (Snyman, 2002:23). 
In S v Khumalo and others 1984 3 SA 327 (A) Nicholas JA referred to the 
case of R v Swanepoel 1945 AD 444, and confirmed that in the assessment of 
an appropriate sentence, regard must be had, inter alia, for the main purposes 
of punishment – namely, to be deterrent, preventive, reformative and 
retributive. According to the court, deterrence has been described as the 
“essential”, “all important”, “paramount” and “universally admitted” object of 
punishment.  
This issue was also addressed by Nicholson A in S v Ngcongo 1996 1 ALL SA 
403 (N) where the court confirmed that there are three factors to be 
considered when determining a proper sentence: the accused, the crime and 
the interests of the community. The objects of punishment must also be 
considered, namely deterrence, prevention, reformation and retribution. 
According to Rabie and Strauss (1985:21), retribution should not be confused 
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with revenge. The basic difference between the two is that while revenge 
knows no balance between the injury done by the person taking revenge and 
the injury occasioned to him, retribution implies that punishment be 
proportional to the gravity of the crime. 
There has been a great public outcry against rhino poaching, and, in the eyes 
of the general public, the courts should bear this in mind when deciding on an 
appropriate sentence. However, as was stated by Harms JA in S v Mhlakaza 
1997n1 SACR 515 (SCA):  
The object of sentencing is not to satisfy public opinion but to serve 
the public interest. A sentencing policy that caters predominantly or 
exclusively for public opinion is inherently flawed. It remains the 
court’s duty to impose fearlessly an appropriate and fair sentence 
even if the sentence does not satisfy the public.  
According to Terblanche (1999:176), if future crime can be prevented by a 
sentence, whether by deterring the accused or other potential offenders, by 
reforming the offender, or by protecting society from the offender by other 
means, such a sentence will be in the interests of society. Terblanche 
(1999:179) then continues by referring to two forms of deterrence. The first is 
known as general deterrence, which operates against society as a whole. The 
second form is known as individual deterrence, which operates against the 
offender. In terms of general deterrence, the sentence is used as an example 
to other potential offenders. The belief is that the threat of similar punishment 
will cause such potential offenders to refrain from committing crime. 
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According to Rabie and Strauss (1985:37), it has frequently been stated that 
the success of general deterrence is more dependent upon the relative 
degree of certainty that punishment will follow the commisssion of a crime, 
than upon the severity of the penalty. In other words, general deterrence is 
more a function of law enforcement than it is of sentencing. In S v Nkambule 
1993 1 SACR 136 (A) the court referred to the fact that criminologists have 
found that certainty of punishment, rather than its severity, is the main 
deterrent. 
According to Emslie and Brooks (1999:68), a problem in many court cases is 
that the fines are set in local currencies that devolve rapidly against hard 
currencies.  Rhino horn is sold for hard currencies.  Over time, a poacher may 
make more money by selling the horn and paying the fine, and will be 
undeterred by the penalties.  The level of poaching will be determined by the 
prices paid for rhino horn on the one hand, and the effectiveness of the 
criminal justice system (risk) on the other hand.  Poachers work out the ratio 
of risk/reward, taking into account aspects such as risk of detection, risk of 
prosecution – even risk of death and injury, balanced out against the financial 
reward for rhino horn.  It is assumed that increasing the risks, when compared 
with rewards, will reduce poaching overall (Duffy et al., 2013:16).  According 
to Du Toit (2013), an increase in jail sentences and financial penalties 
reduced opportunist poaching in Zimbabwe’s Lowveld, but a hard core of 
professional, well-equipped commercial poachers remained. 
In South Africa, the number of rhino-related arrests and convictions with 
deterrent custodial sentences without the option of a fine, has increased. In a 
number of cases, criminals involved in rhino poaching and illegal rhino horn 
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trade have been sentenced to between six and 12 years' imprisonment, and in 
two further cases the offenders were sentenced to 25 and 29 years' 
imprisonment, respectively (CITES, 2013:6). 
The National Wildlife Crime Reaction Unit (NWCRU) was established in 2010, 
and consists of representatives from the South African Police Service (SAPS), 
SANParks, national and provincial nature conservation officials, the NPA, the 
Asset Forfeiture Unit and Interpol. 
NWCRU has dramatically sealed up South Africa’s national response to rhino 
poaching and illegal trade in rhino horn. Since its creation, a series of high-
profile law enforcement actions have occurred, which appear to have been 
collaborative efforts involving a range of authorities (Milliken & Shaw, 
2012:90). 
The Directorate of Priority Crime Investigations (DPCI) known as the Hawks, 
is a specialised division of the SAPS, established primarily to prevent, combat 
and investigate national priority offences. As rhino poaching and the illegal 
rhino horn trade have been identified as a serious national threat, these 
crimes are the responsibility of the Endangered Species Section within the 
Organised Crime Unit (Milliken & Shaw, 2012:90). 
The official investigation at the crime scene can only be conducted by a police 
official or an Environmental Management Inspector (EMI) and in accordance 
with standard operating procedures. It often happens that evidence is 
contaminated, which results in an unsuccessful outcome in subsequent 
criminal proceedings. 
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While it is clear that rhino poaching has increased, so too have the focus and 
activities of the South African security forces in their attempts to protect the 
rhino.  Even so, poaching levels are rising.  On the other hand, it can only be 
speculated what the level of poaching would have been if additional measures 
had not been deployed. 
No method to prevent rhino poaching can be effective on its own.  Law 
enforcement goes hand-in-hand with all other methods or strategies.  
However, despite efforts to prevent pseudo-hunting, the CITES ban on legal 
rhino horn trade, increased law enforcement, increasing arrests, and a good 
conviction rate with significant sentences handed down, the illegal killing of 
rhino has increased.  The South African government will have to consider an 
alternative strategy. 
Corruption and high-level patronage have resulted in some poachers and 
dealers escaping the full force of the law, despite impressive national 
legislation prohibiting poaching and dealing in rhino horn (Emslie & Brooks, 
1999:34). Also, where there is regional insecurity, poverty and/or weak 
systems of penalties and prosecutions for poachers, the risks associated with 
poaching are much lower (Milliken & Shaw, 2012:85). 
Anti-poaching patrols, dehorning and horn poisoning are all expensive, and 
the costs are ongoing.  However, according to ‘t Sas-Rolfes (2012:12), these 
measures are likely to yield greater success than law enforcement measures 
that target subsequent levels in the illegal supply chain.  Such efforts are time 
consuming, and unlikely to ever cause more than temporary market 
disruptions.  Measures such as increasing penalties (fines and prison 
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sentences) may also not be an effective deterrent, as judges and magistrates 
demand better evidence to successfully prosecute more serious cases. 
A contentious issue is the "shoot-to-kill” approach. According to Duffy 
(2010:82), governments responded to international pressure to save 
elephants and rhinos through the development and deployment of military-
style practices. In 1988, President Daniel Arap Moi from Kenya gave 
permission for the Kenya Wildlife Service to use a shoot-to-kill policy against 
suspected poachers. In 1986, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe from Zimbabwe 
assented to a “shoot-to-kill” policy for those situations when the Department of 
National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWM)  patrols encountered 
heavily armed poachers in protected areas (Hanks, 2015a:30). In Tanzania, 
Operation Uhai in 1989 was used to sweep all parks and neighbouring 
communities of suspected poachers (Duffy, 2010:82).  
In 2013, Botswana introduced a hard-line approach towards dealing with 
poachers. According to Hanks (2015a:191), the warning was reinforced by 
Botswana’s Minister of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism at the Africa 
Elephant Summit in Gaborone in December 2013. It was stated that the 
Botswana government has maintained its position of “shoot-to-kill” in their 
quest to stop poaching (Hanks, 2015a:191). 
2.6.6 Demand reduction 
Some Western NGOs seem to believe that the only solution to the poaching 
pandemic is to educate or otherwise convince Asian consumers that the use 
of rhino horn is inappropriate.  According to Duffy (2010:219), conservation 
agencies and NGOs find it difficult to show that their campaigns have a direct 
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impact on buying habits. Furthermore, it is difficult for NGOs to turn their 
attention to their own supporters and point out their role in creating 
conservation problems. They risk alienating their donors, and supporters may 
not be willing to accept that their own lifestyles and demand for wildlife 
products create problems far distant from where they live. 
According to Cheung (1995:152), a change in the traditional beliefs and 
cultural practices of consumers is crucial to curbing demand in the long term, 
and can be accomplished through culturally sensitive public awareness and 
education campaigns.  Cheung admits that in the short term this is virtually 
impossible, as such beliefs and practices are so entrenched in ancient 
medical customs, that many in the Chinese medical community still advocate 
them. 
CITES recognises that demand reduction is a key element in addressing 
poaching and illegal rhino horn trade. Resolution Conf. 9.14 (Rev. Cop15 ) 
urged all implicated states to work with user groups and industries to reduce 
use and consumption of rhino horn.  
‘t Sas-Rolfes (2012:13) argues that there are three reasons why this approach 
may not work to prevent the current poaching unslaught: 
- Firstly, the approach is predicated on the conviction that rhino horn 
has no medical value. 
- Secondly, it is disingenuous to argue that the use of rhino horn 
medicine necessarily causes poaching when horn can be obtained 
by non-lethal means. 
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- Thirdly, a general publicity campaign may have an impact on the 
marginal (fringe) consumers, but is unlikely to reach those actually 
responsible for paying the extraordinarily high prices that are driving 
the poaching problem. 
Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) is an element of indigenous culture that 
is well established, having existed for thousands of years, and today there are 
universities for TCM studies, such as the Jiangxi University of Traditional 
Chinese Medicine (Zhou, Xie & Yan, 2011). 
The Chinese banned the use of rhino horn in traditional medicine in 1993, and 
TCM practitioners have shown a high regard for conserving endangered 
species. According to Hanks (2015b), the likelihood of completely stopping its 
use is very small, for two main reasons: 
- China is a country of over 1,3 billion people, with 56 different 
languages. It would be a formidable task to contact even 1% of that 
total spread across such linguistic diversity. 
- TCM is so well entrenched in China that it would take at least two to 
three generations to wean people away from some of the products 
they believe have genuine therapeutic and medicinal properties – 
an unrealistic time frame at present rates of poaching. 
According to Du Toit (2013:187), a presentation at a workshop held in China 
in 2007, provided extensive data from direct consumer surveys pertaining to 
tiger bone, undertaken between 2004 and 2006 in 11 Chinese cities and 16 
hospitals. The surveys posed questions to two different sample groups: the 
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general public and ailing patients. Among the former, there was an 88% level 
of awareness that tiger bone was banned, with 5,6% of respondents 
expressing an interest in acquiring some of it. However, among ailing patients 
there was a 97,2% awareness of the ban, but despite this, 61,3% of 
respondents wished to acquire it. Among the general public, the percentage of 
respondents eager to acquire tiger bone would drop to 0,26% if the ban were 
lifted: most of the 5,6% were keen to acquire bone to stockpile it for potential 
future use. The following can be deduced from the results of the survey: 
- The majority of ailing patients place their perceived health needs 
ahead of complying with the ban; and 
- The ban is likely to stimulate a degree of speculative stockpiling.  
2.6.7 Technology 
There is increasing use of existing and new technology. The Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) plays a very important role in this 
regard – especially with SANParks, where it takes on the role of technology 
capability provider at strategic, tactical and operational level. 
There is a growing interest in using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for 
conservation law enforcement. Poachers mostly work at night, and mostly 
when the moon is close to full. Rangers have to operate more effectively at 
night. UAVs could be equipped with night-time and thermal-imaging cameras 
which can “see" poachers, even in the dark. The idea is to detect poachers 
before they strike, with the cameras providing GPS co-ordinates of their 
location. Helicopters and microlights are also being effectively used in anti-
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poaching activities. This kind of technology is expensive, and cannot always 
be afforded by private rhino owners. 
2.7 SUSTAINABLE USE 
Sustainable use can briefly be defined as use of wildlife without jeopardising 
the continued survival of species (Duffy, 2000:9). The significant increase in 
game numbers and the land used to breed wildlife, has resulted in South 
Africa becoming the recognised authority in global conservation best practice 
and the sustainable use of natural resources. 
All species have a deep survival instinct. They do anything they can to secure 
their own survival chances. Conservationists have a name for this survival 
instinct – namely “sustainable development”. Conservation through 
sustainable use can take the form of non-consumptive use – such as 
ecotourism and photographic safaris, or consumptive use – such as trophy 
and/or meat hunting, or a combination of both. The success of this approach 
can be measured by the growth in private land. A substantial increase in 
numbers of indigenous wildlife species has been a direct result. 
Wise use within the broader concept of sustainable development is not a 
single issue such as the environment. It is a different model of progress, 
balancing the social and economic needs of the human species with the non-
negotionable imperative of living within the earth’s natural limits with and 
through biodiversity. It is as much a challenge to one's philosophy and 
personal values, as to one's political and economic systems, requiring a shift 
from an ethos of exploitation and domination to one of stewardship and global 
responsibility. 
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Wildlife cannot survive in a developing economy unless it is self-supporting. If 
a zero-use preservation option is enforced, use of wildlife will often take an 
illegal and unsustainable form. Opposing sustainable use is therefore 
tantamount to opposing the objectives of biodiversity conservation. 
South Africa is one of the world’s richest areas of biodiversity. One of the most 
important tasks of the government, national parks, provincial parks, game 
ranchers, and every organisation involved in nature conservation, is to ensure 
that the species and ecosystems of the country are maintained for their 
natural and ecological value, and that they are promoted for sustainable use 
to support new and innovative approaches to development. 
The commitment of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
(2000) to sustainable use, allows diverse interest groups, ranging from 
governments to tourism businesses, local communities, state conservation 
agencies and local NGOs to work together. Unfortunately a number of 
accredited IUCN  members oppose the organisation’s commitment to 
sustainable use. 
Among the IUCN's global membership, sustainable use has different 
implications, depending on a particular member’s world view. The world view 
dichotomy seems to fall between north and south (Allen & Edwards, 1995:97). 
Many members from developing countries view sustainable use as the best 
option for societies in rural areas, who depend on wild species, while many 
members from developed countries view sustainable use with more 
scepticism. 
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According to members from the developed countries, sustainable use appears 
to contradict the aims of conservation. They view sustainable use as a 
threatening concept, because it challenges perceptions of what conservation 
is about. More significantly, sustainable use challenges other paradigms in 
conservation. The possible lifting of the ban on international trade in rhino 
horn, in order to allow sustainable use, is an example of such a challenge. 
In early times in South Africa, the objective of environmental conservation was 
based mainly on a preservationist motive. As in most of South Africa at that 
time, the wildlife management actions were aimed at maintaining the system 
untouched (Els & Bothma, 2010:932). 
The concept of 'conservation' differs from that of 'preservation'. Preservation 
means keeping people away from wild animals and plants. Conservation, on 
the other hand, means people are allowed access to, and also to utilise, 
natural resources in such a manner that the resources are not exhausted. It 
may even be improved in quality and quantity (Verdoorn, 2008:15). Thomson 
(1986:25) makes a distinction between these two concepts, and explains that 
conservation implies “wise use”, while preservation implies “protection from 
harm”. Preservation revolves around saving or preserving animals, usually in 
national parks or game reserves. According to Duffy (2010:149), this model is 
reflected in the definitions that IUCN uses for protected areas; for example, an 
IUCN Category 1a area is a strict preserve which can be used only for 
scientific research, while a Category 1b is a wilderness area managed to 
protect its “natural condition”.  
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In contrast, sustainable use does allow for human use of wildlife, as long as it 
does not damage long-term survival. Duffy (2010:149) then refers to the term 
'use', and differentiates between 'consumptive' and 'non-consumptive' use. 
Non-consumptive uses of wildlife are basically those that do not kill the animal 
– for example, photographic tourism. Consumptive use refers to activities 
which result in the animal being killed. 
History shows that the negative incentives in protectionist policies, such as 
trade bans and law enforcement, are simply not enough to deter people from 
overexploiting wild resources (Allen & Edwards, 1995:94). 
The South African environmental authorities now endorse the principle which 
was accepted by the IUCN, that the sustainable utilisation of renewable 
natural resources is a legitimate form of conservation. 
2.7.1 Hunting as a form of sustainable use 
Hunting is generally one of the most demonstrable forms of sustainable use. 
There has been an increase of most game animals in South Africa, due to the 
demand by hunters for these animals. On most game ranches, owners allow 
sustainable hunting to ensure that the populations remain viable and 
productive. There are some exceptions, and sometimes the preservation 
strategy becomes a necessity to ensure that a species or species complex are 
not exhausted, such as the oribi Ourebia ourebi (Verdoorn, 2008:15). 
As can be expected, the use of hunting as a conservation tool generates 
much debate. According to Emslie (2005), this is due to the philosophical 
differences of opinion on – 
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- whether it is right to kill individual animals to further overall 
conservation objectives for the greater good of a population or 
species; or 
- whether one supports the principle of sustainably using wildlife 
and resources to generate revenue to help fund conservation 
management programmes, and to create positive economic 
incentives to encourage the private sector and communities to 
conserve wildlife and habitats. 
Trophy hunting forms the economic backbone of the hunting industry, based 
on the income generated both directly and indirectly. Foreign (or international) 
hunting forms the bulk of the trophy hunters in South Africa (Du Toit, Van 
Rooyen and Bothma, 2010:643). According to Child, Musengezi, Parent and 
Child (2012:12), the recovery of wildlife over much of Southern Africa has 
gone hand-in-hand with trophy hunting, which is a robust, low-risk solution for 
two reasons: firstly, the mathematics of population biology, and secondly, the 
transparency of safari hunting markets. An offtake of 2-3% provides a steady 
supply of quality trophy males, compared to the population growth rate of 10% 
to 30%. Trophy hunting is profitable and ecologically robust, even more so 
because trophy hunting markets are personalised and information rich. 
The legal harvest  of white rhino (i.e. hunting) is economically motivated, and 
is regulated through a system of permits, mostly on private land. Limited 
hunting of white rhino has been undertaken since 1968. This has clearly been 
sustainable because, since hunting began, numbers of white rhino have 
increased. Legal hunting, combined with the impact of poaching, has not yet 
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reached a level where it has caused a cessation in population growth (Emslie, 
2005). 
The 13th Conference of the Parties (CoP 13) of CITES from 2-14 October 
2004 in Bankok, Thailand, also approved quota applications by Namibia and 
South Africa each to sport hunt five surplus male black rhinos per year. 
Due to the significant economic benefits of hunting to game farmers (together 
with live sales and ecotourism), the private sector has increasingly stocked 
these animals, effectively maintaining rapid metapopulation growth, and 
contributing to the expansion of the species’ range with a further 22,274 km² 
added to the conservation estate in South Africa (South Africa, 2013c). 
According to Benson (2004:40), hunting for recreation has contributed the 
most towards the protection and wise use of nature around the world, 
because hunters wanted to protect land and animals so that hunting could 
continue over time. Kenya, which imposed a blanket ban on all hunting in the 
1970s, has lost almost 85% of all its game. 
The anti-hunting animal rightists argue that because international trophy 
hunters strive to always remove the biggest and best breeding males from the 
animal herds – i.e. the biggest trophies, it weakens the genetic makeup of wild 
animal populations. According to Thomson (2006:28), the truth is that every 
year more and more record trophies are being taken, and this has been 
continuing for decades – not just for years. 
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2.7.2 Community conservation 
The lucrative illegal market for rhino horn is not the only cause of the poaching 
pandemic; poverty is another reason. Poverty is rife in Africa, and when the 
people are reduced to the survival level on the human hierarchical scale of 
needs, people from these communities will do anything in order to survive. 
Communities who are located next to protected areas bear the brunt of 
exploitation, whence crime syndicates recruit potential poachers. If a poacher 
from such an impoverished community is confronted by the last rhino on 
earth, he will still kill it (Thomson, 1992:37). The development of a new wildlife 
culture is absolutely imperative if the continent’s wildlife is to survive 
(Thomson, 1992:42). 
Various projects were launched globally, that aimed to relieve the pressure of 
human survival in communal rural communities. The international shift in 
emphasis in the approach to practical conservation and its acceptance as a 
point of departure for wildlife management, also had an impact in Africa. 
According to Els and Bothma (2010:926), the main objective of these projects 
was to relieve the pressure being exerted by humans on conservation areas. 
This was done by channelling material advantages from the conservation 
areas to their neighbouring rural communities. Implementation was based on 
three main strategies, which were followed either singly or in combination: 
- The first strategy was to improve wildlife management 
measures, and/or to create buffer zones around these 
conservation areas where utilisation was allowed. 
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- The second strategy involved compensating loss of access to, or 
replacement of, the natural resources in the conservation areas. 
- The third strategy was to help the local communities to develop 
socio-economically in other ways, so as to reduce their 
dependence on the renewable natural resources of their 
environment. 
Areas managed by rural communities, either alone or in partnership with 
private enterprise and government agencies, should furthermore assist in 
removing the “hard edge” from essential core conservation areas, where 
human intervention and management are necessarily being kept at an 
absolute minimum. These “hard-edged’ protected areas would have “overflow 
zones” within the surrounding communal and private areas, once the idea has 
taken hold. In the buffer zones, wildlife can be utilised sustainably for the 
economic benefit of all living there. This fact alone will give all communities 
and private owners around a protected area, a vested interest. Examples of 
multiple use zones exist in South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Despite the variety of institutional structures, the new initiatives share a key 
assumption: conservation policies will work only if local communities receive 
sufficient benefits to change their behaviour from taking wildlife to conserving 
it. The benefits offered by the programmes to induce behavioural changes, fall 
into three broad categories (Gibson & Marks, 1995:944). The first type is 
linked directly to wildlife: locals receive jobs, and benefit from the meat of 
safari-killed game, and a few programmes directly give households a share of 
the income. The second type is linked indirectly to wildlife, and consists of the 
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standard goods dispensed by development projects – such as schools, clinics 
and houses. The last type relates to the empowerment of rural residents, 
allowing for a greater degree of participation in decision-making. 
According to Milton (2000:119), community-based conservation involves more 
than consultation and participatory planning. There needs to be an economic 
incentive to conserve, rather than to overexploit, resources. Without economic 
development, natural resources are unlikely to be sustainably managed or 
conserved. 
The aforementioned projects encountered problems as well. According to 
Gibson and Marks (1995:946), the ADMADE programme in Zambia 
experienced serious difficulties that reflected its fundamental assumptions and 
design. Local hunters changed their tactics and prey. Chiefs quickly realised 
the potential of their position in the new scheme, and those initially not 
involved in ADMADE later clamoured to join.  
Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE still contends with considerable levels of poaching. 
Some reports claim that illegal hunting has increased after CAMPFIRE’s 
introduction (Gibson & Marks, 1995:951). It is sometimes difficult to identify 
the community, as communities are not homogeneous in their opinions, 
attitudes and needs, and there are likely to be strong differences within any 
group of people living in a single geographical area (Milton, 2000:120). 
This approach was persistently criticised as being incapable of addressing 
poaching in the long term, especially commercial-scale poaching for lucrative 
wildlife products such as ivory, tiger bone and rhino horn (Duffy, 2010:97). 
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According to Child et al. (2012:4), it is naïve to suggest that wildlife can 
resolve poverty for millions of people on drylands, but, on the other hand, 
Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) has clearly 
benefited both people and wildlife where it has been implemented with some 
level of competence. 
Despite the normal problems encountered in this regard, all those with 
experience of facilitating or participating in community-based conservation 
projects, felt that the approach was appropriate for South Africa’s economic 
and environmental needs.  
With increased dependence on wildlife resources comes decreased 
effectiveness of protectionist conservation strategies – such as the creation 
and management of protected areas, and national and international laws 
designed to enhance the protection of threatened species. People will take 
what they need, in order to survive (Allen & Edwards, 1995:93). 
Emerging from the sustainable use debate is a clear recognition by many that 
positive incentives are the link between resource use and good resource 
management. According to Allen and Edwards (1995:94), history shows that 
the negative incentives in protectionist policies, such as trade bans and law 
enforcement, are simply not enough to deter people from overexploiting wild 
resources.  
With regard to the position in South Africa in 1993, the former National Parks 
Board (now South African National Parks (SANParks) initiated a 
comprehensive community partnership programme in the KNP. The 
programme is known as the Integrated Conservation and Development 
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Project (ICDP) of the KNP, and it was designed to meet some of the needs of 
the rural communities who live west of the KNP. Similar steps have been 
taken by the North West Province, Mpumalanga, the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal (Els & Bothma, 2010:931-934).  
According to the Minister of Environmental Affairs, in a media release on 2 
September 2014, poachers come from the communities. It is also from these 
communities, many of them underdeveloped and neglected, that the natural 
instinct to protect wildlife may be superseded by monetary concerns, because 
the communities are simply too poor. To ensure the long-term sustainable 
utilisation of wildlife, it is important that communities become involved – not 
only by creating an enabling environment that facilitates rhino ownership and 
management for disadvantaged communities, but also through creating 
economic alternatives to poaching within these communities.  
2.7.3 Tourism (wildlife tourism) 
Wildlife-based tourism is a non-consumptive means of using wild resources to 
benefit human populations. According to Barnes, Burgess and Pearce 
(1992:136), wildlife tourism offers a nation the chance to develop a high value 
added industry that simultaneously protects wildlife by removing or reducing 
the incentive to develop land for agricultural or other uses and/or exploit 
wildlife for consumptive uses. 
Tourism is more stable, over the long term, than any other foreign exchange 
earners. Compared with other industries, which are prone to abrupt 
fluctuations and frequent sharp declines, tourism has seldom fallen into a 
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serious long-term downturn, making it seem a near recession-proof industry at 
the global level (Honey, 1999:91). 
The ability to maintain profits in any industry depends on demand and the 
structure of the market. There is no economic profit in any perfectly 
competitive market with a large number of suppliers providing identical goods 
(Isaacs, 2000:65). South Africa is synonymous with the Big Five – one of only 
a few countries that can compete in this market. Should the rhino become 
extinct, South Africa stands a chance to lose a substantial number of tourists. 
According to figures from Statistics South Africa, 14,860,216 foreign visitors 
arrived in South Africa in 2013, a 10,5% increase over 2012. Of these, 9,6 
million were tourists, translating to a 4,7% year-on-year increase in 
international (including the rest of Africa) tourist arrivals, and a 7,1% increase 
in overseas (excluding Africa) tourist arrivals. According to figures for the 
period ending December 2012, direct tourism contribution to the gross 
domestic product (GDP) grew from R83,5 billion in 2011 to R93,3 billion (or 
3% of the GDP) in 2012. At the same time, tourism contributed approximately 
617,287 direct jobs in 2012, amounting to about 4,6% of direct employment in 
the country – up from over 591,785 direct jobs in 2011 (Department of 
Tourism, 2014). 
Ecotourism (which includes wildlife tourism) has the potential to alleviate 
poverty in South Africa by bringing money into the economy and creating jobs. 
With tourism growing, the present time offers an opportunity to capitalise on 
wildlife tourism, to ensure that people living close to the areas being visited 
are benefiting from the economic growth. Reinvesting a portion of the 
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earnings from wildlife tourism directly into the communities living next to the 
tourist destinations, would alleviate poverty. 
An honest account of the ecotourism industry (including wildlife tourism) also 
demands examination of its negative impacts. These side effects can be 
described in terms of damage inflicted intentionally, and unintentionally, on 
native fauna and flora, indigenous cultures and various ecological assets 
(Isaacs, 2000:61). 
Roads and tracks can act as barriers to the movement of wildlife. In addition, 
many animals avoid roads, tracks and trails (Buckley, 2004:212). Where 
ecotourism actively involves wildlife viewing, it can frighten animals away, 
disrupt their feeding, or acclimatise them to the presence of people (Buckley, 
2004:213). 
According to Isaacs (2000:64), the negative impacts of tourism can be 
reduced, and the ecotourism enthusiasts can try to (1) persuade government 
to use its regulatory and administrative powers for the public benefit, (2) 
convince private entrepreneurs that ecotourism is personally profitable, and 
(3) coerce individual entrepreneurs and tourists to comply with its principles 
for philanthropical reasons. 
2.7.4 Can the “sustainable use” approach save the South African 
rhinos? 
The basic message of the sustainable use approach is that wild resources 
and ecosystem services are extremely vulnerable. If the ways that these 
resources and services are governed were changed, and landholders and 
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rural communities could be placed at the junction of benefit and management, 
wild resources would pay for themselves, and, simultaneously, address rural 
poverty and environmental injustice (Child et al., 2012:5). 
The sustainable use approach aims to maximise the benefits from wildlife to 
the people on whose land it lives. According to Child et al. (2012:2), between 
the 1960s and 1980s park authorities in Southern Africa collaborated on a 
bold policy experiment: they devolved the rights to use wildlife to landholders 
(and communities), they encouraged multiple commercial uses of wildlife to 
drive up its value, and, in some countries, they deliberately slashed 
bureaucratic requirements which act as a tax against wildlife. These policies 
proved highly successful. 
There are now reported to be some 9,000 game ranches in South Africa 
alone, and over 15,000 which combine wildlife with livestock. The South 
African game ranching sector has expanded at between 5% and 20% 
annually in the past decade, whereas real farm incomes have declined by 
5,3% (Child, 2012:2). Game ranching is a diverse sector that combines 
ecotourism, the sale of live animals, several forms of hunting, and, as a by-
product, meat production. Environmentalists who promote private sector 
involvement, argue that individuals seek to promote their own welfare and so 
protect the resources on which their welfare depends – and also because 
economic values for resources provide the most efficient way of allocating 
resources (Duffy, 2000:68). 
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Rhino conservation in South Africa has historically been successful. From 
fewer than 100 white rhinos in 1910, they have grown to a viable population, 
of which a substantial number occur on private land. 
Child (2012:3) uses the framework in Table 2.3 for analysing conservation 
strategies: 
Table 2.3:  An economic framework for analysing conservation strategies. 
Proprietorship High price Low Price 
Weak Frontier economy:  
Wild resources are 
decimated through 
poaching and 
unsustainable harvesting. 
Quadrant 1 
No hope economy:  
Wild resources are 
usually replaced by more 
valuable and/or privately 
owned (domestic) 
resources.  
Quadrant 2 
 
Strong Sustainable use approach: 
Wild resources are 
conserved through the 
sustainable use approach 
and community-based 
natural resource 
management.  
Quadrant 3  
Survive if subsidised 
economy:  
Wild resources are 
usually replaced by more 
valuable domestic 
resources, but are 
sometimes conserved 
because people like them 
and can exclude other 
users.  
Quadrant 4 
Source: Child (2012:3). 
The sustainable use approach is most effective where proprietorship is strong 
and prices are high – as indicated in Quadrant 3 in Table 5. However, where 
wildlife is valuable, but proprietorship is weak or absent (Quadrant 1), a 
frontier or open-access economy exists with a high likelihood that wildlife will 
be rapidly exploited. Child (2012:3) then refers to the position regarding rhino 
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where the approach was to ban trade in the hope of reducing the incentives 
for poaching. This ban has moved rhino from Quadrant 1 to Quadrant 2, which 
is the 'no hope' strategy, where landholders switch to more viable enterprises, 
park agencies have less income to fight poachers, and government places a 
lower priority on wildlife because its social and economic benefits are 
reduced.  
According to Child (2012:3), a more constructive strategy is to move from 
Quadrant 1 to Quadrant 3 by devolving rights to use rhino to landholders (and 
reduce regulatory restrictions), and encouraging trade to drive up its price 
through innovation. 
According to Hume (2013), the wildlife ranching sector, were it given the 
opportunity to prosper through utilisation – both consumptive and non-
consumptive, is the one and only buffer available which will ensure the future 
survival of South Africa’s rhinos. 
‘t Sas-Rolfes (1993:ix) is of the opinion that a regime which allows the full 
appropriation of rents by the custodians of rhinos would seem to provide 
greater incentives to conserve, while simultaneously improving economic 
efficiency. Supply of white rhino is relatively unconstrained, with individual 
animals quite frequently being offered for sale at game auctions. 
Consequently, the private sector is significantly involved in this market. There 
is also considerable private sector involvement in both tourism and trophy 
hunting. 
Since the first auction of white rhino in 1986, a total of 3,226 animals have 
been sold at a value of R498 million. The prices of white rhino, since 2000, 
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are shown in Figure 2.2. There was a decrease in the price of white rhino 
between 2000 and 2005. Pseudo-hunting started in 2006, whereafter there 
was an increase in the price of white rhino until 2008 (Du Toit, 2015:64). 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
400000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 
Figure 2.2: Auction prices of white rhino (2000-2013). Source: Du Toit, 
2015:64. 
The public sector is involved mainly in providing tourist services, and owns a 
number of parks and reserves. The largest number of rhinos occur in these 
parks and reserves. Many reserves provide hunting in addition to tourism. 
They are also involved in selling live animals to the private sector. Public 
sector agencies are unlikely to sell black rhinos to the private sector without 
an express undertaking to breed them for conservation purposes alone (‘t 
Sas-Rolfes, 1990:8). 
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2.8 COMPARATIVE EXAMPLES 
2.8.1 Elephant 
Ivory has been an item of trade since pre-history, and its use is deeply 
ingrained in many cultures. Unlike other wildlife products which are primarily 
used for medicine, food and clothing, ivory is primarily used for ornamental 
purposes. 
Four decades ago there was a thriving legal trade in ivory. According to Rice 
(2015), efforts to regulate the trade in ivory had failed, hence CITES adopted 
the international ban on ivory trading, in 1989. In 1999, CITES agreed to allow 
an “experimental” sale of stockpiled ivory to Japan. At the 2002 CITES 
meeting, China blamed the 1999 decision for confusing people, and cited the 
“experimental” sale as the principal cause of the increasing amount of illegal 
ivory entering its shores. 
By 2005, China started campaigning for another stockpiled ivory sale in which 
it would be a recipient. Poaching had begun to increase, along with the 
number of large-scale seizures of illegal ivory, many of which were destined 
for China. 
In 2008, CITES agreed on another sale to accredited Chinese and Japanese 
traders. The stockpiled ivory from four countries (South Africa, Namibia, 
Botswana and Zimbabwe) was sold at an auction for an average price of $160 
per kilogram. In China, this legal ivory was sold on to the registered traders 
and dealers at from $450 to $1500 per kilogram. Once it reached the 
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registered retail outlets, some of it was sold at around the equivalent of $7,000 
per kilogram (Rice, 2015). 
Bennett (2015) is of the opinion that there is a mismatch between the demand 
for ivory and the quantity of tusks available. Similar arguments are raised in 
the case of rhino horn; however, in the case of ivory, the elephant, Loxodonta 
africana, has to either die from natural causes, or be killed, in order to provide 
ivory for the market. In the case of rhino horn, the horn can be harvested on a 
sustainable basis. 
According to Duffy (2010:152), the continuing "wrangles" over ivory and rhino 
horn trading reveal that merely banning the trade does not provide a simple 
and effective answer. A trade ban is problematic, because it is a one-size-fits-
all solution. It is a simplistic and blunt instrument, which fails to grapple with 
the everyday complexities of wildlife management in different places all over 
the world (Duffy, 2010:153). 
2.8.2 Vicuňa 
Research was done in 2012 (Jacobsen, 2012) on the parallel between the 
rhinoceros and the vicuňa, Vicugna vicugna. The vicuňa is native to the 
Andean highlands of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru. The wool of the 
vicuňa is highly sought after in the fashion industry. Prior to European 
colonisation, the vicuňa was considered sacred, and only royalty was allowed 
to wear the wool. They then numbered about two million animals. 
From the time of the Spanish Conquest up to around 1964, there was 
unrestricted hunting of the species. In the mid-1960s, it was estimated that 
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vicuňa numbers were down to only 6,000 animals, and they were declared 
endangered. 
In 1966, a nature conservatory was established for the vicuňa by the Peruvian 
government. Poaching was a serious problem, as poachers came from the 
impoverished local communities. Game wardens were trained in conservation 
and anti-poaching measures, but this proved too slow, and it was difficult to 
incentivise people with the mere offer of a job when the poaching racket was 
far more lucrative in the short term. In 1975, vicuňa were listed as a CITES 
Appendix 1 species, and all trade in their products was prohibited. 
In the 1980s, a Peruvian textile company initiated the “Shear a vicuňa to save 
a vicuňa” campaign, and developed a business plan where they would pay 
local communities to protect vicuňa populations and gather vicuňa wool 
sustainably. The wool would be manufactured into garments and sold 
internationally, and a large portion of the profit would return to the 
communities. 
As a result of these efforts, the vicuňa numbers increased, and CITES agreed 
to lift the trade ban on parts of the vicuňa populations of Peru and Chile. They 
were listed as Appendix 2 species, strict control measures were put in place 
for certain herds, and all farmers had to comply with CITES regulations; 
however, vicuňa could be farmed, herded, sheared, and their wool sold on the 
world market – without having to kill an animal. 
In 1994, the vicuňa numbers in Peru increased to 66,500, hence CITES 
relaxed the trade ban on vicuňa in all its range states, and the majority of the 
 
 
96 
populations were listed as Appendix 2 species, for the exclusive purpose of 
allowing trade in their wool, and with restrictions on this trade. 
In 2007, the vicuňa population in Peru increased to 188,000 animals (55% of 
the global population). The increase in Peru’s vicuňa population is shown in 
Figure 2.3: 
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Figure 2.3: Peru’s vicuňa population 1964-2007. Source: Jacobsen, 2012. 
2.8.3 Prohibition of alcohol in the United States 
A prohibition on the consumption of alcohol was imposed in the U.S. in 1920 
(Thornton, 1991). It was undertaken to reduce crime and corruption, solve 
rural problems, reduce the tax burden, and improve health and hygiene in the 
U.S. 
Alcohol consumption had been decreasing by approximately 9% per annum in 
the ten years prior to prohibition in 1922.  While there was a one-year dip the 
year after the imposition of a bar, the per capita consumption of alcohol 
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increased by 7% per annum in the following ten years, as shown in Figure 2.4 
(Wiltshire, 2015a): 
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Figure 2.4:  Alcohol consumption in the United States: 1910-1929. Source: 
Wiltshire, 2015a). 
2.8.4 Deer Industry in New Zeeland 
Velvet antlers can be defined as “deer antlers, during their phase of rapid 
growth”, and have the name “velvet’ because of the velvet-like covering of 
hair. The first documented evidence of the use of velvet antler as a health 
tonic was found on a silk scroll recovered from a Han Tomb in Hunan 
Province in China. The scroll has been dated at 168 BC. Velvet antler is 
considered by the Chinese to be one of the most powerful animal-based 
remedies in their Traditional Chinese Pharmacopoeia (TCP). 
Deer numbers in New Zealand have grown from a small number to 
approximately 1,2 million, from which is harvested 500 tons of antler velvet 
every year, at a price of $150/kg or $150,000/ton. No animals are harmed, it is 
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legal, and the velvet still goes mainly to China and a few neighbouring 
countries. There are plenty of deer still in the wild, with no poaching (Van 
Hoven, 2015). 
2.9. THE CITES BAN ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN RHINO HORN 
To regulate the wildlife trade, the IUCN, the WWF and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) created another international organisation in 
1975: the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) (Thomson, 2006:3). 
The basic approach of CITES is to regulate international trade in wild animals 
and plants by listing them in three appendices to the treaty, and providing for 
different degrees of protection and trade controls in each category. Appendix 
1 reflects the protectionist aspect by listing species threatened with extinction, 
and prohibiting commercial trade in them or their products altogether – subject 
to a few exceptions. Appendix 2, on the other hand, allows trade, subject to 
controls, in listed species which are not yet threatened but may become so. 
Appendix 3 enables a party to the treaty, which provides protection of a 
species in its domestic legislation, that species not being listed in appendices 
1 or 2, to enlist cooperation from other parties, in order to control trade 
(Glazewski, 2005:50). 
CITES specifically sets guidelines for states to follow in implementing their 
treaty obligations; however, it lacks an effective institutional mechanism for 
enforcement. CITES is similar to other international treaties, in that its text 
does not specify a mechanism of international enforcement which the parties 
can collectively use to ensure that other parties comply with the treaty 
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(Cheung, 1995:129). The white rhino and three Asian species were listed on 
CITES Appendix 1 at the Convention’s inception in 1975. The black rhino was 
moved to Appendix 1 in 1977. 
According to ‘t Sas-Rolfes (1997b:2), Appendix 1 listings of all rhino species 
has not had a discernible positive effect on rhino numbers, and does not seem 
to have stopped the trade in rhino horn. The listings led to a sharp increase in 
the black market price of rhino horn, which simply fuelled further poaching and 
encouraged speculative stockpiling of horn. According to Mander (2012:2), the 
ban has pushed the trade underground, and onto the black market, in order to 
feed demand. 
According to Du Toit (2013:190), most consumer countries did not 
immediately adhere to CITES, thereby allowing for some collection of credible 
price data following the initial ban. This data shows that the 1977 ban was 
followed by a sharp increase in consumer prices for rhino horn in Asian 
markets. Official import data from at least three countries (Japan, Taiwan and 
South Korea) shows a significant price hike in subsequent years. Alongside 
Yemeni data, record pre-ban wholesale values for rhino horn were 
experienced, ranging from US$ 17 to US$ 75 per kilogram, but by 1980 they 
varied between US$ 477 and US$ 764 per kilogram. 
Africa’s black rhinoceros populations continued to be decimated, with 
estimated numbers dropping from about 12,750 in 1981 to some 2,550 by 
1993. During this time, populations in Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia were 
severely reduced – in the latter instance, to complete extinction. By 1991, an 
undercover survey in Taiwan revealed that the average black market 
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wholesale price for African horn was about US$ 3,075 per kilogram, and Asian 
horn about US$ 60,025 per kilogram. In Yemen, the early 1990s wholesale 
price (of African horn) was allegedly in the region of US$ 1,200 per kilogram. 
In 2011, the average retail price appeared to be in the region of US$ 65,000 
per kilogram. This high price has encouraged a far more concerted and 
sophisticated organised crime element to enter the rhino horn market. Growth 
in market demand threatens to outpace the potential rate of supply under a 
trade ban, hence market prices should continue to rise. This makes rhino horn 
worthy of the attention of entrepreneurs who engage in trade and speculative 
investment (Du Toit, 2013:191-192). 
Recognising the failure of the Appendix 1 listing, the following resolutions 
were taken by CITES: 
- 1981:  It was resolved to call on nations that were not parties to 
CITES, also to take measures to prevent the international trade in 
rhino products, and it called for a moratorium on the sale of all 
government and parastatal stocks of rhino products. 
- 1987:  It was resolved to call for even stricter measures, including 
the complete prohibition of trade in all rhino products both 
internationally and domestically. It also called for the destruction of 
government stocks of rhino horn, and suggested that affected 
countries should be financially compensated for destroying their 
stockpiles. Most range states refused to destroy their stockpiles of 
rhino horn, and several key consumer countries failed to implement 
domestic legislation. 
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- 1994:  White rhino in South Africa were downlisted to Appendix 2, 
subject to an annotation. The annotation provided that only live 
animals and trophies would be traded commercially. 
- 2004:  A similar downlisting for Swaziland occurred, and limited 
black rhino trophy hunting quotas for South Africa and Namibia 
were allowed. 
2.10 THE VIABILITY OF LEGALISING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN RHINO 
HORN 
It has already been mentioned in Chapter 1, section 1.2, that there are two 
schools of thought regarding approaches to prevent rhino poaching. 
The first school of thought refers to those who believe that the rhino horn 
trade is wrong, and therefore has to be stopped. This can only be achieved by 
eliminating demand, mainly through the restrictions on trade – the 
“conventional approach”. 
The second school of thought argues that any solutions to the rhino poaching 
problem must address the underlying economic forces. This point of view is 
also referred to as “sustainable use”. The pro-trade argument starts from the 
premise that poaching and illegal trade are a consequence of trade bans 
imposed by bodies such as CITES. The supply reduction provoked by the 
trade ban stimulates the black market and drives prices upwards. The high 
prices on the illegal market constitute powerful incentives that compensate for 
the costs and risks of wildlife trafficking. The trade ban thus fails to achieve its 
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goals, as demand and supply are funnelled underground into relatively 
contained illegal markets where prices and profits are very high. 
It is acknowledged by both schools that there is a market for rhino products, 
hence many of the factors driving poaching and illegal trade in rhino horn, are 
economic in nature. Surging prices of rhino horn is clearly one of them. Other 
economic factors include the poverty in parts of rural South Africa and other 
range states, insufficient budgets for protected area management (especially 
on provincial level), and rising income in consumer countries – particularly 
Vietnam (Campbell, 2013:10). 
The advocates of both schools accept that there is a market for rhino horn, 
leading to a number of implications (Department of Environmental Affairs, 
2013:29): 
- The fact that this market is – for the most part – illegal under CITES,  
does not mean that it does not exist. Declaring the trade in rhino 
products “illegal” has not closed the market down. 
- An illegal market may have some unique characteristics, but 
dynamically it still behaves in much the same way as a legal market. 
A product’s illegal status does not negate the laws of supply and 
demand; it does, however, make it harder to analyse. 
- From the perspective of the participants in the market (suppliers and 
consumers) there is probably little about rhino products that is 
innately different from many other products: it can be supplied 
profitably, and it satisfies particular wants or needs. 
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One of the proposals for fighting rhino poaching is to legalise the trade in rhino 
horn, and adopt a regulated market approach (RMA). The aim of increasing 
the supply of horn is to reduce incentives to poach, by driving down the price. 
There have also been numerous calls for the South African government to sell 
existing stockpiles accumulated from de-horning, natural mortality and the 
seizure of illegal horns, in order to generate funds for conservation efforts.  
According to Collins, Fraser and Snowball (2012:6), the underlying logic of an 
RMA is that, through a series of sales of state-sanctioned stockpiles of 
confiscated endangered species products and/or endangered species 
products from captive breeding programmes (CBPs), the market price can be 
influenced downwards. It is contended that this would reduce the incentive to 
poach, and thus reduce the rate of poaching-related killing of endangered 
wildlife. The outcome of such a policy remains highly uncertain, given that for 
some endangered species' products, demand seems both very persistent and 
highly inelastic. 
Elasticity of demand is a key concept used when studying basic 
demand/supply fundamentals.  Products with an inelastic demand curve 
experience little or no change in demand as price changes.  Examples of 
inelastic products would be highly addictive drugs and lifesaving medicines.  
On the other hand, an elastic product could be something that is easily 
substituted.  A perfectly inelastic product would have a vertical demand curve, 
as shown in Figure 2.5, while a perfectly elastic product would have a 
horizontal demand curve: 
 
 
 
104 
Price    Perfectly  Price      
    Inelastic        
    Demand        
             
            Perfectly 
            Elastic 
              Demand 
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
                  
    Quantity     Quantity 
 
Figure 2.5:  Elasticity of demand. Source: Küller, 2014. 
Ferreira, Pfab, and Knight (2014) compiled a report, based on a workshop 
held in 2013, on management strategies to curb rhino poaching. The 
workshop was attended by 30 participants who had expert interest and 
experience across a broad spectrum of fields, including traditional affairs, 
resource economics, law, enforcement and compliance, conservation science 
and ethics. In addition, the attendees had a common interest in rhinos, and 
were representative of various value systems associated with conservation, 
animal welfare, animal rights, national and provincial South African 
government, and private rhino ownership. A risk-benefit analysis of five 
different rhino management strategies was undertaken to assess the potential 
for delivering agreed-upon rhino conservation objectives.  
The demand and supply of rhino horn to the market for each of the five 
management strategies are described in Table 2.4 (Ferreira et al., 2014:5): 
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Table 2.4: Summary of the risks and benefits associated with the 
management strategies to curb rhino poaching in South Africa. 
Strategy Detailed risk-benefit analysis 
Direct 
disincentives 
(status quo) 
Overall, risks were dominated by an expected general 
degradation of all conservation values with some measure of 
certainty.  Negative consequences for economic values were 
highlighted, but participants were relatively uncertain about 
their impacts and the likelihood of them materialising.  The 
strategy, however, carries some certainty regarding risks to the 
public perception and conservation reputation, including some 
costly logistical challenges. Overall, risks substantially 
exceeded benefits (Figure 2.6). 
International 
awareness 
(demand 
reduction) 
It was acknowledged with some uncertainty that declines in 
poaching rates and enhanced conservation effects may result 
from this strategy.  Degradation of conservation values were 
thought to be more likely, but also with considerable 
uncertainty.  There was also some uncertainty about what the 
consequences might be for the economic value of rhinos.  This 
strategy carried some logistical challenges with considerable 
costs, but benefits to South Africa’s reputation were 
anticipated.  Overall, the strategy carried more risks than 
benefits (Figure 2.6). 
Provision of  
live animals 
to consumer 
states to 
breed for 
horn 
 
Direct poaching effects on rhinos may diminish, but indirect 
effects were identified as having potentially high negative 
impacts on the conservation values of rhinos in South Africa.  
There was general uncertainty about other conservation 
consequences, although some were perceived to be beneficial.  
The effect on the value of live rhinos was thought to be high in 
the short term, and to diminish over time.  It was anticipated, 
although with some uncertainty, that there may be risks 
associated with animal welfare, ethics and South Africa’s 
conservation reputation, but that benefits would more than 
likely accrue from consumer states being appreciative of the 
recognition of their traditional values.  A large number of 
logistical challenges were envisaged.  It was anticipated that 
revenue could be generated, creating further opportunities.  
This option carried more perceived benefits than risks (Figure 
2.6). 
Restricted 
trade in horn 
Several consequences associated with horn stockpiling were 
identified.  It was imagined that rhino owners may want to have 
the option to sell their rhino horn stockpiles, because at 
present, holding rhino horn is a security risk.  It was envisaged 
that this management option would open the possibillity to 
locally perfect the trading mechanism with its checks and 
balances, for later roll-out to the international market.  
Generally, the risk to conservation objectives remained, with 
 
 
106 
much uncertainty and additional expectations of high logistical 
challenges associated with innovative criminal activities and 
stockpile management.  Some opportunities associated with a 
number of anticipated conservation incentives were noted, in 
addition to the increase economic value of live rhinos through 
hunting opportunities.  Overall, this approach carried nearly 
equal risks and benefits (Figure 2.6). 
Unrestricted 
trade in 
rhino horn 
Because of an anticipated reduction in poaching incentives, 
several benefits were identified for conservation and economic 
value objectives.  These assessments, however, only carried 
some certainty.  Enhancement of South Africa’s conservation 
reputation was anticipated, even though there were some risks 
associated with South Africa’s support of medicinal uses that 
may have limited value.  The strategy was perceived to carry 
considerable challenges associated with establishing a 
legitimate trading partner, regulated trade procedures, as well 
as high costs associated with lobbying internationally to 
achieve CITES compliance, although these costs were 
anticipated to be offset by increased financial gains.  
Generally, this strategy had substantially more benefits than 
risks (Figure 2.6). 
Source: Ferreira et al., 2014:5. 
The descriptions include each strategy’s logistical challenges and 
opportunities, relative financial costs and revenue generation potential. A 
comparison of the five alternative management strategies (Figure 2.6) 
suggests that rhino poaching may best be addressed by management 
strategies that generate benefits at least equal to, or higher than, the 
associated risks involved in the supply of horn to the market. Overall, 
unrestricted international trade in rhino horn produced the best risk-benefit 
score, while the worst-case scenario, in which risks substantially exceeded 
benefits, was provided by the status quo strategy (Ferreira et al., 2014:6). 
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Figure 2.6: Relative comparison of risks and benefits for five evaluated 
management strategies to curb rhino poaching in South Africa. Source: 
Ferreira et al., 2014:6. 
According to Bulte and Damania (2005:1223), the key insights to safeguard 
endangered species from excessive hunting pressure are based on simple 
economics: conservation efforts should be geared towards reducing the 
benefits of harvesting, or increasing its cost. Information campaigns, for 
example, are aimed at lowering consumer demand by stigmatising the 
consumption of certain wildlife products. As a result, demand shrinks and 
prices fall, eroding the profitability of harvesting effort, and lowering hunting 
pressure. Raising consumer awareness and altering human preferences, 
however, are difficult and time-consuming, and often hold limited impact. 
Enforcement by anti-poaching units, in contrast, raises the cost of poaching by 
introducing an expected fine or penalty. Both approaches – raising cost and 
reducing benefits – have been effective, with varying degrees of success. 
Bulte and Damania (2005:1223) call this the “supply-side approach” to wildlife 
conservation. Supply-side conservation aims to provide a cheap substitute for 
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the wildlife commodity in question, depressing the commodity's market price – 
which lowers hunting incentives, and forces harvesters to search for 
alternatives. 
Fischer (2004:927) states the following: 
Traditional economic theory says that selling confiscated goods 
should unambiguously  lower prices by satisfying consumer 
demand. These lower prices mean the gains from poaching must be 
smaller, leading to reductions in the activity.  
Campbell (2013:12) has adapted the model by Bulte and Damania (2005), 
which illustrates this effect, showing that if a farmed quantity of a wildlife 
product such as rhino horn is put on the market, prices will decline, and supply 
sourced from poaching will fall (Figure 2.7): 
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Figure 2.7: Basic model of impact of trade on poaching. Source: Adapted by 
Campbell (2013:12) from Bulte and Damania (2005). 
According to this model, the initial supply of rhino horn comes entirely from 
poaching, which results in the high “initial price” and the “initial quantity” 
supplied and demanded by the market. As trade is legalised, farmed and 
stockpiled rhino horn is allowed on the market, expanding total supply, and 
reducing the price to the “legalised trade price”. At that price, poaching has 
become less attractive, so the quantity supplied to the market by poaching 
has been reduced from the “initial quantity” to the level of “poached quantity 
with trade”, the remainder of the supply to the market being made up of supply 
from legal sources (Campbell, 2013:13). 
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According to Fischer (2002:34), although the traditional market model for 
endangered species products suggests that sales of confiscated and legally 
harvested goods help reduce incentives for poaching, more complex 
interactions between markets for endangered species products can lead to 
results that contradict the traditional model. When the policy goal is simply to 
minimise poaching, the intuition behind the “to ban, or not to ban” question 
depends on the characteristics of the markets. If demand from law-abiding 
consumers is relatively high, and laundering can and would occur, an 
enforceable  ban on trade would minimise poaching. However, if the bulk of 
demand comes from non-compliant consumers, and if laundering would 
generally occur, then allowing sales of certified goods would tend to lower 
prices and encourage a return to poaching. 
Bulte and Damania (2005:1223) argue that the basic premises of the supply-
side model ignore important elements of conservation, and demonstrate that 
this model may at times be counterproductive. Supply-side conservation 
typically rests on the assumption that the market for wildlife commodities is 
characterised by perfect competition. The trade in some wildlife commodities 
is, according to Bulte and Damania (2005:1226), one example of an 
imperfectly competitive industry that is controlled by a relatively small number 
of criminal organisations or networks. These groups have the ability, to a 
certain extent, to set market prices by manipulating their own supplies. These 
traders are the crucial hinge between poachers and consumers, often illegally 
trafficking their commodity across borders, and typically earning supernormal 
profits. Bulte and Damania (2005:1232) admit that their main objective is not 
to negate the potential for captive breeding (and therefore legal trade) as a 
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conservation tool, but rather to sound a note of caution on its use. Simple 'rule 
of thumb' might not exist in the complex world of international trade in wildlife 
commodities. 
‘t Sas-Rolfes (2012:14) is of the opinion that establishing an appropriately 
structured legal trading regime for rhino horn may provide a more effective 
and lasting solution to the rhino poaching problem, for three reasons: 
- Firstly, it would bring trade out into the open. Market prices would 
be visible, thereby allowing for continued and accurate monitoring of 
ongoing consumer demand relative to supply. This would enable 
governments, conservationists and rhino owners to be far more 
immediately responsive to changing market conditions. 
- Secondly, by providing a significantly increased and potentially 
ongoing source of supply, the incentives for speculative stockpiling 
by criminals would be greatly reduced, if not altogether removed. 
Furthermore, by meeting the demand at the highly inelastic and 
persistent “top end” of the market, the price of horn would almost 
certainly drop, perhaps quite drastically, thereby reducing the 
profitability of the illegal market and concomitant incentives for 
poaching and illegal trade. 
- Thirdly, by becoming active market participants, legal suppliers of 
rhino horn gain a new source of income, which they are able to re-
invest in improved protection and breeding. Legal owners and 
custodians also have a significant competitive advantage over 
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poachers and illegal suppliers: defendable legal rights and, in most 
cases, privileged physical access to, and control over, their stocks. 
According to Biggs, Courchamp, Martin and Possingham (2013:1), a legal 
trade could similtaneously supply horns, fund rhino protection, and provide an 
incentive for the animals' sustainable use and long-term survival. These 
authors argue that evidence from other wildlife products suggests that a legal 
trade can reduce the incentive for poaching if (i) regulators can prevent the 
laundering of a threatening level of illegal supply under the cover of a legal 
trade; (ii) the legal supply can deliver the product (horn) more easily, reliably 
and cost-effectively than the illegal trade; (iii) the demand does not escalate to 
dangerous levels as the stigma associated with the illegality of the product is 
removed; and (iv) legally harvested horns from live animals can substitute for 
horns obtained from wild poached animals. 
Fischer (2002) refers to a situation where two separate markets exist – legal 
and illegal, and argues that a characteristic of these markets is, inter alia, that 
laundering may bring illegal goods to legal markets when trade is allowed. 
According to Milliken and Shaw (2012:105), there are many instances of 
wildlife commodity trade where legal and illegal trades have existed in parallel, 
and where export, wholesale or retail dealers have had access to both 
sources of trade. Biggs et al. (2013:1) are of the opinion that technology exists 
to track the legality of individual horns, through the selling chain to the end 
consumer, to minimise laundering and the illegal trade. Each legal rhino horn 
traded can carry a small traceable transponder, and have a recorded DNA 
signature which remains identifiable through the market chain to the buyer. 
The fact that rhino horn will most likely change form into a generic, 
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nondescript powder in the end-use market, presents a further challenging 
dimension for the development of an effective identification, monitoring and 
law enforcement system that precludes laundering of illicit horn into the trade 
(Milliken & Shaw, 2012:105). 
According to Child (2012), there are three counter-arguments to the allegation 
that legal trade will cover for illegal trade: 
- Rhino horn has been banned for 35 years (since 1977), yet rhinos 
are still highly threatened; surely it is time to devise new 
approaches? 
- Legalising the rhino horn trade in South Africa is likely to shift the 
market out of the hands of organised crime into legal channels, 
which must be good for rhinos and other wildlife currently moving 
through these illicit channels. A large and steady supply of horns is 
also likely to lower and stabilise prices, which also plays against the 
black market. 
- Rhinos are most seriously threatened where proprietorship of them 
is weak, or where there are insufficient funds for law enforcement in 
protected areas. 
‘t Sas-Rolfes (2012:14) refers to two arguments that have been raised against 
the legal trade option. The first argument is a hard-line ethical stance against 
any form of human interference with, or commercial exploitation of, rhinos, on 
the grounds of them being “wild” animals. This stance regards any form of 
rhino “farming” as abhorrent – an attitude that typically extends to the 
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dehorning of live, free-ranging animals.  The author responds to this argument 
by stating that relatively few unmanaged or "wild” rhino populations remain; 
most are at least subjected to the soft exploitation of tourist viewing, as well as 
frequent veterinary intervention. Such ethical stances are neither objective nor 
absolute – they are subjective and relative. This stance is ultimately self-
defeating if it results in the type of brutal treatment of rhinos that is being 
observed, simply because a compromising position is not accepted.  
The second argument against legal trade is grounded in a concern that, if the 
ban were to be lifted, market size would grow significantly – to an extent even 
greater than can be provided by legal suppliers (Milliken & Shaw, 2012:105). 
According to ‘t Sas-Rolfes (2012:15), this scenario, while not completely 
impossible, is highly unlikely. For poaching to actually increase after lifting a 
ban, would necessitate a dramatic outward shift of the demand curve and/or a 
far more competitive cost function for illegal suppliers. 't Sas-Rolfes continues 
to discuss the likelihood of an outward shift in the demand curve. In the short 
term, the demand curve would shift outward after a ban was lifted, if 
previously law-abiding consumers decided to enter the market.  
In the longer term, two other factors could lead to an outward shift in the 
demand curve: rising levels of income and aggressive product marketing by 
suppliers. Rising income levels are a factor, irrespective of whether the market 
is legal or not. Aggressive product marketing is probably easier in a legal 
market, but can also be addressed by measures that are far easier to 
establish in that environment than in an underground market (‘t Sas-Rolfes, 
2012:15). 
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Nadal and Aguayo (2014:10) are of the opinion that the pro-traders’ argument 
relies on very stringent and highly unrealistic assumptions. Competition is 
presented as perfect competition, meaning that suppliers are price-takers, or it 
is presented in very rudimentary terms. Key agents in the supply chain are 
presented in many cases as crime syndicates, but no serious analysis is 
undertaken to unravel its economic logic.  
Nadal and Aguayo (2014:16) then criticise the argument in favour of wildlife 
trade, in that it only holds logically within a neoclassical mindset, when 
competition is perfect (in the sense that suppliers are unable to set prices), 
supply is vertically integrated, laundering and stigma effects are non-existent, 
there is no product differentiation, and agents do not behave strategically. If 
any of these assumptions is relaxed, a legal trade would more likely stimulate 
poaching. 
According to Duffy et al. (2013:12), critics point out that legalisation will not 
work as imagined, because of weak enforcement in range states and end-
user markets that legalisation will result in a price drop, and therefore the 
economic returns will not be as predicted. A price drop could also result in 
many more consumers being able to afford rhino horn in Southeast Asia, and 
this may stimulate demand. 
Some opponents of a legal trade in rhino horn have also raised concerns 
about the possible impact on rhinos in Asian and other African range states 
where they may be less well-protected, coupled with the risk that a significant 
parallel illegal market could develop. Sharing of some of the revenues from 
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rhino horn sales with other rhino range states has been mentioned as an 
option (Duffy et al., 2013:12). 
South Africa still needs to establish a credible trading partner. All the former 
rhino horn consuming countries in Asia, and also Vietnam, have effected legal 
bans against the trade, and most have moved to completely remove rhino 
horn as an approved ingredient in their traditional medicine. Any proposal to 
CITES to allow legal trade in rhino horn would require the identification of a 
trading partner in the form of a consumer interested in opening a legal rhino 
horn market, but to date there has been no clear indication of interest from 
any of the known end-user countries in Asia (Milliken & Shaw, 2012:105). 
In order to consider the viability of legalised trade, it is important to have 
knowledge of current stockpiles, as well as potential future horn supplies. 
Rhino horn stockpile information is currently considered very sensitive in 
South Africa, due to the high risk of theft. 
According to Taylor et al. (2014:64), the most recent estimate available for the 
total weight of rhino horn kept in registered stockpiles in South Africa (state 
and private) was 15,152 kg as at 31 December 2010. 
Potential horn supplies are sourced from natural mortalities, break-offs and 
de-horning. Taylor et al. (2014:72) predicted that the potential minimum horn 
accumulation that could be acquired from all sources in 2014 would be 2,587 
kilograms (Table 2.5). The maximum horn accumulation for 2014 would be 
3,941 kilograms. 
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Table 2.5:  Minimum and maximum future horn accumulation for all rhinos in 
South Africa. 
Year Horn mass 
(kg) from 
state white 
rhinos- 
natural 
mortalities 
Horn mass 
(kg) from 
private 
white 
rhinos- 
natural 
mortalities 
Horn mass 
(kg) from 
all black 
rhinos- 
natural 
mortalities 
Horn mass 
(kg) from 
break-offs 
(both 
species) 
Horn mass 
(kg) from 
de-horned 
white 
rhinos 
Total 
annual 
horn mass 
(kg) 
accumu-
lation 
 25%  
recovery 
75%  
recovery 
25%  
recovery 
 National 
trade 
Minimum 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
2019 
2020 
388 
394 
401 
409 
416 
425 
434 
443 
453 
221 
234 
248 
263 
278 
295 
313 
332 
351 
16 
17 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
37 
37 
37 
37 
37 
37 
37 
37 
37 
1.677 
1.778 
1.884 
1.997 
2.117 
2.244 
2.379 
2.521 
2.673 
2.339 
2.460 
2.587 
2.724 
2.867 
3.021 
3.184 
3.355 
3.537 
 
 
 
Year Horn mass 
(kg) from 
state white 
rhinos- 
natural 
mortalities 
Horn mass 
(kg) from 
private 
white 
rhinos- 
natural 
mortalities 
Horn mass 
(kg) from 
all black 
rhinos- 
natural 
mortalities 
Horn 
mass (kg) 
from 
break-offs 
(both 
species) 
Horn mass 
(kg) from de-
horned white 
rhinos 
Total 
annual 
horn mass 
(kg) 
accumu-
lation 
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 75% 
recovery 
75% 
recovery 
75% 
recovery 
 International 
trade 
Maximum 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
2019 
2020 
1.163 
1.182 
1.203 
1.226 
1.249 
1.274 
1.301 
1.329 
1.359 
221 
234 
248 
263 
278 
295 
313 
332 
351 
48 
50 
52 
55 
58 
61 
64 
67 
70 
37 
37 
37 
37 
37 
37 
37 
37 
37 
2.137 
2.265 
2.401 
2.545 
2.698 
2.860 
3.032 
3.214 
3.406 
3.606 
3.768 
3.941 
4.126 
4.320 
4.527 
4.747 
4.979 
5.223 
Source:  Taylor et al. (2014:73). 
The literature reveals different opinions pertaining to the effectiveness of the 
ban on international trade and the lifting of the ban, and promotors of the 
“sustainable use” approach will need a two-thirds majority vote in favour of the 
lifting of the ban on international trade. 
CITES has a large number of parties (countries/states) – 180 as at 31 August 
2014. Many of these countries do not have rhinos, yet they have to participate 
in any decision-making in this regard. The NGOs who are also part of the 
decision-making processes at the CoP, do not have any direct interest in 
rhinos from a monetary point of view. South Africa is home to 93,2% of white 
rhinos and 36% of black rhinos in Africa, yet South Africa has one vote at the 
CoP. These rhinos are kept by SANParks, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, provincial 
nature reserves and private rhino owners. The latter are the parties most 
affected by any decisions regarding trade in rhino horn, although they are not 
always afforded the opportunity to raise their views. 
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2.11 SUMMARY 
This chapter dealt with the legal position pertaining to the protection of rhinos 
in South Africa, the role of international law, and measures implemented by 
the South African government. 
The importance of wildlife conservation, and the reasons why species should 
be saved, were discussed. The concept of poaching, with the focus on 
commercial poaching and the poacher, as well as Mozambique’s role in rhino 
poaching, were addressed. The effectiveness of certain strategies to 
stop/prevent poaching were also investigated. 
Various authors' views on sustainable use, and the viability of legalising 
international trade in rhino horn, were evaluated. The effectiveness of the 
CITES ban on international trade in rhino horn (first research question) was 
also discussed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter gives a description and justification of the methodology, sampling 
and data collection techniques adopted in this study. Thereafter, analysis of 
the collected information is discussed. 
This chapter concludes with a discussion of ethical considerations, validity 
and reliability, as well as the limitations to the study. 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
A research design is, according to Nieuwenhuis (2012:70), a plan or strategy 
which moves from the underlying philosophical assumptions to specifying the 
selection of respondents, the data gathering techniques to be used, and the 
data analysis to be carried out. 
According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009:5), the word 'research' has 
three characteristics: firstly, research is data that is collected systematically; 
secondly, research is data that is interpreted systematically; and thirdly, 
research has a clear purpose – namely, to find things out. 
The classification of 'research purpose' most often used in research method 
literature, is the threefold one of 'exploratory', 'descriptive' and 'explanatory'. 
Exploratory research, according to Saunders et al. (2009:592), is research 
that aims to seek new insights into phenomena in a new light. Exploratory 
research can be conducted through a literature search and interviews with 
experts on the topic. Descriptive studies, on the other hand, intend to portray 
an accurate profile of persons, events or situations (Robson, 2002:59), 
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whereas explanatory studies emphasise studying a situation or a problem, in 
order to explain the relationships between variables (Saunders et al., 
2009:140). 
In the light of the aforementioned, the exploratory study is deemed 
appropriate for this study. The choice of this research strategy was guided by 
the research questions and the objectives of the research. 
Research can further be differentiated according to the research strategy that 
is chosen. According to Saunders et al. (2009:600), a research strategy is the 
general plan of how the researcher will go about answering questions or 
meeting research objectives. Research strategies can be divided into 
qualitative research, quantitative research and a mixed methods approach. 
Leedy and Ormrod (2010:94) point out the following differences between a 
quantitative and qualitative approach:  
- Quantitative research involves looking at amounts or quantities of one or 
more variables in some way, perhaps by using commonly accepted measures 
of the physical world (e.g. rulers, thermometers, oscilloscopes), or carefully 
designed measures of psychological characteristics or behaviours (e.g. tests, 
questionnaires, rating scales). 
- Qualitative research involves looking at characteristics or qualities, that 
cannot easily be reduced to numerical values. A qualitative researcher 
typically aims to examine the many nuances and complexities of a particular 
phenomenon.  
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As far as the purpose of a specific research approach is concerned, 
quantitative researchers seek explanations and predictions that will generalise 
to other persons and places. Qualitative researchers seek a better 
understanding of complex situations (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:95). 
According to De Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport (2011:312), the qualitative 
research design differs inherently from the quantitative design, in that it does 
not usually provide the researcher with a step-by-step plan or fixed recipe to 
follow. The term 'qualitative research' is an indication that this approach 
concentrates on the qualities of human behaviour – i.e. on qualitative aspects, 
and not quantitatively measurable aspects of human behaviour (Schurink, 
2003:3). 
According to Kara (2012:114), mixed method research is research that 
includes qualitative and quantitative elements, using both primary and 
secondary data. Mixed method research is described by Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004:17) as the class of research where the researcher mixes 
or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, 
approaches, concepts or language, into a single study. According to Saunders 
et al. (2009:152), mixed method research uses both quantitative and 
qualitative data collection techniques and analysis procedures, either at the 
same time or one after the other, but does not combine the two techniques. 
This method has also been criticised. According to Gorard (2007:1), mixing 
methods is wrong – not because methods should be kept separate, but 
because they should not have been divided at the outset. 
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According to Marshall and Rossman (2006:54), the strengths of qualitative 
studies should be demonstrated for research that is exploratary or descriptive 
and that stresses the importance of context, setting and the participants’ 
frame of reference. In qualitative research, according to Nieuwenhuis 
(2012:56), it is maintained that knowledge should emerge out of the local 
context, and privilege the voice of the “insiders”, taking into account what 
people say, do and feel, and how they make meaning of the phenomena 
under investigation.  
Patterns, trends and themes should therefore emerge from the research 
process, and the role of the researcher should be to understand real-life 
situations from the point of view of the insider, rather than from that of the 
outsider. It was for this reason that the methodology used in this study was of 
a qualitative nature. Rhino poaching is not a single faceted issue. It is 
complex, and interacts with all sectors of society – from rhino owners to local 
communities, rhino custodians and government. 
Another reason for using the qualitative method was the need to corroborate, 
validate and explain the information that was collected during this study. 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994:10), qualitative research is useful 
when one needs to supplement, validate, explain or interpret the collected 
information. 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010:137), qualitative research provides a 
means by which a researcher can judge the effectiveness of particular 
policies, practices or innovations. This is also one of the reasons why the 
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researcher decided on a qualitative research approach – more specifically, to 
answer the first two research questions: 
(i) Does the CITES ban on international trade in rhino horn provide 
an effective measure to stop or prevent poaching? 
(ii) Can the lifting of the ban on international trade in rhino horn 
discourage poaching and save the rhino from extinction?  
Qualitative researchers typically rely on four methods for gathering 
information: (a) participating in the setting; (b) observing directly; (c) 
interviewing in depth; and (d) analysing documents and material culture 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2006:97).  
Qualitative research acknowledges an interactive relationship between the 
researcher and the participants, as well as between the participants and their 
own experiences, and how they have constructed a reality based on those 
experiences (Nieuwenhuis, 2012:55); hence, interviews and questionnaires, 
combined with a desk-based study, have been chosen for the purposes of this 
research. 
3.3 DATA COLLECTION STRATEGIES 
Data was collected by means of semi-structured interviews, questionnaires 
and a desk-based study (literature review).  
3.3.1. Interviews 
According to Fontana and Frey (2000:655), interviewing involves individual, 
face-to-face, group interchange, mailed or self-administered questionnaires 
 
 
125 
and telephone surveys. These can be structured, semi-structured or 
unstructured in nature. Individual interviews represent the most widely-used 
data collection strategy in qualitative research (Sandelowski, 2002). 
Researchers typically choose individual interviews to collect detailed accounts 
of participants’ thoughts, attitudes, beliefs and knowledge, pertaining to a 
given phenomenon (Fielding, 1994). 
The aim of qualitative interviews is to see the world through the eyes of the 
participants, and can be a valuable source of information, provided they are 
used correctly (Nieuwenhuis, 2012:87). 
Interviews are put into three general categories: the informal, conversational 
interview, the general interview guided approach, and the standardised, open-
ended interview (Patton, 2002:341). The open-ended interview is based on an 
assumption fundamental to qualitative research: the participant’s perspective 
on the phenomenon of interest should unfold as the participant views it (the 
emic perspective), not as the researcher views it (the etic perspective) 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2006:101). This type of interview usually requires the 
participant to answer a set of predetermined questions. It does allow for the 
probing and clarification of answers (Nieuwenhuis, 2012:87).  
In this research, the exact wording and sequence of questions were 
determined in advance (questionnaire attached as Appendix A). All 
participants were asked the same basic questions in the same order. 
Questions were worded in a completely open-ended format. The researcher 
started with the more general questions, and included descriptive questions 
where participants had to give a general overview. Contrast questions were 
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also included, in order to encourage participants to compare certain 
perceptions. Evaluative questions guided the participants towards their own 
personal feelings regarding rhino poaching.  
At first sight, questions 8, 9 and 16 appeared to be closed and quantitative in 
nature – which could have resulted in a mixed methods being used. However, 
the purpose of questions 8 and 9 was to determine whether rhinos are 
regarded, from the viewpoint of the owner, as an asset or a liabilty. The 
purpose of Question 16 (with sub-questions) was to determine whether rhino 
owners are prepared to participate in the compilation of a centralised 
database, and the kind of information that they are prepared to provide. The 
overall purpose of these questions was therefore of a qualitative nature. 
According to Symonds and Gorard (2010:126), the traditional categorisation of 
the many different “tools”, “techniques” or “methods” for collecting data seems 
to be largely based on whether they create closed- or open-ended data. 
However, the idea of “closed” data should not be confined to the quantitative 
paradigm. The current assignment of closed- and open-ended data gathering 
methods into separate paradigms is based on their most common use, and 
not on their potential, or in some cases their actual, uses. Quantitative 
researchers tend to rely more on deductive reasoning, whereas qualitative 
researchers make considerable use of inductive reasoning. However, it is 
important to note that quantitative research is not exclusively deductive, nor is 
qualitative research exclusively inductive (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:96). 
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The use of semi-structured interviews allows the views of different 
stakeholders to be put into play against each other, staging an indirect 
dialogue that produces more nuanced conversations. 
Questions ranged from 'factual' questions that asked people to provide 
information, to 'opinion' questions that assessed their attitudes and 
preferences. The focus in this study was on both 'factual' and 'opinion' 
questions. As the participants consist of rhino owners and non-owners (e.g. 
NGOs), the latter were only required to respond to those questions relevant to 
themselves. Individual interviews were conducted with six (6) of the 18 
participants. (The selection of participants will be discussed in section 3.4). 
 The researcher made use of a digital tape recorder, in order to record the 
interviews. These were transcribed at a later stage. Permission to use a tape 
recorder was obtained from each participant prior to the interview. The 
participants were given the option to stop the tape recorder at any stage. 
Notes were also taken, and compared with a transcript of the tape. The 
interviews followed a conversational mode (with the questionnaire as basis), 
which presented the opportunity for a two-way interaction between interviewer 
and participant.  
According to Marshall and Rossman (2006:102), interviewers should have 
superb listening skills, and be skillful at personal interaction, question framing, 
and gentle probing for elaboration. The researcher is a practising attorney with 
extensive experience in interviewing and questioning. Participants were 
cooperative – especially the rhino owners, and were eager to impart their 
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knowledge. Two of the interviewees, however, objected to the use of the tape 
recorder.  
An informal (face-to-face) interview was conducted with a representative of 
the South African Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), as well as with 
the chief warden of one of the nature reserves in Botswana. During these 
interviews, and due to the nature of these interviews, the researcher deviated 
from the questions contained in the questionnaire. The purpose of these 
interviews was to obtain some background, with a view to conducting the 
research for this study. 
Questionnaires were sent by email to those participants who could not be 
interviewed personally. It was not expected of participants to fill in their 
responses on the questionnaire and thereby limit the length of their respective 
responses. Participants did not have to write the answers down in given 
spaces on the questionnaire. No limitations were put on the length of their 
responses, except in those cases where the question specifically made 
provision for a short motivation.  
According to McCallon and McCray (1975:17), some of the characteristics of a 
good questionnaire are as follows: 
- The respondent should feel that the instrument will provide 
meaningful solutions to a problem, and should have a direct bearing 
on the research problem. 
- The covering letter should be brief and inviting. 
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- The respondent should be motivated and persuaded to complete 
the questionnaire. 
- Depending on the research problem, the questionnaire should be as 
short as possible. 
- Unnecessary questions should be eliminated from the 
questionnaire. 
- The questionnaire should be neat, professional and well structured. 
The researcher made sure that the questionnaire in this study complied with 
the abovementioned characteristics. 
The questionnaires were accompanied by a covering letter explaining the 
purpose of the research, as well as a consent form (copy of letter and form 
attached as Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively). According to Berdie 
and Anderson (1974:59), the covering letter should impress the respondent 
and motivate them. Participants were also telephoned beforehand and 
informed of the purpose of the research, as well as the background. 
3.3.2 Desk-based study/literature review 
According to Marshall and Rossman (2006:107), researchers supplement 
participant observation, interviewing and observation, with gathering and 
analysing documents produced in the course of everyday events, or 
constructed specifically for the research at hand. As such, the review of 
documents is an unobtrusive method, rich in portraying the values and beliefs 
of participants in the setting.  
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According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010:145), qualitative researchers often use 
multiple forms of data in any single study. They might use observation, 
interviews, objects, written documents, audovisual material, electronic 
documents (e.g. email messages, Internet websites), and anything else that 
could help them answer their research question. Furthermore, many 
qualitative studies are characterised by an emerging design. Data collected 
early in the investigation often influences the kinds of data that the researcher 
subsequently gathers. In this research, the researcher used the collected data 
in order to frame the research problem as well as the research questions. 
An extensive literature review was conducted on the topic. According to 
Nieuwenhuis (2012:82), it is important to distinguish clearly between the 
literature review of a study, and using documents as part of the data-gathering 
strategy. The two do overlap, in the sense that they both deal with data 
sources in some or other written format, but including document analysis as 
part of the data-gathering strategy is something distinct from the literature 
review. Hofstee (2006:121) refers to this technique as the extended literature 
review, a technique used to classify and relate various schools of thought and 
debates. 
This stage of the research design involved a qualitative approach, to access 
the knowledge and opinions of stakeholders involved in conservation, as well 
as those who are affected by the ban on international trade in rhino horn.  
Most of the NGOs did not want to participate in the research, hence the 
researcher had to rely on a literature research pertaining to the relevant 
NGOs’ viewpoint on the subject. 
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3.4 SAMPLING 
The researcher selected a sample which would be reliable and appropriate for 
this study. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010:96), qualitative researchers 
are often described as being the research instrument, because the bulk of 
their data collection is dependent on their personal involvement (interviews, 
observations) in the setting, whereas in many quantitative studies it is 
statistical representivity that is sought. With qualitative studies, generalisability 
of results is frequently the target, and this can be achieved when the sample, 
in terms of content, represents the case being investigated (Flick, Von Kardoff 
& Steinke, 2004:167). 
Sampling refers to the process used to select a portion of the population for 
study. According to Bailey (1994:96), purposive sampling is done when the 
researcher chooses only those respondents who have specific knowledge that 
best meets the purpose of the study. Qualitative research is generally based 
on non-probability and purposive sampling, rather than probability or random 
sampling approaches. Purposive sampling simply means that participants are 
selected because of some defining characteristics that make them the holders 
of the data needed for the study. Sampling decisions are therefore made with 
the explicit purpose of obtaining the richest possible source of information to 
answer the research questions. Purposive sample sizes should rather be 
determined on the basis of theoretical saturation (the point in data collection 
when new data no longer brings additional insights into the research question) 
(Nieuwenhuis, 2012:79). In qualitative research, credibility of the findings is 
not measured in terms of the number of participants, but in terms of the 
richness of the information gathered. 
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Typically, the sample is selected to represent some larger population of 
interest – the group of people or institutions that are the subject of the 
research (Clifford & Valentine, 2003:950). According to Green and Thorogood 
(2009:120), the experience of most qualitative researchers is that, in interview 
studies, little that is new comes out of transcripts after one has interviewed 
twenty or so people. 
The following criteria, as mentioned by Flick et al. (2004:169), was applied in 
the selection process for this research: 
- They had available the knowledge and experience that the 
researcher needed. 
 - They were capable of reflection. 
 - They were articulate. 
- They had time to be interviewed (or to respond to the 
questionnaire). 
 - They were willing to take part in the investigation. 
The sample in this study was not taken according to the principle of 
randomness, as this kind of sample would have led to results based on 
emotions only. In this study, stakeholders in nature conservation, rhino 
owners and NGOs were chosen – specifically those who had a direct interest 
in the conservation of rhinos. 
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According to Flick et al. (2004:167), the investigation should involve not only 
favourable cases that confirm the existing state of one's knowledge, but also 
unfavourable or critical cases. It must be guaranteed that different viewpoints 
are represented, and that the participants show themselves to be well 
informed. 
Prior to the selection of a sample, the literature review in Chapter 2 already 
revealed different viewpoints. It is not always possible to predict the viewpoint 
of a specific participant, as it can only be established after the interview or 
after analysing the questionnaire. However, the viewpoint of an organisation 
such as the PROA and most of the NGOs, could be established by means of 
a press release or policy documents. Participants were not selected on the 
basis of a specific viewpoint that they might have had, but on the basis that 
they had an interest in the conservation of rhinos. 
Further, in order to comply with the requirement of presenting different 
viewpoints, a literature research was conducted by the researcher.  
Although only eighteen (18) participants participated in this study, they 
represented the owners and custodians of approximately 80% of the rhinos in 
South Africa. With this sample, in combination with the literature review, the 
requirement of generalisation would be achieved.  
The sample structure for this study is represented in Table 3.1 below. As rhino 
poaching is a very sensitive issue, the researcher cannot reveal the specific 
number of rhinos per rhino owner or custodian. 
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Table 3.1: Sampling structure of participants. 
A senior representative from SANParks. 1 
Chairperson of the Private Rhino Owners Association (South 
Africa), an organisation representing approximately 500 private 
rhino owners in South Africa. 
1 
A representative of Wildlife Ranching South Africa. 1 
Three representatives from organisations involved in 
conservation of rhinos. 
3 
A representative from an organisation involved in conservation 
in general (rhinos included). 
1 
Senior representatives from two provincial nature conservation 
authorities in South Africa. 
2 
Six private rhino owners. 6 
The manager of a game reserve on the western boundary of the  
KNP and chairperson of Game Reserves United. 
1 
The manager of a private game reserve. 1 
A representative from an NGO. 1 
TOTAL 18 
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A number of NGOs involved in conservation were approached. Most of the 
NGOs did not even respond to the request to participate. However, the CEO 
of one of the leading NGOs in nature conservation responded as follows (the 
response is an indication of the extent of the questionnaire that was used for 
this research): “I have looked at the questionnaire but simply haven’t got the 
time to reply as it will take me several days to reply in full. Also, a lot of what 
you are asking for cannot be answered in simple terms and the issues speak 
to complete EWT policies and positions, some of which are under 
development. I am afraid that there is simply just too much information 
required and it would be like me writing a thesis to cover everything that you 
have raised. I am also not able to reply to some questions due to my role as 
member of the Committee of Inquiry. I wish you luck with the thesis and am 
sorry that we cannot help”. 
For this reason, the researcher had to rely on policy (and other) documents, to 
determine the views of some some of the NGOs which did not participate in 
the study. 
3.5 LIMITATIONS 
According to Marshall and Rossman (2006:42), all proposed research projects 
have limitations; none is perfectly designed. One of the challenges that the 
researcher encountered was the reluctance of NGOs involved in nature 
conservation, to participate. Also, many of the private rhino owners were 
reluctant to participate, as they were afraid that sensitive information 
regarding their specific situation could be revealed. 
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It was difficult to arrange for interviews with some of the participants, due to 
long distances and time constraints. The researcher travelled approximately 
2,520 km in order to conduct interviews. A telephone conference was 
conducted with one of the participants situated in Cape Town. 
Credibilty and quality of findings are often questioned in qualitative research 
studies. These aspects will be addressed in section 3.7. 
3.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
Analysis involves breaking up the data into manageable themes, patterns, 
trends and relationships. The aim of analysis is to understand the various 
constitutive elements of one’s data through an inspection of the relationships 
between concepts, constructs or variables, and to see whether there are any 
patterns or trends that can be identified or isolated, or to establish themes in 
the data (Mouton, 2001:108). 
In qualitative research, the researcher usually works with descriptive data, 
collected through methods such as interviews and document analysis. The 
research strategy is usually of a contextual nature. According to Mouton 
(1996:169), this implies a focus on the individual case in its specific context of 
meanings and significance. Analysis in these cases means reconstructing the 
inherent significance structures and the self-understanding of individuals, by 
staying close to the subject. The overall coherence and meaning of the data is 
more important than the specific meanings of its parts. This leads to the use of 
methods of data analysis that are more holistic, synthetic and interpretative. 
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According to Marshall and Rossman (2006:154), qualitative data analysis is a 
search for general statements about relationships and underlying themes. The 
variety of approaches (including ethnography, narrative analysis, discourse 
analysis and content analysis) correspond to different types of data, 
disciplinary traditions, objectives and philosophical orientations. Because each 
qualitative study is unique, the analytical approach used will be unique. 
For the purposes of this study, the researcher decided on a qualitative content 
analysis – which has been defined as follows: 
(i) It is a detailed and systematic examination of the contents of a 
particular body of material, for the purpose of identifying 
patterns, themes or biases (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:144). 
(ii) Content analysis is used to refer to any qualitative data-
reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of 
qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies 
and meanings (Patton, 2002:453). 
(iii) Qualitative content analysis involves a process designed to 
condense raw data into categories or themes, based on valid 
inference and interpretation. This process uses inductive 
reasoning, by which themes and categories emerge from the 
data through the researcher’s careful examination and constant 
comparison (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2005:1). 
The basic idea of qualitative content analysis consists of maintaining the 
systematic nature of content analysis for the various stages of qualitative 
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analysis, without undertaking over-hasty quantifications (Flick et al., 
2004:266). 
Content analysis usually refers to analysing text (interview transcriptions or 
documents). With deductive analysis, the data is analysed according to an 
existing framework in contrast with inductive analysis, where findings emerge 
out of the data, through the analyst’s interactions with the data. 
Zhang and Wildemuth (2005:2) refer to three approaches to qualitative 
content analysis, based on the degree of involvement of inductive reasoning. 
The first is conventional qualitative content analysis, in which coding 
categories are derived directly and inductively from the raw data. This is the 
approach used for grounded theory development. The second approach is 
directed content analysis, in which initial coding starts with a theory or relevant 
research findings. Then, during data analysis, the researcher immerses 
himself in the data and allows themes to emerge from the data.  
The purpose of this approach is usually to validate or extend a conceptual 
framework or theory. This approach has been followed in this research, as two 
basic theories have already been identified, namely (a) that the trade ban is 
an effective method to prevent poaching (anti-trade), and (b) that the trade 
ban is not effective in preventing poaching (pro-trade). The third approach is 
summative content analysis, which starts with the counting of words or 
manifest content, and then extends the analysis to include latent meanings 
and themes. 
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3.6.1 Strengths and limitations of qualitative content analysis 
Flick et al. (2004:269) mention the following strengths and limitations of 
qualitative content analysis: 
(i) As a rule, the systematic nature of qualitative content analysis 
follows established sequential models. This renders the 
procedure transparent, intelligible, easy to learn, and readily 
transferable to new research questions. 
(ii) There is normally a system of categories at the centre of the 
analysis, but this is revised in the course of the analysis by 
means of feedback loops, and is adapted flexibly to the material. 
(iii) Its rule-governed procedure also allows for the better 
implementation of quality criteria and inter-coder reliability. 
However, if the research question is very open, or the study is of a markedly 
exploratory character, and would also be hampered by an inductive formation 
of categories, or be incapable of conclusive theoretical justification, then more 
open procedures would be more appropriate – such as those found in 
grounded theory. 
Qualitative data is complex, and not readily convertible into standard 
measurable units of objects seen and heard. It varies in level of abstraction, in 
frequency of occurrence, and in relevance to central questions in the research 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2006:155). In this study, the researcher also used the 
research questions, the objectives of the study, and the related literature, as 
guidelines for data analysis. 
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Analysis will be sufficient when critical categories are defined, relationships 
between them are established, and they are integrated into an elegant, 
credible interpretation. 
3.6.2 The process of qualitative content analysis 
Depending on the goals of a study, content analysis may be more flexible or 
more standardised, but, according to Zhang and Wildemuth (2005:3), it can be 
divided into the following steps: 
 (i) Prepare the data 
According to Zhang and Wildemuth (2005:3), data needs to be transformed 
into written text before analysis can begin. Content analysis is most often 
used to analyse interview transcripts, in order to reveal or model people’s 
information-related behaviours and thoughts. 
In this study, data generated during the interviews has been transcribed 
(transformed into written text). In the case of participants who filled in 
questionnaires, the latter were already in written form. The same applies to 
the literature. 
The researcher then organised the data in the form of a table, where the 
relevant questions appeared in the first column, the participant’s responses to 
the questions in the second column, and general comments in the third 
column. 
 (ii) Generating categories 
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Qualitative content analysis usually uses individual themes as the unit of 
analysis, rather than the physical linguistic units. According to Zhang and 
Wildemuth (2005:3), an instance of a theme might be expressed in a single 
word, a phrase, a sentence, a paragraph, or an entire document. When using 
a theme as a coding unit, the researcher is primarily looking for the 
expressions of an idea. 
Themes are common trends or ideas that appear repeatedly throughout the 
data. Themes come both from the data (an inductive approach) and from the 
researcher’s prior theoretical understanding of the phenomenon under study 
(an a priori approach) (Ryan & Bernard, 2003:85). 
A priori codes can be identified from a range of sources: 
- Previous research or theory 
- Research or evaluation questions the researcher is addressing 
- Questions and topics from the interview schedule/questionnaire 
Even with a fixed set of open-ended questions, one cannot anticipate all the 
themes that arise, before analysing the data. It is at this stage where the 
grounded theory has a role to play in discovering new themes in what 
grounded theorists call 'open coding' (Ryan & Bernard, 2003:88). 
The researcher aimed to have a preliminary model or theory, and generate an 
initial list of coding categories from the model or theory. This model or theory 
would be modified within the course of the analysis as new categories 
emerged inductively. 
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 (iii) Coding data 
Coding data is the formal representation of analytic thinking. Codes may take 
several forms – for instance, abbreviations of keywords, coloured dots and 
numbers (Marshall & Rossman, 2006:160). In this study, coloured dots were 
used. Because coding proceeded while new data continued to be collected, it 
became possible for new themes and concepts to emerge and be added to 
the coding manual. 
 (iv) Assessing coding consistency 
The consistency of coding needs to be rechecked. According to Zhang and 
Wildemuth (2005:5), it is not safe to assume that if a sample was coded in a 
consistent and reliable manner, the coding of the whole corpus of text is also 
consistent. Human codes are subject to fatigue, as humans are likely to make 
more mistakes as coding proceeds. 
 (v) Interpretation of data 
Interpretation brings meaning and coherence to the themes, patterns and 
categories. According to Patton (2002:480), interpretation means attaching 
significance to what was found, making sense of the findings, offering 
explanations, drawing conclusions, extrapolating lessons, making inferences, 
considering meanings, and otherwise imposing order. Part of this phase is 
evaluating the data for its usefulness and centrality (Marshall & Rossman, 
2006:162). 
In this study, the data was analysed in order to obtain a better understanding 
of the circumstances that caused the increase in rhino poaching. In other 
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words, the arguments of the two “schools of thought” were analysed 
(document analysis) and compared to the opinions of various stakeholders, in 
order to formulate a proposal on how to save South Africa’s rhino population. 
3.7 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
3.7.1 Introduction to the concepts of validity and reliability 
Both quantitative and qualitative researchers need to test and demonstrate 
that their studies are credible. According to Patton (1999:1190), the credibility 
issue for qualitative inquiry depends on three distinct but related inquiry 
elements: 
- Rigorous techniques and methods for gathering high-quality 
data, that are carefully analysed, with attention to issues of 
validity, reliability and triangulation. 
- The credibility of the researcher – which is dependent on 
training, experience, track record, status, and presentation of 
self. 
 - Philosophical belief in the value of qualitative inquiry. 
According to Golafshani (2003:600), while credibility in quantitative research 
depends on instrument construction, in qualitative research the researcher is 
the instrument. Although reliability and validity are treated separately in 
quantitative studies, these terms are not viewed separately in qualitative 
research. 
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The key validity criterion for data collection is “reliability”. According to Mouton 
(1996:144), this is the requirement that the application of a valid measuring 
instrument to different groups under different sets of circumstances, should 
lead to the same observations. Validity and reliability of data refers to the 
accuracy of the research findings.  The meanings emerging from the data 
have to be tested for their plausibility, sturdiness and confirmability – that is, 
their validity. Otherwise one is left with interesting stories about what 
happened, of unknown truth and utility (Miles & Huberman, 1994:11). 
Since there can be no validity without reliability, a demonstration of the former 
is sufficient to establish the latter (Lincoln & Guba, 1985:316). According to 
Golafshani (2003:601), reliability and validity are conceptualised as 
trustworthiness, rigour and quality in a qualitative paradigm. 
In qualitative research, the researcher is the data-gathering instrument. Thus 
it seems, when qualitative researchers speak of research “validity and 
reliability” they are usually referring to research that is credible and trustworthy 
(Nieuwenhuis, 2012:80).  
According to Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson and Spiers (2002:17), it is time to 
reconsider the importance of verification strategies used by the researcher in 
the process of inquiry, so that reliability and validity are actively attained, 
rather than proclaimed by external reviewers on the completion of the project. 
These strategies include, inter alia, investigator responsiveness, 
methodological coherence, sampling adequacy, an active analytic stance, and 
saturation. These strategies, when used appropriately, force the researcher to 
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correct both the direction of the analysis and the development of the study, as 
necessary, thus ensuring reliability and validity of the completed project. 
3.7.2 Testing validity and reliability in this research 
As mentioned in section 3.7.1, verification strategies, in order to ensure 
reliability and validity of data, are activities such as ensuring methodology 
coherence, sampling adequacy, and an active analytic stance. 
The researcher's intention was to ensure congruence between the research 
questions and the components of the method. According to Morse et al. 
(2002:18), the interdependence of qualitative research demands that the 
research question match the method – which matches the data and the 
analytic procedures. 
The researcher selected an appropriate sample consisting of participants who 
best represented, or had knowledge of, the research topic. This ensures 
efficient and effective saturation of categories, with optimal quality data and 
minimum dross (Morse et al., 2002:18). 
Sampling adequacy, evidenced by saturation, supplemented by a literature 
review, means that sufficient data to account for all aspects of the research, 
has been obtained. The researcher took cognisance of the fact that there 
were different viewpoints. These viewpoints were compared with data 
collected during the literature review, in order to ensure validity.  
The lack of responsiveness of the researcher at all stages of the research 
process is, according to Morse et al. (2002:18), the greatest hidden threat to 
validity, and one that is poorly detected using post hoc criteria of 
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“trustworthiness”. As a possible lack of responsiveness might have been due 
to a lack of knowledge, the researcher conducted an extensive literature 
review, in order to acquaint himself with the research topic. 
Triangulation was mentioned in section 3.7.1. According to Patton 
(1999:1197), triangulation is a process by which the researcher can guard 
against the accusation that a study’s findings are simply an artifact of a single 
method, a single source, or a single investigator’s bias. Triangulation is 
defined by Creswell and Miller (2000:126) as a validity procedure where 
researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of 
information, in order to form themes or categories in a study; therefore, 
triangulation is, typically, a strategy for improving the validity and reliability of 
research or evaluation of findings. 
One type of triangulation that contributes to verification and validation of 
qualitative analysis, is to examine the consistency of different data sources 
within the same method – that is, triangulation of sources. This means 
comparing and cross-checking the consistency of information derived at 
different times and by different means within qualitative methods – for 
instance, comparing the perspectives of people from different points of view 
(Patton, 1999:1195). This type of triangulation was utilised by the researcher 
in this study. 
According to Heyink and Tymstra (1993:297), making use of literature 
establishes the validity of qualitative research by validating the correctness of 
the findings. Literature is also used to point out the differences between 
research findings and the reasons for these differences. The researcher 
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conducted an extensive literature research; therefore, literature was also used 
to supplement and evaluate the research findings. 
The researcher strove to produce findings that would be believable and 
convincing, by also presenting negative or inconsistent findings, in order to 
add to the credibility of the study. 
According to Patton (1999:1198), there can be no definite list of questions that 
must be addressed, in order to establish investigator credibility. The principle 
is to report any personal and professional information that may have affected 
data collection, analysis and interpretation, either negatively or positively. The 
researcher in this study is a member of the Game Rangers Association of 
South Africa, the Field Guide Association of South Africa, and Wildlife 
Ranching South Africa. However, the researcher did not represent any of the 
aforementioned organisations for the purposes of this research.  
The researcher has a keen interest in nature conservation and, in addition to 
qualifications in law, obtained an MPhil in Wildlife Management. The 
researcher is also a practising attorney, with extensive experience in 
interrogation techniques. As jurist, the researcher is well trained in the 
principles of objectivity. 
3.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
According to the Helsinki Declaration of 1972, it is imperative to obtain 
clearance from an ethics committee when human (or animal) subjects are 
involved in any kind of research of an empirical nature. Unisa has a strict 
policy on ethics, and this research has adhered to that policy. 
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Any researcher has the right to search for the truth, but this cannot be done at 
the expense of the rights of other individuals in society (Mouton, 2001:239). 
According to Vermeulen (1998:17), participants in research projects have the 
right to remain anonymous, as well as to expect that their personal information 
will be treated confidentially. 
Before conducting the interviews, it was reiterated that the data would be 
viewed as confidential. The participants nevertheless gave permission for their 
names to be mentioned as having taken part in the study. Those who were 
interviewed gave permission for the interviews to be recorded. They were, 
additionally, given the choice to stop the tape recording or to withdraw from 
the interview, at any point. Two of the interviewees did object to the use of a 
tape recorder. 
3.9 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an overview of the methodology used in this study, 
with specific reference to the research design and data collection strategies. 
Interviews and a desk-based study, as data collection strategies for this 
research, were discussed, whereafter the issue of sampling was addressed. 
The process of data analysis was also detailed, as well as the limitations and 
ethical considerations of the research.  
The following chapter, Chapter 4, presents the analysis and findings resulting 
from the research process. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results derived from the semi-structured interviews, 
questionnaires, literature review, and also the policy documents of certain 
NGOs. 
The problem statement and the research questions were used as a basis, in 
order to draft the questionnaire. It was mentioned in Chapter 3, that the 
questionnaire was also used as a basis for the interviews – i.e. the 
participants were posed the questions contained in the questionnaire; the 
exact wording and sequence of questions were used.  
Participants were given the opportunity to elaborate on their responses. It was 
mentioned in Chapter 3 that, even with regard to the questionnaires, it was not 
expected of participants to fill in their responses on the questionnaire and 
thereby limit the extent of their responses. No limitations were put on the 
length of their responses, except in those cases where the question made 
provision for a “short motivation”. Interviews took approximately two hours 
each. 
The research questions, as well as the objectives of the study, were used to 
identify four categories for the purposes of analysis, namely –  
 (i) Reasons for the increase in rhino poaching 
 (ii) Concurrent strategies/techniques 
 (iii) The CITES trade ban 
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 (iii) Possible solutions 
The division of categories into themes and sub-themes is illustrated in Table 
4.1: 
Table 4.1: Categories, themes and sub-themes. 
Category Theme Sub-theme 
Reasons for the increase 
in rhino poaching 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Poor law enforcement 
 
 
 
2. Moratorium and norms 
and standards 
3. Trade ban  
4. Money driven (lucrative 
business) 
5. Increased demand 
6. Socio-economic reasons 
1.1 Corruption 
1.2 Lack in capacity and 
equipment 
1.3 Suitable punishment 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Poverty and 
unemployment 
Concurrent 
strategies/techniques  
 
 
 
 
1. Dehorning  
2. Poison 
3. Translocation 
4. Increased security 
5. Demand reduction 
 
CITES trade ban   
Possible solutions 1. Sustainable use 
 
 
1.2 Legal trade 
1.3 Trading partner  
1.4 Centralised database 
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1.5 Laundering of illegal 
horn 
1.6 Negative impacts 
1.7 Demand 
1.8 Community 
conservation 
 
The data was coded, using themes and sub-themes, and fitted into pre-
existing categories. The research adopted a theory-testing approach, and, in 
accordance with the qualitative research design, the researcher was the 
primary instrument for data collection and analysis.  
The remainder of this chapter presents the data obtained from the six (6) 
interviews and twelve (12) questionnaires, as well as the relevant literature. 
4.2 CATEGORIES 
Four categories were identified beforehand, namely  (i) reasons for the 
increase in rhino poaching; (ii) concurrent strategies/techniques to prevent 
poaching; (iii) the CITES trade ban; and (iv) possible solutions. 
The aforementioned categories will be discussed separately. 
4.2.1 Reasons for the increase in rhino poaching 
It is important to investigate and analyse this category, as it is important to link 
the reasons for rhino poaching to possible solutions.  
It must also be borne in mind that section 4.2.1 does not only relate to the 
reasons for poaching in general, but rather to the reasons for the “increase in 
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poaching of rhinos”. Poaching, as such, has been part of society for years. 
The focus of section 4.2.1 is therefore on the “increase in poaching of rhinos”.  
The various responses of the participants were in line with the views of 
experts on this topic. Knight (2015:11-12), for instance, said that poaching is 
being driven by a complex mixture of the following: 
- Increasing illegal demand for rhino horn in newfound markets in 
Southeast Asia, mainly Vietnam; 
- Cooperation and support by some unscrupulous South African 
wildlife ranchers, veterinarians, outfitters and professional hunters 
who have colluded with Asian nationals to make rhino horn illegally 
available; 
- The close proximity of Mozambique, which is awash with many poor, 
unemployed, trained and armed ex-combatants after years of civil 
war, together with an inadequate law enforcement system that is 
compromised by rampant corruption; 
- Increasing numbers of wealthy individuals and increasing disposable 
income in some Southeast Asian countries have coincided with a 
large increase in the price of rhino horn, fuelling poaching; 
- The involvement of well-organised transnational criminal networks 
has made the business of illegal trading in rhino horn into a 
multimillion-dollar industry; 
- Declined efficiency and corruption in the South African law 
enforcement and conservation establishment. 
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4.2.1.1 Poor law enforcement 
Although the interviews (and questionnaires) started with the question: “ ... 
what is the reason for the increase in rhino poaching?”, the literature research 
had already revealed that poor law enforcement could be one of the reasons 
for an increase in rhino poaching in South Africa. The researcher therefore 
asked more direct questions relating to law enforcement (questions 2, 6, 11 
and 12), in order to determine the participants’ responses to these questions. 
Therefore, in order to give a proper evaluation of the issue of law 
enforcement, it was imperative to investigate the participants’ responses to 
questions 2, 6, 11 and 12 all together, as part of this category. 
Poor law enforcement was indicated by most of the participants as a cause of 
the increase in rhino poaching, although only two of the participants indicated 
that it is the most important cause of the increase. Other reasons were also 
given, which will be discussed in sections 4.2.1.2 to 4.2.1.5.  
Even the various responses to Question 2, which did not refer directly to law 
enforcement, revealed that  most of the participants were of the opinion that 
law enforcement plays an important role. Question 2 reads as follows: “The 
current global approach to fighting illicit wildlife trafficking is failing? If yes – 
what do you think is the reason for this failure?” The majority (12) of the 
participants put the blame on poor law enforcement. 
On the question of “whether increased law enforcement can limit the poaching 
of rhinos”, the majority (11) of the participants were of the opinion that 
increased law enforcement can limit poaching. 
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When the question was asked “whether our legal system is effective enough 
to deal with poaching”, the majority (10) of the participants indicated that the 
legal system is not effective enough.  
On the question “whether the punishment fits the crime and if stricter 
sentences could deter potential poachers”, the majority (11) of the participants 
indicated that the punishment does not fit the crime, and that stricter 
sentences could deter potential poachers. By asking this question, it is almost 
like putting the participant in the shoes of the poacher. 
Participants, however, differed with regard to their views, hence the opinions 
of the minority will also be discussed in this chapter. 
In order to discuss “law enforcement”, it is also important to refer to the 
definition of “wildlife trafficking”. According to Wyatt and Cao (2015:5), wildlife 
trafficking is a multi-stage crime that, because of the focus on animals, begins 
with the poaching or capture of the target animal. They must then be 
transported by smuggling, or other fraudulent means, to the location where 
they will be sold. Depending upon the animal, or any part of the animal, and if 
they are alive or not, this involves multiple people, different forms of 
transportation, and various techniques for hiding the animal or animal part. 
For the purposes of this research, the theme “poor law enforcement” has been 
divided into three sub-themes, namely (i) corruption;  (ii) lack in capacity and 
equipment; and (iii) suitable punishment. The aforementioned sub-themes 
emanated from the interviews and the questionnaires: 
(i) Corruption 
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Corruption was mentioned as a concern by 12 participants, hence there are 
worrying signs that corruption remains a challenge to effective law 
enforcement. This concern is also reflected in the relevant literature. 
According to Douglas and Alie (2014:275), economic under-performance and 
poor governance make the resource wealth of many developing countries 
vulnerable to patronage and corruption. Lemieux and Clarke (2009:463) are of 
the opinion that where corruption is highest, trafficking is pervasive. According 
to Wyatt and Cao (2015:9), there is a range of corrupt actors, such as the 
military, police, border guards, judiciary, custom officials, embassy staff and 
state diplomats. Criminal organisations and exporters have enough money to 
bribe rangers, customs officers and police officers, in order to obtain false 
documents which make it appear that the poached wildlife is legal. 
Corruption facilitates the range of transactions that need to happen 
throughout the trafficking process. This includes all the connections between 
the supply, transit and demand countries (WWF/Dalberg, 2012:14). 
Vietnamese diplomatic officials in South Africa have been implicated in illegal 
rhino horn trade. In one instance, a Vietnamese employee in South Africa was 
caught on tape conducting rhino horn trade in front of the Vietnamese 
embassy in Pretoria. Vietnamese government officials also have served as 
“conduits’ for rhino horn between Africa and Vietnam (Environmental 
Investigation Agency, 2013:6). The aforementioned is also reflected in the 
participant’s perceptions of officials – for instance: 
“. . . big money is made, big bribes to officials happen” (P8) 
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The role of corruption and organised crime in rhino horn and ivory trafficking is 
so significant, that Interpol launched Operation Worthy in 2012 to combat 
trafficking and poaching in Africa. A key element of Operation Worthy was 
building national inter-agency cooperation through National Environmental 
Security Task Forces, which brings together representatives of police, 
customs, environmental agencies, revenue departments, transport, health 
agencies, prosecutors and Interpol. Countries which participated in Operation 
Worthy were Ethiopia, Botswana, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Ruanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe (Duffy & St John, 2013: 6). 
According to Wyatt and Cao (2015:6), several researchers have noted the 
involvement of organised crime in wildlife trafficking, and state that organised 
crime is closely tied to corruption. The corruption of government officials is 
essential to the transnational smuggling and flow of illegal goods. It has been 
pointed out that corruption itself is not the driver of wildlife trafficking; however, 
poor governance and corruption are commonly linked to this environmental 
crime as primary facilitators of its increase and existence. Poaching tends to 
thrive in places where corruption is rife, government enforcement is weak, and 
where there are few alternative economic opportunities (Wyatt & Cao, 
2015:7). This is also in line with the view of the participants: 
“. . . good organised crime syndicates too clever for corrupt police system. 
Corrupt police must be removed" (P1) 
“. . . our (South Africa) record of corruption is too high” (P2) 
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According to the Global Corruption Barometer (Heyman & Dell, 2012), 62% of 
people in South Africa feel that between 2007 and 2010, the level of 
corruption in the country had increased. It has also been found that 45% of 
the people in South Africa feel that the government’s efforts to fight corruption 
is ineffective. According to Thomson (2012:3), corruption has undeniably 
contributed to the significant rise in poaching. 
Another concern raised by the participants was the involvement of officials in 
supplying information: 
“Officials handling permits, are suspects in supplying information” (P3) 
“. . . the integrity of officials is seriously under suspicion. Corruption is a 
problem” (P13) 
The qualitative data confirms the findings of the literature pertaining to the role 
of corruption in wildlife trafficking and poaching. Most of the participants put 
the blame on officials employed by provincial nature conservation 
departments/agencies in South Africa. There is a clear lack of trust in these 
departments/agencies, and participants referred to the theft of a vast amount 
of rhino horn from the offices of the Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency. 
They also refered to the involvement of SANParks rangers and traffic officers 
in poaching in the Kruger National Park. 
Even bribery and corruption in South Africa’s neighbouring countries were 
raised as a concern – especially in Mozambique. 
(ii) Lack in capacity and equipment 
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South Africa and Kenya have both experienced a general rise in the 
proportion of horn entering illegal trade. This is indicative of the enforcement 
challenges following increased organisation of illegal horn-trading networks 
and, possibly, capacity shortages within some conservation authorities 
(Milledge, 2007:104). 
In 2012, the Portfolio Committee on Water and Environment Affairs (South 
Africa) called a parliamentary hearing in Cape Town, in order to discuss rhino 
poaching. The meeting was attended by a range of government and provincial 
representatives, as well as NGOs and concerned individuals. Several 
common threads were identified, including the need for better communication 
and collaboration between government departments in South Africa, and 
improved permitting and database systems for live rhinos and rhino horn 
stockpiles (Save the Rhino International, 2012). 
Participants was in agreement that there is a need for an increased number of 
arrests, prosecuting, and stiffer sentencing for rhino-related crimes. Many of 
the participants expressed concern about capacity shortages and constraints 
to achieve the above and combat the poaching threat. 
 “Lack of equipment” was mentioned by only one participant (P3). However, 
according to a policy perspective statement of the Wilderness Foundation 
(Wilderness Foundation South Africa, 2012), protection of rhinos in state-
owned parks and reserves is far from adequate, due to budget constraints for 
specialised anti-poaching equipment, logistical support (vehicles and other 
supplies) and adequately trained personnel. Most of the anti-poaching efforts 
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have been financed by public support, as conservation budgets have not 
increased, or else very little has been allocated specifically to rhino protection. 
“Lack in capacity” was raised as a concern by 12 of the participants. Seven (7) 
of the participants mentioned a “lack in capacity” more than once. Staff 
responsible for law enforcement were mostly blamed by participants: 
“Poor investigations by law enforcement officers” (P1) 
“Lack in capacity of environment departments (staff). Cases drag too long” 
(P2) 
“The lack of law enforcement” (P6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14) 
“Too many delays and postponement of cases” (P2) 
“We do not think that all the people in the legal system know and realise the 
impact and consequences of the likelihood that a species can disappear from 
the earth. People in these systems need to be educated and kept informed of 
the magnitude of rhino poaching” (P5) 
“I suggest that they train a specialised task team to take responsibility for 
rhino-related cases – from the officer who arrests the poacher, the prosecutor 
and the magistrate” (P10) 
“The problem is the incapacity of prosecutors and magistrates” (P14) 
Some of the participants were of the opinion that the problem lies with the 
government in not making provision for the necessary finances to fill 
vacancies, and a lack of political will: 
 
 
160 
 “. . . political apathy, reduced funding for conservation and law enforcement. 
An environmental court should be established to deal with endangered 
species cases”  (P2) 
“Fragmentation/different departments/institutions dealing with poaching. If one 
unit works on the illegal wildlife issues, the situation will be better” (P3) 
“. . . the risk to be caught is very low, due to the high vacancy rate at 
conservation enforcement agencies. Enforcement is not properly financed 
according to the extent of the problem. A contributing factor is the high 
vacancy rate and lack of experienced investigators. Properly staffed and 
budgeted enforcement can stem the tide of poaching”  (P5) 
“There is not adequate domestic and international collaboration and 
cooperation. Government tends to be very slow in responding, while criminal 
syndicates can act within minutes” (P6) 
“Our legal system is a failure” (P7) 
“Our legal system is not good for poaching – radical improvement is needed” 
(P8) 
“The strategy of crime syndicates is to focus on those places with the 
minimum risk to be caught. Previously, due to military activities on South 
Africa’s border, the risk to be caught was high” (P16) 
The aforementioned is also in line with the view of Wyatt and Cao (2015:6), 
namely that one of the reasons why developing countries struggle to combat 
the illegal wildlife trade, is the lack of resources, including very few law 
enforcement officers dedicated to policing wildlife trafficking. In this respect, 
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WESSA has, in its position statement on rhino poaching in South Africa 
(WESSA, 2013:2), identified certain key areas which need to be strengthened 
at all levels (government and the private sector), in order to address the lack 
in capacity: 
- More coordinated and focused efforts and use of resources to fight 
poaching (i.e. less fragmented and more efficient approach). 
- Good selection process – people are employed with the right 
qualification, skills and attributes for their job. 
- Appropriately trained and resourced people in place to deal with this 
information. 
- Increased capacity to deal with the situation at all levels – from field 
rangers through to forensic specialists. 
- A more efficient judicial system where rhino poaching is elevated in 
significance, in terms of prosecution time and sentences. 
- Better prepared prosecutions – this includes better trained legal 
personnel who are better prepared as a result of better crime scene 
management and investigations. 
- Improved monitoring and legal enforcement. 
- Greater political will to bring rhino poaching to an end.  
According to Duffy and St. John (2013:8), evidence indicates that reducing 
effort devoted to enforcement within protected areas leads to increased levels 
of poaching. Fifty years of records from Serengeti, Tanzania, show that the 
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rapid decline in enforcement in 1977 resulted in large increases in poaching 
and the decline in many species. From the mid-1980s, expanded budgets 
allowed for increased anti-poaching patrols; as a result, poaching was greatly 
reduced, and populations of buffalo, elephant and rhino showed signs of 
recovery.  
According to Milledge (2007:103), a combination of adequate legislation, 
capacity and implementation of appropriate enforcement strategies, is needed 
to successfully prevent and respond to rhino crimes. 
In South Africa, despite the adaptation of seemingly better legislation after 
2005, better policing did not follow, as the Threatened Species Unit of the 
SAPS was disbanded. Specialised knowledge and coordination in provincial 
governments where application of conservation laws takes place, also 
became fragmented because of a lack of applicable capacity (Du Toit, 
2013a:98). 
Not everyone was in agreement that increased law enforcement would 
necessarily limit poaching, as one participant stated the following: 
“Law enforcement and policing within a conservation environment i.e. both 
inside and outside of the protected area, is essential but requires significant 
and sustained resources to respond to the current levels of poaching. This is 
not feasible given the limited budgets allocated to conservation management. 
It is evident that increased and concentrated law enforcement efforts in places 
like Kruger National Park have not reduced poaching. Traditional law 
enforcement practices are thus ineffective” (P18) 
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(iii) Suitable punishment 
It is a cause of intense frustration all over the African continent that when 
poachers or the middlemen driving the trade are arrested, they are frequently 
released, because cases against them were poorly prepared. More often than 
not, the penalties for poaching amount to no more than a "slap on the wrist", 
and in the absence of a significant deterrent, the same individuals continue 
their activities as if nothing has happened (Hanks, 2015b:6). Eustace (2011:1) 
suggests that there is a 90% chance of a poacher avoiding any penalty. 
It was stated in section 2.6.5 that, in South Africa, the number of rhino-related 
arrests and convictions with deterrent custodial sentences without the option 
of a fine, has increased. However, there is no proof that the aforementioned 
has been conducive towards deterring poachers. 
On the question whether the “punishment fits the crime”, 11 of the participants 
were of the opinion that the punishment does not fit the crime, while seven (7) 
maintained the opposite view. However, most of the participants who agreed 
that the punishment does fit the crime, were of the opinion that punishment is 
not consistently applied by the court. 
The predicament with a question like this is that the opinions of participants 
could be influenced by emotion. 
Most of the participants who felt that the punishment does not fit the crime, 
were also of the opinion that stricter sentences would deter “would be” 
poachers. 
“The shoot-to-kill policy must be implemented” (P15) 
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However, on the other hand, 
“The money is too good. Even killing poachers does not deter new recruits” 
(P2) 
In S v Nkambule 1993 1 SACR 136 (A) the court referred to the fact that 
criminologists have found that certainty of punishment, rather than its severity, 
is the main deterrent. 
It has also been mentioned in section 2.6.5 that corruption and high-level 
patronage have resulted in some poachers and dealers escaping the full force 
of the law. As one participant said: 
“What does punishment help, our system is wrong and another two poachers 
will step into the boots of one poacher that has been caught” (P9) 
4.2.1.2 Moratorium on domestic trade 
The domestic trade in rhino horn and derivatives is prohibited, in terms of a 
national moratorium published in the Government Gazette of 13 February 
2009) (South Africa, 2009b), in an attempt to stop rhino horn bought legally on 
the domestic market, being exported illegally. 
According to Hume (2015:37), the moratorium was purportedly implemented 
as a temporary measure, in order to afford the then Minister of Water and 
Environmental Affairs the opportunity to investigate a long-term solution to the 
rhino poaching crisis: 
It is an unfortunate fact that, whatever measures have been 
implemented since February 2009, and whatever feasibility studies 
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were conducted, or perhaps are still being conducted by the current 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and her department, the brutal 
onslaught of rhino poaching has spiralled out of control and the very 
survival of the species is at immediate risk.  
According to Walker and Walker (2012:159), it is quite possible that the tight 
regulation of the South African rhino market, including the domestic 
moratorium on horn sales, and restrictions on pseudo-hunts, caused a supply 
constriction during 2008. This most likely resulted in a price increase, which 
then created a stronger incentive for poaching. 
Only two participants were of the opinion that the moratorium played a role in 
the increase of poaching: 
“Rhino poaching was always one per cent of poaching numbers until the 
moratorium”  (P1) 
“We say that the moratorium was one of the main reasons for the increase in 
poaching in 2009. The bottom line is the unintended consequences of the 
moratorium” (P9) 
However, the majority (10) of the participants supported the lifting of the 
moratorium on domestic trade. One of the participants responded as follows: 
“Yes, the moratorium should be lifted, but that would be second best. It should 
reduce poaching and help private owners. It will also increase the value of live 
rhino and once again, National Parks will be able to achieve better prices in 
auctions” (P7) 
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Another three of the participants stated that lifting the moratorium on domestic 
trade will only work if the international trade ban is also lifted: 
“Yes, but the ban on international trade will have to be lifted as well. The end-
users are not really in South Africa, they are living in countries like China and 
Vietnam. For every product, there must be an end-user” (P17) 
Three of the participants said that the moratorium on domestic trade should 
not be lifted at all. They argued that it will legitimise trade and that it will result 
in an increase in demand. 
According to a report issued by the Department of Environmental Affairs 
(2013:26), those in favour of lifting the moratorium include the Private Rhino 
Owners Association (PROA) and the representatives of the private sector, as 
well as members of the public sector reserves. They argue that permission to 
sell horn on the domestic market will, inter alia, restore the confidence of the 
private sector rhino owners, and act as a pilot for the eventual opening of 
international trade. In a survey conducted by Lindsay and Taylor (2011:11), 
only 13 of the 67 respondents were of the opinion that the moratorium on local 
horn trade, and the subsequent drying up of ‘legal’ supplies of horn, were 
responsible for the spike in rhino poaching. 
The implications of lifting or not lifting the national moratorium have been 
investigated by Taylor et al.  (2014), and the findings of these authors are set 
out in section 2.2.1.3 of this research. 
On 26 November 2015, Legodi J delivered judgment in the High Court of 
South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria) in the case of Kruger and Hume v 
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The Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs and two others, 57221/12. 
This court case was, inter alia, about a challenge to the moratorium on 
domestic trade in rhino horn. The court set aside the moratorium, for 
substantial non-compliance with the consultative and participatory process by 
the members of the public, as contemplated in terms of sections 99 and 100 
of NEMBA. It was stated that the moratorium was put in place as a temporary 
measure, and had not been lifted since.  
In Paragraph 88.4 of his judgment, Legodi J referred to a report in which rhino 
experts were asked for their opinion on the cause of the spike in rhino 
poaching in South Africa in the last four years since the moratorium:  
They were asked specifically if they thought the moratorium on local 
trade in rhino horn had influenced poaching. Out of 63 participants 
that answered the question, 49% believed that the moratorium had 
not influenced the poaching spike, 30% thought it had influenced the 
poaching spike (all of whom thought it caused an increase in 
poaching) while 21% were unsure. 
4.2.1.3 Money driven (lucrative business) 
Six of the participants were also of the opinion that the increase in rhino 
poaching is driven by money: 
“The large amount of money involved on all levels of the value chain. 
Lucrative business. Money versus personal risk – the risk to be caught is very 
low” (P5) 
“It is all about monetary value” (P10) 
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“Money and the price of horn. Lucrative business” (P12, 13, 14 and 15) 
The financial chain is the reverse of the value chain. Due to the large amounts 
of money involved in these types of transactions, there are organised crime 
investors who invest X amount at a 20% interest rate per transaction. It 
spreads the risk, and yields a very good return on the investment (Du Toit, 
2013:114). 
4.2.1.4 Increased demand 
According to Du Toit (2013a:192), the message here is clear:  
Rhino horn is a commodity with increasing value. Growth in market 
demand threatens to outpace the potential rate of supply under a 
trade ban regime that appears unlikely to change, so market prices 
should continue to rise. This makes rhino horn worthy of the 
attention of entrepreneurs who engage in trade and speculative 
investment. 
Seven of the participants also mentioned that the increase in demand is a 
reason for the increase in poaching: 
“Increased affluence in the East. Horns are a symbol of wealth” (P2) 
“Established demand that is intractable to demand reduction strategies” (P4) 
“There is a huge illegal demand” (P6) 
“Increased demand – new wealth in Asian countries” (P7) 
“More people in China and Vietnam can afford to buy horn products” (P8) 
 
 
169 
“Southeast Asia’s demand for rhino horn. Increased demand” (P11) 
“The escalation in poaching is brought about by increase in consumer 
demand, which is influenced by perceptions that rhino horn has some benefit. 
This resulted in grossly inflated value being attached to rhino horn within the 
illegal market chain system” (P18) 
The aforementioned is also in line with the view of Ferreira (2014:1), namely 
that the rise in poaching has been driven by an exponential increase in the 
illegal demand and black market price for rhino horn in Southeast Asia, 
especially Vietnam and China:  
This increased demand for horn has not only come from the 
traditional Chinese medicine users, but has also been brought about 
by anecdotes of the unproven cancer reducing properties of rhino 
horn together with its newly found status symbol and general 
entrepreneurial uses, all supported by thriving regional economies 
with a higher disposable income than previously. The inelastic 
relationship between the increasing demand and restricted supply 
influences the high black market prices for rhino horn, making the 
product attractive to criminals and organised crime syndicates. 
The recent poaching spike most likely signalled the full re-emergence of a 
commodity market (for rhino horn) that had been temporarily choked in the 
mid-1990s by civil war in Yemen, and domestic bans in key East Asian 
markets that depressed demand and discouraged trade. Traders and 
speculators therefore needed to redistribute accumulated stockpiles, and 
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since most easily accessible wild rhino stocks had been depleted, further 
poaching at that time was not economically justified (Du Toit, 2013a:194). 
4.2.1.5 Socio-economic reasons 
(i) Poverty and unemployment 
The majority of the participants mentioned poverty and unemployment as a 
reason for the increase in poaching: 
“Poverty, lack of alternative employment in contiguous communities” (P4) 
“At present, communities are turning to poaching as it is a lucrative prospect. 
For every poacher that gets arrested, there are one hundred more people 
willing to take their place” (P9) 
“Poverty of neighbouring communities” (P2, 5, 10, 11 and 12) 
“The unemployment rate in South Africa – gap between the rich and the poor” 
(P13 and 15) 
“The dire level of poverty and high levels of unemployment within communities 
living adjacent to protected areas has created the ideal environment for 
criminal syndicates to exploit communities and entice them into poaching with 
the promise of income and a better living” (P18) 
Poverty, according to Duffy and St John (2013:1), is both directly and 
indirectly linked to poaching and trafficking of ivory and rhino horn from sub-
Saharan Africa. Poverty reduction depends on sustainable resource use. It is 
claimed that the poaching crisis in Africa is orchestrated by organised criminal 
networks, but ultimately facilitated by poverty. 
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The majority of rural communities adjacent to the KNP in South Africa, are 
living in poverty. Mozambique, on the eastern boundary of the KNP, ranks 
185th out of 187 countries on the United Nations Development Programme’s 
2013 Human Development Index. With the black market price of rhino horn 
being high, Mozambique has become a seemingly inexhaustible supply of 
cross-border Mozambican poachers, who have not been deterred by the 
significant and growing risk of death, or lengthy jail sentences, when they 
cross the KNP (Hanks, 2015b:2). 
According to Roe (2008:1), the trade in wildlife and wildlife products, both 
domestic and international, also generates cash income and employment in 
biodiversity-rich countries, and can represent an important contribution to their 
GDP. When this trade is legal, sustainable and effectively managed, it can 
provide benefits for local communities. When it is poorly managed and largely 
illegal, the benefits to local communities are lost. 
Although it is believed that the local people can be prevented, by means of 
education, from utilising game and poaching, experience shows that this 
approach has essentially failed. Wild animals are considered a “public good” 
almost everywhere, and therefore subject to the “tragedy of the commons”. 
Everyone tries to consume the free resources, because otherwise others will 
do it. The result is over-utilisation, lack of sustainability and, finally, extinction 
(Baldus, 2014:2). 
4.2.2 Concurrent strategies 
It is important to analyse the success or failure of current strategies to prevent 
poaching, namely dehorning, poison, translocation,  increased security and 
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demand reduction. Despite the implementation of these strategies, poaching 
is still increasing, and the various participants have different opinions 
pertaining to the success or failure of these strategies. They are specifically 
named “concurrent” techniques, because it is also common knowledge that no 
one of these techniques can be used on its own. 
4.2.2.1 Dehorning 
Regarding dehorning, the following question was posed to participants: “Can 
dehorning limit the poaching of rhinos? Short motivation”. 
Two issues are important when referring to dehorning of rhinos. The first is the 
possibility that dehorning would deter poachers. The second issue is the 
dehorning of rhinos in order to make the horn available for the market (i.e. 
should trade in rhino horn be legalised?). The focus of the abovementioned 
question was on the first issue. The kind of answers provided by the 
participants indicated that they understood the question correctly. 
Only two of the participants were adamant that dehorning would not limit 
poaching, one did not know, while the majority (15) were of the opinion that 
dehorning can help to limit poaching. However, it transpired from the 
responses of the majority that there is no simple 'yes' or 'no': 
“Yes, but poachers can still try and use the stump that is left over. You can not 
dehorn and neglect security” (P1) 
“Yes, but not 100% as we still find rhino that was dehorned, being poached” 
(P3) 
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“It is a yes/no answer . . . the opportunistic poacher will still say: I am in the 
veld, here is a rhino, even if I can get 1 kilogram” (P6) 
“It can only work if you have dehorned and your neighbours haven’t. If 
everybody has dehorned, it will still be worthwhile to poach the dehorned 
rhino. In other words it is almost a yes/no answer. Law enforcement is still 
important” (P17) 
“Dehorning may be considered as an optional urgent measure that some rhino 
owners may choose to implement in areas where this may serve as a 
poaching deterrent. This will also require improved management, security, 
closer monitoring of rhino stockpiles” (P18) 
According to Hanks (2015b:8), dehorning is more suited for use in smaller 
reserves with few rhino, and is somewhat unrealistic for larger and widely 
dispersed populations. This view was also shared by most of the participants, 
who said that dehorning can only work on private land and small reserves: 
“Yes, but it will shift the focus to wild populations where horns have not been 
removed, for example larger nature reserves and national parks. Furthermore, 
it will only be effective if poachers know dehorning had been done” (P2) 
“In remote areas with limited numbers of rhino it does, but it is not a guarantee 
as more poaching groups pop up they all need places to go and I believe the 
power play between the established groups keep poachers in places where 
dehorned animals are kept” (P5) 
“Only in small reserves with limited rhino” (P11) 
“Yes, not in national parks but on private land” (P12) 
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In a survey carried out by Lindsay and Taylor (2011:47), respondents were 
asked whether they agreed with a common criticism of dehorning: that all it 
does is shift the threat of poaching from one area to another. More than 50 of 
the 67 respondents answered in the affirmative. 
Some of the participants in this study also linked poaching of dehorned rhino 
with risk to the poacher – for instance: 
“. . . the same risk for rhino with horn and those without horn; the poacher is 
going to choose the animal with horn” (P6) 
“. . . the poacher would have the same amount of work for less reward” (P9) 
It has already been mentioned in section 2.6.2, that poaching pressure on a 
particular population is likely to be a function of the equation used by Du Toit 
(2011:13): 
 
    Reward to poaching (from the illegal sale of horn 
Poaching pressure  =  _________________________________________ 
Risk to poacher of being arrested x Effort required 
to poach 
 
According to Lindsay and Taylor (2011:44), poaching pressure is thus likely to 
be reduced by either reducing the reward to the poachers through dehorning, 
or increasing the risk and difficulty associated with poaching by investing in 
anti-poaching security. 
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Hanks (2015b:8) states that the permitting system for possessing, transporting 
and storing the horns is considered by private rhino owners to be onerous, 
and imposes security risks by providing opportunities for information to be 
leaked – particularly on the location of horns or on their planned 
transportation. Some of the participants also shared this concern: 
“Dehorning can limit poaching, but the legal process of dehorning and the 
cost, is making it not practical. Information by officials issuing the permits 
seems to be a problem” (P13) 
The participants who were of the opinion that dehorning will not limit poaching, 
gave the following reasons: 
“No. . . it does not work. Several instances have been reported where rhinos 
were killed to harvest the stumps” (P8)  
This statement is correct, but the participant failed to consider (or refer to) 
those instances where a rhino was not poached for the stump, and the 
possible reasons for not poaching such a rhino. 
“No, you must bear in mind, you have to dehorn every six months. That is not 
good for the rhino and it is very expensive. It is not good to see a rhino without 
a horn” (P15) 
 According to Lindsay and Taylor (2011:50), the frequency with which rhinos 
should be re-dehorned depends on the level of the ongoing poaching threat 
(re-dehorning should only be considered, given a high level of threat), the 
level of security in place, and the availability of funds. If repeated dehorning is 
considered necessary, rhinos should be re-dehorned every 12 to 24 months 
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under conditions of high poaching intensity, and every 24 to 36 months under 
conditions of relatively lower risk.  
According to Reilly (2015b:25), it has to be agreed that a farmed rhino without 
a horn is not the rhino we all want to see. But it is at least a live rhino, and a 
live rhino is also a breeding rhino, and surely a live rhino has got to be better 
than a dead rhino or no rhino at all. 
Most of the participants were of the opinion that dehorning would only be 
effective if poachers were aware of the fact that the rhinos were dehorned. In 
addition, security/law enforcement must also be effective. The aforementioned 
is also in line with the study done by Lindsay and Taylor (2011:49). With the 
absence of security, rhinos may continue to be poached, regardless of 
whether they have been dehorned or not. 
During a workshop convened by the Endangered Wildlife Trust (Du Toit, 
2011:40), the 41 participants who attended the workshop were all of the 
opinion that dehorning is not a solution in itself, and should not be done in 
isolation (it helps reduce reward for poachers, but anti-poaching measures 
need to be maintained), and that dehorning reduces risk, but does not 
eliminate the risk due to residual horn and re-growth. 
4.2.2.2 Poisoning of the horn 
Poison as a possible solution has already been discussed in section 2.6.3, 
and it is probably the most contentious of all possible solutions. 
On the question of whether poison can limit the poaching of rhinos, the 
majority (11) of the participants were of the opinion that it could not, while one 
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of the participants was not sure. Some of the participants were of the opinion 
that it will not work, as either the poison/chemicals cannot penetrate the horn, 
or else the poison/chemicals are, in themselves, ineffective: 
“. . .the product cannot maintain its effectiveness in the cheratin [sic]” (P1) 
“Does penetrating the horn work? It cannot – it is physical[ly] impossible” (P6) 
“. . .it doesn’t work, it does not enter the horn” (P12, 16 and 17) 
Most of the participants who said that poison would not limit poaching, were of 
the opinion that it would not deter poachers: 
“Poachers do not know which horns have been attempted to be poisoned. 
Even if they did, they will not care. They do not know who the end-user is and 
do not worry about him” (P2) 
“The fact that the end-user do[es] not no [sic] about the ‘poison’ will not stop 
them from using it” (P5) 
Some of the participants also referred to the legal consequences, which has 
also been discussed in section 2.6.3: 
“. . . it could cause the people doing it, to be charged with murder” (P4) 
“Real poisoning of horn is illegal because you can kill people” (P8) 
“. . .although unlawful, it should have an effect” (P11) 
A number of participants referred to the fact that rhinos have been poached, 
despite the horns being poisoned: 
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“Does it safe [sic] rhinos from being poached. . . not at all. The properties 
where it has been done, all suffered losses” (P6) 
“No it does not work as these rhinos have also been poached as the poachers 
might not even know about it” (P8) 
Five of the participants felt that poisoning can limit poaching, as two of the 
participants stated: 
“Yes – anything will help, but it is useless on its own” (P7) 
“ . . . this may serve as an optional poaching deterrent that may be applied by 
rhino owners who choose not to dehorn or trade in horn” (P18) 
Most of the participants who supported poisoning were also of the opinion that 
it must be made known: 
“Notice boards will have to be errected. Poachers must be aware of the fact 
that rhino horns are poisoned” (P10, 14 and 16) 
“All the employees on my farm have to assist with the poisoning. They must 
see that we actually inject the poison. The message must be spread” (P15) 
Some of the participants also asked the following question: 
 “What are we going to do with the contaminated horn, should trade be 
legalised?” (P6, 10 and 16) 
It has already been mentioned in section 2.6.3, that the effectiveness of such 
treatments has not been satisfactorily demonstrated. According to Duffy et al. 
(2013:7), evidence to date from a number of recovered treated horns that 
have been sectioned, shows that the dye (and presumably also the poison) 
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has failed to penetrate the treated horns, suggesting that this treatment is 
ineffective. 
4.2.2.3 Translocation 
The general principles pertaining to translocation have already been 
discussed in section 2.6.4. 
When the participants were asked whether translocation of rhinos would limit 
poaching, the majority (12) responded in the affirmative, but added the 
condition that rhinos should be translocated to “safer” places: 
“. . . if it is relocated to a highly secured area” (P3) 
“Translocation of rhino can limit poaching, if the rhinos are translocated to 
safer places” (P15) 
“The translocation of rhino to safe areas that are consistent with rhino habitat 
requirements may also be considered as an optional tool for preserving and 
stimulating the recovery of the species, as was successfully achieved from 
earlier rhino translocation programmes” (P18) 
Three of the participants indicated that rhinos should be translocated to other 
continents, rather than other places in Africa. This is also an indication of the 
participant’s fear of corruption in Africa: 
“Translocation can work if you send them to a real safe environment of which 
few exist in Africa” (P8) 
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“They must be sent to the right places. If you send them to America or 
Australia, it can work. But if you send it to another place in Africa, it would not 
work” (P15) 
Some of the participants were of the opinion that there are possibly some safe 
places in Africa: 
“Yes, translocation to Botswana, because it has vast areas of sparsely 
populated wilderness areas” (P6) 
“Yes, if you send them to the Karoo where it is more open and less people. 
The people know each other and they will quickly pick up strangers in the 
area” (P10) 
“We should move some rhino from our national parks and put them in the 
custody of the communities. Game farmers should be encouraged to engage 
surrounding rural communities and teach them to conserve and breed with 
rhinos. If communities are generating a substantial income from these rhinos, 
they would literally guard them with there [sic] lives” (P9) 
According to the chief warden of the Khama Rhino Sanctuary in Botswana 
(personal communication), the sanctuary had not had a single poaching 
incident since its establishment in 1993. In 1993, four rhinos were 
translocated from northen Botswana, and, in 1995, another five were 
translocated by the North West Parks Board from South Africa. The sanctuary 
is a community trust, governed by a board of trustees who are elected from 
the local communities. 
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Three of the participants were of the opinion that translocation will not limit 
poaching, while one participant indicated that it could only be a temporary 
solution: 
“. . . wherever they go, poachers will follow” (P12) 
“It is only a temporary solution” (P17) 
The theme of corruption emerged again, as one of the participants responded 
as follows: 
“Officials handling permits are suspects in supplying information to poachers” 
(P13) 
Throughout the interviews, it transpired that even with translocation, security 
is still important: 
“We also have to recognise that the exploitation of rhino on such an 
unparalleled scale implies that all areas are vulnerable and will require 
extensive security measures to be implemented” (P18) 
It has already been mentioned that those participants who supported 
translocation emphasised the fact that rhinos can only be translocated to 
“safer” places. Although a “safer” place has different meanings for different 
participants, increased security was mentioned by most of the participants.  
4.2.2.4 Increased security 
In this section, the various participants’ responses to increased security will be 
analysed, as well as relevant literature in this regard. Security is more 
proactive in nature, than law enforcement. 
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According to ‘t Sas-Rolfes (2012:12), field protection measures such as anti-
poaching patrols, dehorning and horn poisoning, are all costly, and the costs 
are ongoing. However, these measures are likely to yield greater success 
than law enforcement measures, which target subsequent levels in the illegal 
supply chain. Such efforts are time consuming, and unlikely to ever cause 
more than temporary market disruptions. 
Hall-Martin, Du Toit, Hitchins and Knight (2008:39) state as follows:  
Not only are the numbers of rhinos poached increasing, but there 
are new and disturbing trends in the methods used to kill rhino for 
their horn. The present law enforcement effort on the part of State 
authorities is evidently insufficient to curb this plague, and the rhino 
owners will of necessity have to become more involved in providing 
security for their animals. 
Participants were asked what type of security they had, as well as the annual 
cost of that security. They were also asked whether they had experienced any 
increase in security costs over the past three years. The reason why the 
researcher decided on a three-year period, was that research was done by 
the PROA in 2011, where the PROA also used a three-year period. This 
enabled the researcher to compare results, for the sake of reliability. 
Participants from national and provincial reserves could not respond to the 
said questions, as they did not have these figures available. As far as 
SANParks was concerned, a considerable amount of money, in the form of 
equipment, is being donated or sponsored by the SANParks Honorary 
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Rangers or other donors (personal communication with a senior SANParks 
official). 
Those participants who responded were all, with the exception of one, in 
agreement that there had been a sizeable increase in security costs. The 
participant who disagreed was also the participant who indicated that 
poisoning could help to limit poaching. However, this participant (P15) also 
indicated that he used security officers to guard his rhinos at night. 
The following are examples of the responses from those who indicated that 
they experienced a considerable increase in security costs: 
“The quantum of security  has massively increased over the last three years 
by 300% to 400% currently from our last survey as cost to protect 5,000 
rhinos by the private sector is about R272,000,000.00 per year only on rhino 
security” (P6) 
“Foot patrols at R200,000.00 per annum and cost have doubled over three 
years” (P8) 
“. . .confidential, but it has increased by 700% in four years” (P9) 
“. . .cost is three times more. Bomas had to be erected where the rhinos sleep 
every night, fences had to be improved, cameras, etc.” (P10) 
“Rangers, special rangers, canine, air and land mobility, some fences and 
obstacles and technology being rolled out. The cost escalated dramatically – 
at least double” (P11) 
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“The best possible security. Between R60,000.00 and R70,000.00 per animal 
per year. Yes, three times more” (P12) 
“We appointed more field rangers than three years ago. We definitely 
experience an increase in security cost. Twenty per cent of our budget is 
spent on security cost” (P16) 
“Fifteen per cent of our budget is spent on security. We have appointed a 
security company which works under supervision of our own personnel. We 
have our own field rangers who do foot patrols” (P17) 
The researcher added Question 8 for reliability purposes. Participants were 
asked how financial costs of keeping rhino had changed since 2008. 
Participants had a choice between the following: 
- Significantly decreased (more than 10%) 
- Moderately decreased (between 10% and 5%) 
- Small change (between 0% and 5%) 
- Moderately increased (between 5% and 10%) 
- Significantly increased (more than 10%) 
Six (6) participants (including participants from national and provincial 
reserves) did not respond to this question, while the majority (11) of the 
participants were of the opinion that costs had significantly increased. Only 
one participant indicated that they had experienced a small change in costs. 
According to Jones (2014:127),  the PROA carried out a recent survey among 
private reserves and rhino owners. They were asked to advise their budget 
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expenditure on “rhino security”, and also the size of their reserves. When 
compared, the minimum expenditure was R250,000.00 per annum, and the 
maximum R6 million per annum. When total expenditure is divided by the total 
hectares of private rhino reserves – it works out that, on average, R136.00 per 
hectare per year is spent on rhino security. This equates to R272 million spent 
annually.  
It is evident from the interviews and the questionnaires, that there has been a 
significant increase in the cost of security, in order to safeguard rhinos. 
Additional personnel have been appointed in order to do foot patrols. 
According to Baldus (2013:1), without “boots on the ground” the illegal killings 
will not be terminated. It is also evident that costs which should be spent on 
research, upgrading on farms or reserves, as well as reserve expansion, is 
now being spent on security. 
Walker and Walker (2012:182) also state that there is no doubt that “feet on 
the ground” is a fundamental component in dealing with the immediate short-
term poaching crisis, but this alone does not improve enforcement, especially 
in state parks and reserves. This requires committed political will – which 
means increased spending. 
According to Jones (2014:129), the costs and risks of ownership have caused 
a number of rhino owners to sell their rhinos; accordingly, an estimated 
400,000 hectares of rhino range has been lost. 
There is also a close correlation between the various responses to questions 
8 and 9, where the following question was posed to participants: “How would 
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you describe the net profit made from having rhino on your farm for the last 
financial year?: 
- Costs greatly exceed benefits 
- Costs slightly exceed benefits 
- Costs similar to benefits 
- Benefits slightly exceed costs 
- Benefits greatly exceed costs”. 
Participants from national and provincial reserves did not respond. Once 
again, only one participant (P15) indicated that costs are similar to benefits. 
The rest of the participants all agreed that costs greatly exceed benefits: 
“Accept [sic] for tourism value, rhinos have become a liabilty more than an 
asset” (P16) 
“Our rhinos currently only have tourism value. It is one of the big five and 
tourists are keen to see rhinos . . .no, it still has benefits, but costs greatly 
exceed benefits” (P17) 
Massé and Lunstrum (n.d.:3) are particularly concerned about the 
militarisation of conservation practice in response to commercial poaching. 
Such militarisation is driven and rationalised by discourses of war and 
national/regional security, that transform poaching from a conservation issue 
into a security issue. 
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4.2.2.5 Demand reduction 
When participants were asked whether they have any suggestions on how to 
stop poaching, demand reduction was mentioned by only one of them: 
“Simultaneously, sustained effort has to be made to reduce demand by 
consumer countries” (P18) 
Most of the participants supported legal trade as a possible solution, hence it 
is obvious that legal trade cannot run alongside demand reduction campaigns. 
Two of the participants, however, commented on demand reduction: 
“Some NGOs are against legal trade. They support demand reduction which, 
taking into consideration the current situation, will be a futile exercise” (P6) 
“NGOs are in favour of demand reduction. This will only benefit the NGOs. 
You cannot change a long-standing tradition” (P10) 
It has already been mentioned that NGOs (with the exception of one) were 
reluctant to participate in this research. As many of the NGOs support 
demand reduction campaigns, the literature in this regard had to be analysed. 
According to Thomson (2015), who represented OSCAP at the workshop of 
the  Committee of Enquiry in March 2015, it appears from various reports that 
the current demand for rhino horn is from newly created markets spurred on 
by newfound wealth in Asia, and are not old traditional TCM markets:  
This makes demand reduction a lot easier as there should be little or 
no ‘cultural’ sensitivity involved in addressing these markets and 
bringing a halt to the demand for rhino horn. 
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According to Wildlife ACT (2015), even if trade in rhino horn ultimately 
becomes viable in the long-term, one has to understand that this trade will 
only perpetuate the idea that animal products have a medicinal or health value 
or benefit. What one should rather be focussing on, is changing deep-seated 
beliefs that these animal products have some sort of intrinsic value. 
According to Humane Society International (HSI) (2014), insatiable demand 
for rhino horn is driving rhinos to the brink of extinction; therefore, reducing 
that demand is crucial. The HSI also claims that demand for rhino horn in 
Vietnam has decreased by 38% since the launch, a year ago, of a public 
education and awareness campaign jointly implemented by HSI and the 
Vietnam CITES Management Authority (Humane Society International, 2014). 
‘t Sas-Rolfes (2012:13) is of the opinion that the aforementioned views of the 
NGOs to prevent the current poaching onslaught, may not work, for the 
following reasons: 
(i) It is predicated on the conviction that rhino horn has no medicinal 
value. Just because Western reductionist science has not (yet) 
established a healing effect of rhino horn, does not negate the deeply-
held beliefs and rich ancestrial experience of an Eastern culture that 
adopts a more systems-based approach to medicine. 
(ii) It is disingenuous to argue that the use of rhino horn medicine 
necessarily causes poaching, when horn can be obtained by non-lethal 
means. 
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(iii) The general publicity campaign may have an impact on marginal 
(fringe) consumers, but is unlikely to reach those actually responsible 
for paying the extraordinarily high prices that are driving the poaching 
problem.  
According to Hanks (2015b:9), the likelihood of completely stopping the use of 
rhino horn is very small, for two main reasons: 
(i) China is a country of over 1,3 billion people, with 56 different 
languages. It would be a formiddable task to contact even 1% of that 
total spread across such linguistic diversity. 
(ii) TCM is so well entrenched in China, that it would take at least two to 
three generations to wean people away from some of the products they 
believe have genuine therapeutic and medicinal properties – an 
unrealistic time frame at present rates of poaching. 
The demand reduction approach assumes that there is too much demand for 
rhino horn, that this needs to be somehow reduced in volume, and that this 
might save the rhino. However, according to ‘t Sas-Rolfes (2012:13), the 
challenge for rhino conservation may not be that there are too many potential 
consumers, but rather the existence of a relatively small number of really 
persistent ones, oblivious to legality and ethical arguments, and willing to pay 
increasingly high prices to acquire rhino horn. In the case of the latter 
scenario, a different approach might be far more effective – that of providing 
an appropriately regulated supply to the market. 
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4.2.3 CITES trade ban 
Although only three participants indicated that the ban on international trade in 
rhino horn was the most important reason for the increase in poaching, the 
majority were of the opinion that the ban was one of the reasons why the 
CITES fight against illicit wildlife trafficking is failing: 
“Easy money for organised crime syndicates because of increased price in 
horn due to trade embargo” (P2) 
“Prohibition of legal supply routes will promote illegal supply which will 
increase poaching”.  Banning goods for which there is an intractable demand 
has always failed, for instance alcohol, drugs and prostitution” (P4) 
“The fact that it is illegal, creates opportunity for criminals. Easy money – 
increased demand – increased poaching” (P7) 
“The Western world does not want to understand sustainable utilisation. There 
is no trafficking in deer velvet which is grown legally in New Zealand and large 
quantities exported to North Korea” (P9) 
According to Hanks (2015b:10), the world should look at the failure of the U.S. 
alcohol prohibition legislation, in force for some 13 years, from 1920 to 1933, 
and the ongoing global efforts to eliminate the international drug trade. Both 
are examples of trade bans that have not worked. In fact, illegal markets 
expanded dramatically, thereby enriching criminals, who have enjoyed greater 
incentives to trade with anyone and everywhere. 
According to Du Toit (2013a:60), recent events have proved that the CITES 
approach is a dismal failure. The demand for rhino horn is stronger than ever, 
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and is driving a new wave of intense poaching. The illegal trade is driven by 
the high price for rhino horn. The price is high because the ban on 
international trade has made rhino horn artificially scarce. Rhino horn has 
become artificially scarce because there was an increase in demand, without 
a legal supply (see section 4.2.1.4). 
CITES trade bans have not succeeded in halting the rhino horn trade, and the 
large reduction in black rhino populations has occurred even though it is 
included in Appendix 1. This indicates that international trade bans alone have 
not been effective (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2013:27). As Weber, 
Mandler, Dyck, Van Coeverden De Groot, Lee and Clark (2015:391) state:  
By removing legal trade, incentives to preserve wildlife may 
diminish; this can push trade ‘underground’ where it is unmonitored, 
uncontrolled, and ultimately the preservation of a species can be 
ineffective and lost. 
According to Reilly (2015a:4), the majority of custodians of Africa’s rhinos 
wish to scrap the ban, which has not worked for 38 years, in favour of trying 
the legalisation of trade. The pro-trade states own approximately 93% of 
Africa’s white rhinos, yet they are being forced to continue with a dysfunctional 
ban by non-custodian member CITES states which have no rhinos of their 
own to defend. 
Jones (2015:15) states as follows:  
The reality is the trade ban has not worked by any reasonable 
measure, and on the contrary has helped create a vast illegal 
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market dominated by transnational crime syndicates that remain 
untouchable. According to a survey conducted by the PROA in 
2015, more than 85% of their members support a trade proposal “to 
bring much needed revenue back to fund rhino conservation and 
security cost”. 
Thomson (2015:33) gives the following opinion:  
Today, CITES is a very different organisation to what it was in 1975. 
There are now more NGO delegations than there are official ones, 
and it seems that most of these are animal rightists. Animal rightists 
are people whose purpose in life is to abolish all animal ‘uses’ by 
man, and they are virulently opposed to the wildlife trade; whereas 
the purpose of CITES is to regulate the international wildlife trade. In 
CITES, all the accredited animal rightist NGOs are actively engaged 
in sabotaging the convention. This is why CITES is a failure. 
The aforementioned is also in line with the comments of some of the 
participants – for example: 
“. . . consider how saving the rhino would affect the fundraising at those 
organisations whose interests are vested in its continued endangered status” 
(P16) 
The aforementioned view is also supported by Reilly (2015a:3):  
As harsh as it might be to say, it is not in the financial interests of the 
anti-trade NGOs to find a solution to the rhino crisis, for this would 
simply remove a very lucrative platform for raising donor funding on 
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which they survive. Diceros bicornis longipese, the western 
subspecies of African black rhino, was still being monitored long 
after its extinction. Revealing its extinction would have removed the 
monitoring NGO's reason to exist. 
4.2.4 Possible solutions 
The third category holds possible solutions to the poaching problem. This 
category was divided as follows for the purpose of the analysis: 
- Theme: Sustainable use 
-  Sub-themes: Community conservation, Pro-trade/Anti-
trade,Trading partner and Centralised database 
4.2.4.1 Sustainable use 
It has already been mentioned in section 2.7.4, that the sustainable use 
approach aims to maximise the benefits from wildlife to the people on whose 
land it lives. It has also been mentioned that the sustainable use approach is 
most effective where proprietorship is strong and prices high – as indicated in 
Quadrant 3 in Table 2.3. 
The various forms of sustainable use have already been discussed in section 
2.7. For the purposes of this research, the focus is on “legalised trade” as a 
form of sustainable use. 
When participants were asked about suggestions on how to stop poaching, a 
number of participants mentioned “sustainable use” as a possible solution: 
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“. . . leftist environmentalists not understanding the concept of ‘if it pays it 
stays’ in poorer countries in Africa” (P2) 
“Protectionism is failing as it does not take into consideration the needs of 
people who live in Africa and is dictating to Africa from Westeners” (P7) 
“Sustainable use – the existence of species and the livelihoods of people are 
interrelated, especially those living in rural areas. The Western world does not 
want to understand sustainable utilisation” (P9) 
“Sustainable use helped to increase the numbers of other species in South 
Africa. As long as landowners and communities have an incentive to continue 
to protect rhinos, rhinos will continue to thrive” (P10) 
“If it pays it stays. Unfortunately most of the countries, especially those without 
wildlife, do not understand the concept of sustainable utilisation” (P16) 
According to Thomson (2013:5), the most important element of the World 
Conservation Strategy (WCS), from the game ranchers' point of view, is what 
the document refers to as “living resource conservation”. It outlines three 
objectives which are, in brief, the following: 
(i) To maintain essential ecological processes and life support 
systems. 
(ii) To preserve genetic diversity (no species must become extinct).  
(iii) To ensure the sustainable utilisation of species and ecosystems 
which support a number of rural communities as well as major 
industries. 
 
 
195 
In other words, the WCS supports and promotes the sustainable use of 
wildlife for both commercial and subsistence purposes. 
According to Hanks (2015b:10), the purpose of CITES has been made clear in 
its strategic vision, indicating that CITES recognises that trade in wildlife 
species is indeed an option for its conservation: 
Conserve biodiversity and contribute to its sustainable use by 
ensuring that no species of wild fauna or flora becomes or remains 
subject to unsustainable exploitation through international trade, 
thereby contributing to the significant reduction of the rate of 
biodiversity loss. 
Child (2015:207) refers to a recent scientific publication that shows that in 
Southern Africa, wildlife in protected areas has increased, whereas wildlife in 
parks in East and West Africa has declined by 50% and 80%, respectively: 
South Africa’s success is based on bold policies to maximise the 
returns from wildlife to private, community and state landholders, 
and to ensure that wildlife is the most competitive use of land in 
drylands and forests. This is called the sustainable use approach, at 
the core of which lies two principles – proprietorship and price. 
According to Child (2012:4), the sustainable use approach predicts that (a) 
developing the ownership of rhinos to private, community and state 
landholders, and (b) promoting legal markets for rhino hunting and trade 
within an institutional framework that is built up from decisions at international 
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forums such as CITES, will provide powerful economic incentives for rhino 
conservation in South Africa. 
‘t Sas-Rolfes (2015:28) is of the opinion that if South Africa and other 
Southern African countries are thwarted from employing sustainable use 
principles and accessing lucrative overseas markets for consumable wildlife 
products, the economic viability of wildlife ranching and conservation will be 
seriously undermined. 
Legal trade as a form of sustainable use, will be discussed in the following 
section. 
4.2.4.1.1 Legal trade 
The arguments of the anti-trade supporters, and the pro-trade supporters’ 
responses to those arguments, will be presented first, whereafter the various 
arguments of the pro-trade supporters will be discussed. 
4.2.4.1.1.1 Arguments by anti-trade supporters 
When participants were asked whether legal trade in rhino horn can limit 
poaching, four participants responded in the negative: 
“No, too many illegal syndicates and systems already in place. There will 
always be two legs, legal and illegal, for example diamonds and ivory. Legal 
trade will have a negative impact on rhinos in other range states” (P5) 
“Legal trade is not an option. South Africa will not be in a position to regulate a 
legal trade” (P14) 
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“Trade cannot limit poaching as we do not know what the demand is. The 
demand could be too big. For a legal trade you need a trading partner – I 
don’t think South Africa will be able to find a trading partner” (P15) 
“With only about 20,000 rhino available globally, the demand far exceeds 
supply which make rhino horn scarce and more desirable as numbers decline. 
Legal trade in horn, will only serve to confirm its desirability and open up a 
greater market of consumers who may currently choose not to possess or 
consume rhino horn because it is illegal. A legal trade system without 
stringent regulations and controls will only create an environment for illegal 
products to be legitimised” (P18) 
The following arguments against a legal trade can be deduced from the 
aforementioned comments: 
 (i) The demand for rhino horn is too great. 
(ii) Legal trade can create the opportunity for illegal rhino horn to 
enter the market.  
 (iii) South Africa will not be able to find a trading partner. 
 (iv) South Africa will not be able to regulate a legal trade. 
This is also in line with the arguments of some of the NGOs. The Network for 
Animals (2015:8) is of the view that lifting the ban on rhino horn trade would 
be disastrous for rhinos because “it would legitimise and encourage rhino horn 
use, thus leading to increased demand and even more poaching”. 
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According to WildAid (2015), “trade will send a counter-message to 
consumers, potentially creating massive new demand”. 
WESSA issued a warning in the following press release (WESSA, 2015): 
-  the current trade proposal carries an unacceptable high risk of 
being corrupted by the poaching syndicates and illegal horn traders, 
and that re-opening legal trade will encourage a growth in horn 
consumer demand and speculation buying; 
- Furthermore, creating legal access to horn risks reawakening 
demand in older markets, such as Taiwan, Japan, Singapore and 
Yemen, where demand for rhino horn was prevalent in the 1970s 
and 1980s and has since decreased. If demand grows again in 
these markets, it will put upward pressure on the horn price, 
incentivising poaching. 
The David Shepherd Wildlife Foundation (DSWF) (as quoted by Walker and 
Walker, 2012:175) holds the following viewpoint:  
Once rhino horn is legally available, demand will soar, as it has with 
ivory. CITES may well be starting to regret opening up legal ivory 
trade with China – those responsible for elephants in range states 
certainly are – and they simply don’t have the resources to combat 
increasing wildlife crime. Ivory prices, elephant poaching and ivory 
smuggling were all supposed to fall as a result of this experiment. 
The opposite has happened. It’s not a case of people switching from 
illegal to legal ivory. They are now buying both.  
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According to Child (2012:4), there are widely used arguments that whatever 
the local success in Southern Africa, the trade in rhino horn, or ivory for that 
matter, will be used as a cover for illegal trade from other countries with a less 
successful wildlife conservation policy. 
The arguments raised by the supporters of an anti-trade approach were 
already identified during the literature review, hence the following questions 
were posed to participants, and also added to the questionnaire: 
- In order to legalise trade, South Africa needs a trading partner. Do 
you think that is possible and what do you suggest in this regard? 
(Question 15) 
- Will South Africa be in a position to effectively regulate a system of 
legal trade nationally and internationally? (Question 17) 
- Will it be possible to keep illegal rhino horn out of the legal market? 
(Question 20) 
- Will a legal trade of rhino horn have other negative impacts on the 
conservation and well-being of the species?  (Question 21) 
- Do you think that South Africa will be in a position to meet the 
demand in rhino horn on a continuous basis, bearing in mind that 
there might be an increase in demand? (Question 24) 
The topics covered by the various questions will now be dealt with separately: 
(a) Will South Africa be in a position to find a trading partner? 
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The majority (15) of the participants indicated that South Africa would be in a 
position to find a trading partner: 
 “Yes, China and Vietnam need to admit to being countries using horn and 
must agree to cooperate in legalised trade” (P2) 
“Yes, it is going to be easier than we think” (P7) 
Most of the participants who indicated that South Africa would be able to find 
a trading partner, mentioned China and Vietnam as possible trading partners. 
Some of the participants also mentioned Cambodia, Thailand and Yemen (P9 
and 15) 
Two of the participants even indicated Texas as a possible trading partner, 
should rhinos be translocated to Texas: 
“If rhinos are translocated to Texas for instance, a country like Texas will also 
be prepared to trade” (P16) 
“Yes, countries in the East, even a country like Texas, if rhinos are 
translocated to Texas” (P17) 
Participants, however, suggested certain conditions: 
“ . . . countries must agree to a legalised trade under strict conditions” (P2) 
“. . . those that abide by regulations in respect of dealing in legal horn. I know 
this will be an imperfect system but we want to keep the balance of power in 
favour of South African producers. Porter’s 5 forces model” (P4) 
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“We must just be wake-up that the same thing does not happen again as with 
the ivory where the group of buyers formed different groups and agreed to 
keep the price low (price fixing)” (P5) 
“. . . but then it would require intergovernmental agreement to provide a 
platform for legalised trade and thereafter governments to stand back and let 
the private sector do its own thing” (P6) 
“However, South Africa also needs to consider the positions of African and 
international governments who are opposed to trade in any form. A decision to 
trade may have dire consequences for South Africa’s international relations” 
(P18) 
One participant (P3) did not respond to this question, and another (P14) 
responded by saying that “South Africa will not be able to find a trading 
partner”. The participant could not give any reasons, however. 
(b) Will South Africa be in a position to effectively regulate a system 
of legal trade nationally and internationally?  
When participants were posed this question, five (5) indicated that South 
Africa will not be in a position to effectively regulate a system of trade: 
“Unlikely, our record of corruption is too high” (P2) 
“No, the integrity of officials is seriously under suspicion. Corruption is a 
problem” (P13, 14 and 15) 
“The regulation systems implemented to support the trade in ivory did not 
work and there is little evidence to indicate that this will be improved for any 
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form a trade approach, be it a once-off trade, domestic trade or permanent 
sale” (P18) 
Only one of the participants did not respond to this question. 
According to the NFA (2015), even if South Africa were able to adequately 
monitor and control a trade in rhino horn, there is little evidence that, at the 
moment, its trading partner would be able to do the same. 
The majority (12) of the participants were of the opinion that South Africa 
would be in a position to effectively regulate a system of legal trade nationally 
and internationally. It transpired from the various responses that it should be 
done in a transparent and accountable manner, free of corruption: 
“We already have a system in place for managing stockpiles. DNA plays a 
very important role. . . enough proof that it can be done in a transparent and 
accountable manner and to minimise corruption” (P6) 
“Legal trade should be regulated in partnership between the private sector 
and the government – a central database. The system should be developed in 
such a way that it will not be flawed by corruption” (P16) 
“. . . on condition that both government and the private sector are involved, 
however, I am concerned about the trustworthiness of government officials 
because of corruption” (P17) 
‘Yes, we have already done it in the diamond trade” (P4, 8 and 12) 
According to ‘t Sas-Rolfes (2015:27), such a system would need to include 
measures to prevent horn from newly poached animals from being laundered 
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and sold through legal channels, as well as a mechanism to subsidise 
conservation of other threatened rhino populations in the event of increasing 
prices for horn. Without such assurances, managers of other rhino 
populations are likely to perceive additional threats to their own safety, and 
will most likely contest legalisation. 
Biggs et al. (2013:3) are of the opinion that one option for the implementation 
of a highly regulated trading system, is through a Central Selling Organisation 
(CSO). A CSO would negotiate and manage the selling of horns, so that it is 
more attractive, reliable and cost-effective for buyers to obtain the product 
legally, than through illegal means. A CSO would be supported by, and 
accountable to, the white rhino range states and the CITES CoP (which 
include governments from demand countries), for its performance. 
Eustace (2011:3) suggests that, rather than a 'free for all', it would make 
sense to have all sales of horn conducted  through a CSO, where the volumes 
can be controlled, and the legality of the origin of the horn can be assured. An 
essential component would be to have market expertise to manage the sales, 
and there should be scope to replace managers when and if that becomes 
sensible. The CSO could be owned by the owners of rhino, pro rata 
approximately to the number of animals they own or of which they are 
custodians. The structure should probably not allow for one single 
organisation to have control. 
According to the Endangered Wildlife Trust (2013b:3-4), based on the 
experience with the establishment of trade in other wildlife products, South 
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Africa will have to attend to the following, in order to conduct legal 
international trade in rhino horn: 
(i) Trade may be limited to suitable trading partners, pre-approved by 
CITES, who have proved that their internal trade controls are sufficient 
to prevent laundering of illegal horn. 
(ii) Proposed structure and trading protocols to be used in both South 
Africa, as the source country, and the consumer country, will need to 
be addressed. 
(iii) An improved control information system linked to the permitting system 
and to the DNA database (RhoDIS), is an important step towards trade 
controls to provide transparency around how horns have been 
obtained. 
(iv) South Africa will need to prove that effective internal trade controls 
have been implemented, and are sufficient to prevent the laundering of 
illegally obtained rhino horn. 
(v) Adequate regulatory and other measures to ensure that South Africa 
complies with reporting and inventory obligations – which would include 
doing the following: 
- Encouraging non-compliant private rhino owners to register their 
horn stockpiles by providing guidance and assistance with 
security, convincing them that their personal information will be 
stored securely, and issuing DNA certificates with each 
possession permit for each rhino and each rhino horn. 
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- Conducting regular audits of horn stockpiles to discourage illegal 
sales. 
- Only issuing possession permits for rhino horns when sufficient 
proof of legal ownership or acquisition is provided.  
- Increasing capacity at ports of entry/exit to detect illegal wildlife 
products. 
(vi) Clarity on how the revenue from trade will be utilised. 
In order to establish whether private rhino owners would be prepared to 
comply with certain requirements, participants were asked whether they would 
be prepared/willing to provide the following details: number of animals, 
records of reproduction, mortality, sales, purchases, hunting and poaching. 
The majority (14) of the respondents indicated that they would be prepared to 
provide all the abovementioned information. Most of the participants indicated 
that they are providing this information at the moment. 
Three of the participants said that they would only provide this information if 
trade is legalised – which means that they are not complying with the 
provision of information at the moment: 
“ Only if it is held by an independent and confidential organisation such as 
PROA – not by government” (P8) 
“We will provide this information, but trade must be legalised” (P10) 
“We are prepared to provide all the information that might be necessary for 
keeping a centralised database” (P16) 
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Four of the participants did not respond to the aforementioned question. 
Participants were also asked whether they had any suggestions regarding a 
contralised database, and who should be responsible for such a database. 
Participants were of the opinion that the system should be developed in such 
a way that there would always be a trail to follow – for instance: 
“The system must be developed in such a way that there will be a trail to 
follow. Horn must be traced back to its origin” (P16) 
“It would be imperative that all legally acquired rhino horn be declared and 
registered on a national centralised database. These horns need to be 
registered in the prescribed manner and then stored at a central storing 
facility. This will be the only way that South Africa will be able to convince 
CITES that we do have effective control and no illegal horn can enter the 
market” (P5) 
Participants had a number of different opinions about who should be 
responsible for keeping such a database. Four of the participants were of the 
opinion that the government should be responsible for the database. Nine of 
the participants indicated that it should be kept by either the private sector or 
an NGO. Two participants indicated that it needed to be a partnership 
between the private sector and the government: 
“The government must be included in order to enforce compliance with regard 
to information that must be provided” (P6 and 17) 
One participant was adamant that it could be anybody except government. It 
is also evident, from the abovementioned responses, that participants do not 
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have confidence in government for keeping such a database. This is also in 
line with the comments by Knight (2015:13): “Distrust by land owners for many 
dysfunctional and/or corrupt government departments has plagued the 
provision of information in the recent past”. 
(c) Will it be possible to keep illegal rhino horn out of the legal 
market? 
The majority (15) of the participants were of the opinion that it will not be 
possible to keep illegal horn out of the legal market. However, most of these 
participants indicated that the trade in illegal horn can be limited: 
“Not possible to do 100% but good enough – just as the big retailer brands 
do” (P4) 
“Only if all legally acquired rhino horn be declared and registered on a national 
centralised database” (P5) 
There will always be some laundering – but it is more difficult to launder than 
to be outright illegal. Proper controls will incentivise buyers and sellers to be 
legal and thus they will report illegality” (P7) 
“It won’t be possible to keep illegal horn out of the legal market, but it can be 
limited. We have a similar situation with diamonds and cigarettes” (P16) 
It depends on the reliability of the centralised database. Twenty per cent of the 
rhino horn in the market will be illegal and eighty per cent will be legal” (P17) 
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Seven of the participants who indicated that illegal horn could not be kept out 
of the legal market, only gave reasons to that effect, and did not provide any 
counter-arguments: 
“No, what about cigarettes and diamonds?” (P14) 
“Any legal market system is open to exploitation in spite of regulation and 
control measures and this is further undermined by corruption” (P18) 
According to Du Toit (2013b:9), the rhino horn production faces the same 
dilemma as blood diamonds:  
The biggest contoversy facing the diamond trade currently is conflict 
diamonds also known as blood diamonds because of the bloodshed 
involved to obtain them. Conflict diamonds were smuggled into the 
diamond trade along with legitimate diamonds. Concerned groups in 
the diamond industry have instituted the Kimberley Process, which 
monitors and certifies a diamond at every point of its production 
process. The United Nations estimates that more than 98% of 
diamonds on the market now are conflict-free because of the 
Kimberley Process. 
According to Du Toit (2013b:10), the same kind of procedure (Bicornis 
Process) must be put in place to certify that the product is legally obtained and 
sold as blood-free horn (traceability). 
Three of the participants were adamant that illegal rhino horn could be kept 
out of the legal market: 
“ Yes, because DNA will tell the difference in blood horn and legal horn” (P6) 
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“Absolutely yes. Only registered owners of rhino can market – must produce 
proof of DNA matching” (P8) 
“Yes, a responsible body will be able to keep illegal horn out of the legal 
market” (P9) 
According to Wiltshire (2015b:41), it might be possible that laundering will 
increase; this is unlikely to lead to a sustained increase in demand for 
poached horn, as South Africa already has a sophisticated horn-tracking 
system based on DNA, isotopes and chip monitoring in place. 
(d) Will legal trade of rhino horn have other negative impacts on the 
conservation and well-being of the species? 
When the participants were posed this question, five (5) were of the opinion 
that legal trade in rhino horn would have other negative impacts on the 
conservation and well-being of the species. One of the participants, for 
instance, argues as follows: 
“It is important that we place value to the presence of wildlife in their natural 
environment and not as tradable commodities where market systems 
determine the value of a species in competition with others. This is a fine 
balance which could easily be distorted by encouraging the legal trade in rhino 
horn which may result in the exploitation of other species purely driven by 
consumptive needs and not conservation” (P18) 
According to Child (2015:4), there are three counter-arguments to this opinion: 
- Rhino horn trade has been banned for 35 years, yet rhinos are still 
highly threatened, and surely it is time to devise new approaches; 
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- Legalising rhino horn trade for South Africa is likely to shift the 
market out of the hands of organised crime into legal channels, 
which must be good for rhinos and other wildlife currently moving 
through these illicit channels. A large and steady supply of horns is 
also likely to lower and stabilise prices, which also plays against the 
black market; and 
- Rhinos are most seriously threatened where proprietorship of them 
is weak or where there are insufficient funds for law enforcement in 
protected areas. 
Eustace (2014:2) states that the intention of a smart trade is to satisfy demand 
with legal horn, which should result in a reduced poaching threat for all rhino 
populations. With regard to the view of the anti-trade supporters, namely that 
if Africa trades, then endangered populations of rhino in the rest of the world 
will come under increased pressure, Eustace (2011:4) argues that pressure 
will be taken off those animals, because Africa will fill the market with legal 
goods at cheaper prices, and there will be fierce policing of the illegal trade in 
China. 
According to Biggs et al. (2013:3), opponents of a legal trade in rhino horn 
argue that the bulk sales of ivory by countries in Southern Africa leads to 
increased poaching elsewhere on the continent; yet, there is no conclusive 
empirical evidence that supports this. Moreover, the ivory sales take place too 
infrequently and unpredictably to attract buyers away from the illegal market 
and reduce poaching pressure.  
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One participant did not respond to this question, while the majority (12) of the 
participants were of the opinion that legal trade would not have other negative 
impacts on the conservation and well-being of the species: 
“Money will flow back to rhino owners/conservators. Fewer rhinos will be 
butchered. There will be a value to rhino again” (P4) 
“ . . . depending on the way the income generated is utilised” (P5) 
“I don’t believe there will be any negative impacts. We are in a fortunate 
position to have a very powerful private sector who are able to take the 
pressure off wild rhino. Not to make use of this would be fatal, and the private 
sector will throw the towel in very soon” (P7) 
“Not if well regulated. Proceeds may benefit other species” (P11) 
(e) Will South Africa be in a position to meet the demand in rhino 
horn on a continuous basis? 
The majority (10) of the participants were of the opinion that South Africa will 
be in a position to meet the demand; however, current stockpiles must be 
used to "level the playing field" first: 
“. . . if you wisely filter the stockpiles into the market” (P10) 
“Five ton per year of the current stockpile plus an increasing annual amount 
from private owners would be the equivalent of what is being poached now” 
(P9) 
“Yes, we have huge stockpiles in South Africa and rhino horn can be 
harvested on a regular basis” (P17) 
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One participant did not respond to the question and another participant was 
unsure: 
“Unsure – we do not know what the actual market is. By opening trade for a 
trial period we can establish this” (P2) 
Five of the participants indicated that the demand is too big: 
“No, the demand is almost infinite and growing” (P11) 
“No, demand will grow” (P5, 10 and 12) 
“China has 1,5 billion people. If 10% of these people has cancer, it means that 
150 million people could buy 1 gram of rhino horn per year. It is impossible to 
supply that amount of rhino horn per year” (P15) 
In this regard, ‘t Sas-Rolfes (2012:15) states that one needs to distinguish 
between short-term and long-term effects. In the short term, the demand 
curve would shift outward after a ban was lifted, if previously law-abiding 
consumers decided to enter the market. This is known as the reverse stigma 
effect, and is often cited as a reason to maintain prohibitions. However, in 
examples of alcohol and drug markets where prohibitions were lifted, fears of 
reverse stigma effect turned out to be exaggerated.  
‘t Sas-Rolfes (2012:16) then continues to refer to the longer-term effect, where 
two other factors could lead to an outward shift in the demand curve, rising 
income levels and aggressive product marketing by suppliers: 
- Rising income levels is a factor irrespective of whether the 
market is legal  or not. 
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- Aggressive product marketing is probably easier in a legal 
market, but can also be addressed by measures that are far 
easier to establish in that environment than in an 
underground market. 
‘t Sas-Rolfes (2012:16) argues that technological advances such as DNA 
fingerprinting allow for the mitigation of so-called ‘laundering’ of illegal stocks, 
and legal suppliers would have strong incentives to keep illegal supplies out of 
their market. 
‘t Sas-Rolfes (2012:14) refers to another argument that has been raised 
against the legal trade option. This argument is a hard-line ethical stance 
against any form of human interference with, or commercial exploitation of, 
rhinos, on the grounds of them being “wild” animals. This stance regards any 
form of rhino “farming” as abhorrent – an attitude that typically extends to the 
dehorning of live, free-ranging animals.  He responds to this argument by 
stating that relatively few unmanaged or ‘wild” rhino populations remain – 
most are at least subjected to the soft exploitation of tourist viewing, as well as 
frequent veterinary interventions. Such ethical stances are neither objective 
nor absolute – they are subjective and relative. This stance is ultimately self-
defeating, if it results in the type of brutal treatment of rhinos that one is 
observing, simply because a compromise position is not accepted.  
4.2.4.1.1.2 Arguments by pro-trade supporters 
(a) Arguments from the participants’ point of view 
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The majority (13) of the participants who took part in this research were of the 
opinion that legal trade in rhino horn can limit poaching of rhinos. Two of the 
participants indicated that they did not know if legal trade could limit poaching. 
The participants who supported legal trade, responded as follows: 
“The illegal trade is driven by crime syndicates who seek to maximise profits 
and minimise uncertainty of supply . . . if they are provided with a more 
convenient, reliable supply, they will gradually move to that route. Poachers 
will change behaviour if demand drops” (P4) 
“We say it can limit poaching poorly because if the product is available 
through legal supply, then we will have a reduced poaching pressure. The 
moment that the moratorium on local trade was implemented and it was also 
made difficult for hunters from Asia, there was a lack of supply, hence the 
door was open for supply through poaching” (P6) 
“It is the only way to get funds where they are needed and to address the 
demand issue. It will give incentives for people to protect rhino again, and 
could help communities to take part in conservation as opposed to be 
recruitment grounds for poaching” (P7) 
“Regulated legal trade in horn will have Chinese pharmacists prefer the 
cheaper and legal route. With cheaper pricing comes less poaching” (P8) 
“Legal trade will definitely limit poaching. The market could be supplied with 
horn that do not come from rhinos that are killed specifically to supply horn. 
The wildlife ranching sector, were it given the opportunity to prosper through 
 
 
215 
utilisation – both consumptive and non-consumptive – is the only buffer which 
we have which will ensure the future survival of our rhino population” (P9) 
“If trade is legalised, the value of stockpiles will drop, forcing investors in 
illegal stockpiles to sell. Legal trade is the only option that we have now, if this 
is not going to work, nothing will work” (P10) 
“Yes, it will pay for protection on private farms” (P12) 
“The supply will be higher which will reduce demand, causing the prices to 
drop” (P13) 
“We have a huge area to protect which already puts a burden on our budget. 
We have a legal stockpile worth a lot of money. We can utilise that money to 
appoint more field rangers and to buy modern equipment in order to protect 
our rhinos and to increase the population. Legal trade will have a negative 
impact on crime syndicates. Communities must be enabled to farm with rhinos 
in order to address poverty” (P16) 
“ . . . you will have more resources available in order to protect rhino” (P17) 
Participants were also asked the following: “If trade were legalised either 
nationally or internationally, would you buy or sell horn?” 
Eleven (11) participants indicated that they would be prepared to sell horn, 
while four indicated that they would also buy horn. Two (2) participants 
indicated that they would not sell horn, while five (5) participants did not 
respond. The aforementioned is an indication that the majority of rhino owners 
and rhino custodians in South Africa are prepared to participate in a legal 
trade of rhino horn. 
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(b) Arguments from the experts in rhino conservation's point of view 
According to Eustace (2014:2), poaching will be less profitable to the criminals 
than now, and carry higher risks, and the market for poached horn will be 
much smaller:  
Illegal goods typically trade at 30% discount if there is a legal 
market. This relates to the risk of being caught and punished. In 
addition, there will be the risk of buying false or poisoned horn in the 
illegal market – which will increase the discount to, say, 40%. 
Hanks (2015b:11) summarises the advantages of a strictly controlled legal 
trade: 
(i) Rhino horn could be supplied without killing a single animal, as 
horns regrow and produce about one kilogram per year in males, 
and 600 grams a year in females.  As an alternative to an annual 
cut, horn can be shaved off in much smaller quantities throughout 
the year.  More importantly, live rhinos would be more valuable than 
dead rhinos – which is not the case at present. 
(ii) The trade in horns would be brought out into the open, with 
transparency on horn prices.  Linked to this would be the ongoing 
monitoring of consumer demand relative to supply, enabling the 
rhino ‘owners’ to respond immediately to changing market conditions 
relating directly to consumer demand. 
(iii) Those who have rhinos on their land, urgently need mechanisms for 
funding that are likely to be financially sustainable, and not have to 
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rely on donations which are fickle and unreliable.  By becoming 
active market participants, those responsible for rhino conservation 
would be able to generate a substantial income from these animals, 
that could be 100 times higher than that generated from domestic 
stock. 
(iv) Rhino horn stockpiles held by conservation agencies and private 
landowners could be fed into the market, removing the high costs 
and security risks associated with maintaining them. 
(v) A significantly increased and potentially ongoing source of supply 
should greatly reduce the incentives for speculative stockpiling by 
criminals, because a legal supply would deliver rhino horn more 
reliably and cost-effectively than the illegal trade. 
(vi) A controlled legal trade should encourage other private landowners 
and, importantly, local communities, to obtain and maintain their own 
rhino populations, and to start breeding from them – which should 
have a significant impact on helping to increase rhino numbers. With 
supplementary feed, a farm of 16 km² could hold at least 60 rhinos, 
and could create over 100 full-time jobs and generate at least R12 
million a year in areas where at present there are virtually no 
opportunities for sustainable employment. No form of agriculture will 
produce the same yield, per hectare, as rhino farming. 
‘t Sas-Rolfes (2015:26) is of the opinion that the immediate effect of potential 
trade legalisation cannot be predicted, as not enough is known about the 
current markets for rhino horn. If they are driven largely by speculative 
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stockpiling – ‘banking on extinction’, legalisation could cause a significant drop 
in prices, which would likely be accompanied by a drop in poaching pressure. 
However, if the number of potential consumers is large, and legalisation 
attracts many new buyers, the price could remain at similar levels, or even 
increase. Rising prices might benefit those who farm rhinos and can reinvest 
their increased returns into security, but will not benefit custodians of wild 
populations who are either unwilling or unable to sell horn. 
According to the Taylor (2015:1), the commercial use (trade) of wildlife 
resources must contribute to the ongoing survival of the species in the wild 
(free-roaming populations). An economic model should not be developed 
solely for the benefit of management systems that keep rhinos in small 
camps, as this will shift the risk of poaching to other areas. The economic 
model must also work for state-protected areas, extensive private game 
ranches and reserves, as well as other rhino range states (Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Botswana and Kenya.). 
‘t Sas-Rolfes (2012:14) argues that the establishment of an appropriately 
structured legal trading regime for rhino horn may provide a more effective 
and lasting solution to the rhino poaching problem, for three reasons:  
- Firstly, it would bring trade into the open. 
- Secondly, by providing a significantly increased and potentially 
ongoing source of supply, the incentives for speculative stockpiling 
by criminals would be greatly reduced, if not altogether removed. 
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- Thirdly, by becoming active market participants, legal suppliers of 
rhino horn gain a new source of income, which they are able to re-
invest in improved protection and breeding. Legal owners and 
custodians also have a significant competitive advantage over 
poachers and illegal suppliers – namely, defendable legal rights and, 
in most cases, privileged physical access to, and control of, their 
stocks.  
According to Thomson (2012:3), it is important to realise that what is 
happening now (trade ban) is not sustainable. Any new solution that might 
work – and that might turn the tables on the poachers, therefore, is worth a 
try. 
Speculators are likely to cease buying horn when they realise that a legal 
trade will provide a large and consistent supply of horn which will satisfy 
annual demand, and that there will be little scope for price appreciation 
(Eustace, 2014:2). 
The only way that the market can obtain horn now is by killing rhinos, and 
criminals make all the money. A legal trade, on the other hand, would mean 
that parks and conservation would make the money, and that is where the 
money rightfully belongs (Eustace, 2012:1). 
If international trade is legalised, stockpiles of horn may be eligible for 
controlled sale to the Far East. Protected areas holding rhino will, without 
harming the animal, be able to harvest the horn every three years, as it 
continually grows back. If managed correctly, large amounts of funding could 
be injected into the struggling wildlife conservation industry (Mander, 2012:1). 
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Support for a trial of the legal trade of horn by big game parks in Swaziland 
(Reilly, 2015a:6), is based purely on what it sees as the remaining option to 
save rhinos from extinction, knowing that the 38-year-old ban is failing to do 
so:  
It will never be known if lifting the ban will work until it is tried. If this 
is to be an option, it must be tried while there is still a cushion of 
rhinos to test it on. 
According to Biggs et al. (2013:2), evidence from studies of other wildlife 
products suggests that legal trade can reduce the incentive for poaching, if – 
- regulators can prevent the laundering of a threatening level of illegal 
supply under the cover of a legal trade. 
- the legal supply can deliver the product more easily, reliably and 
cost-effectively than the illegal trade. 
- the demand does not escalate to dangerous levels as the stigma 
associated with the illegality of the product is removed. 
- legally harvested horns from live animals can substitute for horns 
obtained from wild, poached animals. 
Communities must be encouraged to set aside a suitable area of land where 
they can start making money from rhinos by breeding and selling them, 
eventually harvesting the rhino horn on a regular basis – with the expectation 
that there will be opportunities for a legal trade in rhino horn (Msimang, 
2015:8). 
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According to Knight (2015:13), South Africa would need to show an 
improvement in some basic activities – many of which, in fact, led to South 
Africa’s conservation success in the very first place: The following is a 
summary of those activities: 
- An improvement in the basic underlying governance of South 
Africa's conservation estate and law enforcement establishment. 
- South Africa needs good, reliable information on rhino populations 
and rhino horn stocks. 
- There is a need for greater self-regulation of professionals and 
members in the wildlife industry, to show the world that South Africa 
is serious about cleaning up its tarnished image. 
- South Africa would reassure parties that rhino populations in non-
trading states would not be under greater threat of poaching. 
Wiltshire (2015a:40) states that –  
scientific methodology suggests that experimentation is the best 
method for removing uncertainty, and a controlled legal trade with a 
regular, reliable supply would provide the opportunity to better 
determine price and underlying demand. 
It is also evident from the interviews, questionnaires and the literature, that 
most of the supporters of a legal trade realise that legal trade on its own 
cannot be a solution: 
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“Multi-pronged approach. Education (especially in the East); strict 
enforcement measures; centralising permits, tourism levies to ensure funds 
are provided for conservation and enforcement; opening horn trade (even if its 
for an initial trial period); expanding rhino ranges in South Africa, Africa and 
overseas; farming rhino, dehorning small populations” (P1) 
“What needs to happen is to increase and enforce all existing interventions as 
well as create a legitimate supply” (P7) 
“There is no single solution. To stop poaching the following issues will have to 
be addressed: address poverty, sustainable use and law enforcement” (P16) 
According to Knight (2015:12), the call from certain sectors in the private and 
conservation industry, that the legal trade in horn is the perfect 'tonic' to cure 
this 'poaching ill', is simplistic:  
It could certainly be an important option (on top of already existing 
commercial value generated through tourism and limited trophy 
hunting). However, legalising trade in horn will not be a single 
solution to the problem.  
Jones (2015:16) states the following:  
It has never been stated that trade is the simple or only solution; it 
must form part of a composite management plan that includes better 
law enforcement, international cooperation, community involvement 
and beneficiation, to name a few strategies.  
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4.2.4.1.1.3 Community conservation 
A sub-theme that emerged several times during the interviews, and which also 
emanated from the questionnaires and the relevant literature, was community 
conservation. This issue was already discussed in section 2.7.2, hence the 
researcher will, for the purposes of Chapter 4, only deal with the comments of 
the participants, as most of the participants who supported legal trade, also 
supported community conservation: 
“ . . . protectionism is failing as it's not taking into consideration the needs of 
people who live in Africa and is dictated to Africa from Westerners. It will give 
incentives for people to protect rhino again, and could help communities to 
play a part in conservation as opposed to being recruitment grounds for 
poaching” (P7) 
“ . . . ways should be found of the local communities receiving income from 
the wild life which is susceptible to poaching and trafficking. The government 
should be encouraging the emergent black farmers and the communities to 
get involved in rhino farming to increase the numbers and range of rhino in 
Africa” (P9) 
“In the rural communities, given the number of people the income generated 
by legal trade in rhino horn will be able to address poverty” (P16) 
“One of our neighbouring communities has land available to accommodate 
more than 1,000 rhinos. If they can generate money from 1,000 rhinos, just 
imagine what they can do with that money. It is something positive and it will 
encourage them to look after the rhino” (P17) 
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According to Maenetje (2015:20), the sustainable use of rhino is a key issue in 
terms of promoting the socio-economic upliftment of the Balepye and Selwane 
communities in Limpopo:  
Communities that are invested in the survival of the species will be 
less likely to offer support to poachers in exchange for money. In 
fact, if similar projects are allowed to flourish in the country, we will 
be able to push back poaching and actually take the fight to the 
poacher. 
It must be borne in mind that community conservation does not only relate to 
sustainable utilisation, but to recruitement of poachers as well. As Thomson 
(2012) states: “The most important long term solution to poaching in South 
Africa, is to eliminate poverty in all those communities that harbour poachers”. 
This is also in line with the media release by the Minister of Environmental 
Affairs (referred to in section 2.7.2), namely that poachers come from the 
communities:  
It is also from these communities, many of them underdeveloped 
and neglected, that the natural instinct to protect wildlife may be 
superceded by concerns for money because they are simply too 
poor. To ensure the long-term sustainable utilisation of wildlife, it is 
important that communities are involved – not only by creating an 
enabling environment that facilitates rhino ownership and 
management for disadvantaged communities, but also through 
creating economic alternatives to poaching, within these 
communities. 
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Community conservation goes hand-in-hand with ownership (which has 
already been discussed in section 2.3), as community conservation without 
allowing for ownership of rhinos to the community, will be a futile exercise. 
4.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the results of the semi-structured interviews. The 
views of the participants regarding the causes of the increase in poaching, 
were discussed. There was also referral to the relevant literature in this 
regard. This is deemed important, as the source of the problem needs to be 
identified, in order to find a suitable solution. 
Findings pertaining to concurrent strategies as well as the CITES ban on 
international trade in rhino horn were also covered, whereafter sustainable 
use as a possible solution was discussed. 
 Chapter 5 focuses on the conclusions, based on the findings, and 
recommendations for further research are offered. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Conclusions, based on the findings of this research, are presented in this 
chapter. Recommendations for further research and investigation are also 
offered. 
The variety of responses emphasises the fact that rhino poaching is not a 
single faceted issue; it is complex, and interacts with all sectors of society – 
from rhino owners and local communities to rhino custodians and government. 
Nieuwenhuis (2015:56) states the following:  
In qualitative research, we maintain that knowledge should emerge 
out of the local context and should privilege the voice of the 
‘insiders’, taking into account what people say, do and feel, and how 
they make meaning of the phenomena under investigation. Patterns, 
trends and themes should therefore emerge from the research 
process, and the role of the researcher should be to understand 
real-life situations from the point of view of the insider, rather from 
the point of view of the outsider. 
The research findings revealed that both the pro-trade and anti-trade 
supporters accept that there is a market for rhino horn, leading to a number of 
implications (referred to in section 2.10): 
- The fact that this market is – for most part – illegal under CITES,  
does not mean that it does not exist. Declaring the trade in rhino 
products “illegal” has not closed the market down. 
 
 
227 
- An illegal market may have some unique characteristics, but 
dynamically it still behaves in much the same way as a legal one. A 
product’s illegal status does not negate the laws of supply and 
demand. It does, however, make it harder to analyse. 
- From the perspective of the participants in the market (suppliers and 
consumers) there is probably little about rhino products that is 
innately different from many other products: it can be supplied 
profitably, and it satisfies particular wants or needs. 
5.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The objectives of the study have been met by conducting a literature review, 
establishing a suitable theoretical framework, and adopting appropriate 
research methods for collection, analysis and presentation of the sources of 
data. 
A discussion of the legal position and the concept of sustainable use, were 
covered in the literature review in Chapter 2, in order to give a background of 
the framework of conservation – more specifically, rhino conservation. 
The effectiveness of strategies to prevent poaching were evaluated during the 
literature review, as well during the process of data analysis in Chapter 4. This 
process also contributed towards the reliability and validity of the research. 
The effectiveness of the ban on international trade in rhino horn, and the 
viability of legalising international trade in rhino horn, were also investigated 
during the literature review, as well as during the process of data analysis in 
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Chapter 4. All of the aforementioned culminated in answering the research 
questions. 
5.3 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
One of the reasons why the researcher decided on the qualitative method of 
research, was the need to corroborate, validate and explain the information 
collected during the study. Qualitative research proves useful when one needs 
to supplement, validate, explain or interpret the collected information (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994:10). Furthermore, the use of interviews, questionnaires and 
literature research contributed to the trustworthiness of the study. 
In accordance with the qualitative research design, the researcher was the 
primary instrument for data collection and analysis. The use of semi-
structured interviews and questionnaires with open-ended questions, in this 
study, created the opportunity for participants to contribute to richer detailed 
answers. However, due to the sensitivity of the research topic, some of the 
participants could not respond to certain questions. This aspect, as well as the 
fact that certain NGOs were reluctant to participate, was a limitation to the 
study.  
The findings of this study can be generalised to larger samples, due to the 
composition of the sample. It has already been mentioned in Chapter 3 that 
the participants in this study represent owners and custodians of 
approximately 80% of South Africa’s rhino population. 
The researcher complied with the requirements of sampling adequacy, 
supplemented by a literature research; hence sufficient data to account for all 
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aspects of the research has been obtained. The different viewpoints of 
participants were compared with the data collected during the literature 
research, in order to ensure validity. 
5.4 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The research problem has already been dealt with in section 1.3 of this 
research, namely: “Despite the ban on international trade in rhino horn, 
poaching of rhino has increased. Poaching syndicates have capitalised on the 
CITES ban”. (The CITES trade ban will be discussed in section 5.6). 
The following reasons for the increase in poaching emanated from the 
interviews and the questionnaires: 
- Poor law enforcement 
- Moratorium on domestic trade 
- Money driven 
- Increased demand 
- Poverty and unemployment 
Poor law enforcement was indicated by most of the participants as a cause of 
the increase in rhino poaching.  
The research revealed that corruption remains a challenge to effective law 
enforcement. Economic underperformance and poor governance make the 
resource wealth of many developing countries vulnerable to corruption. It has 
also been indicated that where corruption is highest, trafficking is pervasive, 
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and corruption facilitates the range of transactions that need to happen 
throughout the trafficking process. 
The involvement of organised crime in wildlife trafficking is clearly related to 
corruption. Corruption on the part of government officials, and the involvement 
of officials in supplying information, were also raised as a concern by 
participants as well as experts in rhino conservation. Bribery and corruption in 
South Africa’s neighbouring countries was also raised as a concern. 
Most of the participants and experts in rhino conservation expressed concerns 
about capacity shortages and the lack of resources. A lack in capacity of law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors and magistrates, were mentioned, and the 
government is blamed for not making provision for the necessary finances. 
The government is also blamed for a lack of political will. 
It was common knowledge among participants and experts in rhino 
conservation, that the risk of being caught is low, due to the high vacancy rate 
of law enforcement officers. The situation is aggravated by inadequate 
domestic and international collaboration. 
Although most of the participants were of the opinion that the punishment 
does not fit the crime, the danger exists that the opinions of participants, as 
owners and custodians of rhinos, could be influenced by emotion. 
Harms JA stated the following in S v Mhlakaza 1997 n1 SACR 515 (SCA) 
(referred to in section 2.6.5):  
The object of sentencing is not to satisfy public opinion but to serve 
the public interest. A sentencing policy that caters predominantly or 
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exclusively for public opinion is inherently flawed. It remains the 
court’s duty to impose fearlessly an appropriate and fair sentence 
even if the sentence does not satisfy the public. 
It has been found that most of the participants were of the opinion that 
certainty of punishment, rather than the severity of the penalty, would deter 
poachers. Most of the participants were concerned about poor investigations. 
The aforementioned is also in accordance with Rabie and Strauss (1985:37), 
where it was stated that the success of general deterrence is more dependent 
upon the relative degree of certainty that punishment will follow the 
commission of a crime, than upon the severity of the penalty. In other words, 
general deterrence is more a function of law enforcement than it is of 
sentencing. 
It has already been shown in section 2.6.2, that a poacher will always 
consider the risk, and weigh up the risk against the reward. If the statement by 
Eustace (2011:1) is considered to be correct, namely that there is a 90% 
chance of a poacher avoiding any penalty, then it is obvious that this is one of 
the reasons for an increase in poaching. 
The moratorium on domestic trade in rhino horn as a possible reason for the 
increase in rhino poaching, has already been discussed in section 2.5.1; 
however, this research has revealed that participants and experts in rhino 
conservation hold different opinions on whether or not the moratorium was 
responsible for the increase in rhino poaching.  
Most of the participants supported the lifting of the moratorium on domestic 
trade, but added that it would not have any effect, unless the ban on 
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international trade was also lifted. Participants who supported a legal trade 
were all in agreement that there must be an end-user. If it is accepted that the 
moratorium did not cause an increase in poaching, the fact that South Africa 
has no end-users could be the reason why the moratorium did not cause an 
increase in poaching. 
This research revealed that by removing legal trade, trade was pushed 
underground, where it created a vast illegal market dominated by crime 
syndicates. The price of rhino horn increased because of the increase in 
demand without any legal supply, and it has become a lucrative business for 
organised crime investors. 
Findings indicate that an increase in demand was responsible for an increase 
in poaching. This point of view is also supported by experts in rhino 
conservation. Once again, the inelastic relationship between the increasing 
demand and restricted (illegal) supply influences the high black market prices 
of rhino horn, making the product attractive to criminals and organised crime 
syndicates. 
Most of the participants were in agreement that the poaching crisis in Africa is 
facilitated by poverty. The aforementioned is also supported by experts in 
rhino conservation (Hanks, 2015b:2; Roe, 2008:1). It is also evident that all 
the reasons for an increase in poaching, mentioned in this chapter, are closely 
linked to an increase in price. 
Considering the reasons for the increase in poaching, the following will have 
to be addressed, in order to curb poaching: increased security (section 5.5.4), 
international trade ban (to be discussed in section 5.7 as part of sustainable 
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use), increased demand (section 5.5.5) and poverty (community conservation) 
(section 5.7.3), while the concurrent strategies to curb poaching will be 
discussed in section 5.5.  
5.5 CONCURRENT STRATEGIES 
The purpose of the discussion of the findings of the concurrent strategies, is to 
establish whether these strategies have been successful in order to limit 
poaching, or if an alternative approach should be implemented. 
5.5.1 Dehorning 
Findings from the current research indicate that dehorning is more suited for 
use in smaller reserves and game ranches with few rhino; however, it could 
shift the threat of poaching from one area to another. 
Poaching pressure is likely to be reduced by either decreasing the reward to 
the poachers through dehorning, or increasing the risk and difficulty 
associated with poaching. Findings also indicate that the permitting system for 
possessing, transporting and storing the horns appears to be onerous, and 
imposes security risks. It is also considered important that dehorning would 
only be effective if poachers were aware of the fact that rhinos were 
dehorned. 
It was also stressed that security/law enforcement should be effective, and 
that dehorning is not a solution in itself, and should not be done in isolation. 
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5.5.2 Poisoning of the horn 
The research revealed that most of the participants were of the opinion that  
poisoning of the horn would not deter poachers. Many of the participants 
referred to the fact that rhinos have been poached, despite the horn being 
poisoned. The aforementioned view is also supported by Duffy et al. (2013:7). 
Participants who were of the opinion that poisoning of the horn can limit 
poaching, supported it on condition that it must be made known. The legal 
consequences of poisoning have already been discussed in section 2.6.3. 
Should international trade be legalised, contaminated horn could be released 
onto the market. This was a concern of some of the participants. 
5.5.3 Translocation 
Findings indicated that most of the participants supported translocation, on 
condition that rhinos are translocated to safer places and to a suitable habitat. 
Participants had differing views pertaining to what they regard as a safer 
place; however, it has been indicated that safety goes hand-in-hand with 
security. 
Translocation is also in line with the South African government’s strategic 
management approach, referred to in section 2.2.1.5.3. 
5.5.4 Increased security 
The literature review (Hall-Martin et al., 2008:39; ‘t Sas-Rolfes, 2012:12) 
revealed that increased security measures are likely to yield greater success 
than law enforcement measures. 
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This research further revealed that all the participants (rhino owners and 
custodians) have increased their security measures – which include the 
appointment of more rangers to do “foot patrols”. They have all experienced a 
considerable increase in security costs. It is clear that increased security is 
also a prerequisite for dehorning and translocation. 
Findings in the current research confirmed that the costs of keeping rhino 
have signifcantly increased, and that the costs greatly exceed the benefits. 
This has caused a number of rhino owners to sell their rhino (Jones, 
2014:129). 
5.5.5 Increased demand 
It is clear that increased demand can only be addressed either by demand 
reduction campaigns or by an increase in supply. All the participants (except 
one) were of the opinion that demand reduction campaigns cannot limit 
poaching. 
The literature review revealed that demand reduction campaigns are mostly 
supported by some of the NGOs. However, experts are of the opinion that the 
likelyhood of stopping the use of rhino horn is very small (Cheung, 1995:152; 
Hanks, 2015b:9; ‘t Sas-Rolfes, 2012:13). The research further indicates that 
most of the participants do not have any trust in these NGOs. Findings also 
indicate that a demand reduction campaign cannot be run alongside a legal 
trade. 
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5.6 CITES TRADE BAN 
The majority of the participants were of the opinion that the ban on 
international trade in rhino horn was one of the reasons why the CITES fight 
against illicit wildlife trafficking is failing. Some of the participants were even of 
the opinion that the CITES trade ban was one of the reasons for the increase 
in poaching. The study also revealed that some of the NGOs are blamed for 
the ban on international trade in rhino horn. This is confirmed by experts in 
rhino conservation (Jones, 2015:15; Reilly, 2015a:3; Thomson, 2015:33). 
The effectiveness of the ban on international trade in rhino horn is dealt with in 
section 2.9 of the literature review. Although supporters of the ban argue that 
there has been insufficient regulation of internal markets in individual 
consumer countries, this research confirmed that the CITES trade ban is a 
failure, and has pushed the trade underground, and onto the black market. 
This viewpoint is confirmed by Du Toit (2013:190), Emslie and Brooks (1999), 
Mander (2012:2), ‘t Sas-Rolfes (1997b:2), ‘t Sas-Rolfes (2011a:18), and 
Milliken and Shaw (2012). 
5.7 SUSTAINABLE USE 
The literature regarding the question whether “the sustainable use approach 
can save the South African rhinos”, is discussed in section 2.7.4. Findings 
from the current research indicate that “sustainable use” is widely considered 
as a possible solution to the poaching of rhinos. This approach is also in 
accordance with the World Conservation Strategy, as well as the CITES 
Strategic Vision (referred to in section 4.2.4.1). Legal trade is also accepted 
as a form of sustainable use; furthermore, legal trade in rhino horn is not 
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possible, unless the ban on international trade is lifted. This also refers to the 
second research question, namely “Can the lifting of the ban on international 
trade in rhino horn discourage poaching and save the rhino from extinction?”.  
This research question will be discussed in section 5.8. 
5.7.1 Legal trade 
The research revealed that the anti-trade supporters, mostly NGOs, have the 
following arguments against a legal trade: 
5.7.1.1 Will South Africa be in a position to find a trading partner? 
Most of the participants indicated that South Africa will be in a position to find 
a trading partner; however, the trading partner would have to comply with 
certain conditions. The trading partner country needs to – 
- agree to a legalised trade under strict conditions. 
- abide by regulations in respect of dealing in legal horn. 
As this finding is based on the opinions of participants who have not formally 
investigated the possibilty of a trading partner, this issue needs to be further 
investigated by an organisation such as the PROA or WRSA, in collaboration 
with the South African government. 
5.7.1.2 Will South Africa be in a position to regulate a system of legal 
trade nationally and internationally? 
The research revealed concerns about South Africa’s ability to effectively 
regulate a system of legal trade, due to corruption. However, most of the 
participants in this study were of the opinion that South Africa would be in a 
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position to regulate a system of legal trade, either nationally or internationally, 
on condition that it is done in a transparent and accountable manner, free of 
corruption. The aforementioned view is also supported by Biggs et al. 
(2013:3), Eustace (2011:3) and ‘t Sas-Rolfes (2015:27). Rhino owners and 
custodians are already complying with the norms and standards for the 
marking of rhinos and rhino horn, as well as those for the hunting of rhino for 
trophy hunting purposes (South Africa, 2012). 
5.7.1.3 Will it be possible to keep illegal rhino horn out of the legal 
market? 
The study revealed a concern about the possibility of keeping illegal rhino 
horn out of the legal market; however, most of the participants were of the 
opinion that although it would not be possible, it could be limited. 
5.7.1.4 Will legal trade of rhino horn have other negative impacts on the 
conservation and well-being of the species? 
The study revealed a concern, mostly by NGOs, about the negative impacts 
on the conservation and well-being of the species; yet, as stated by Biggs et 
al. (2013:3), there is no empirical evidence that supports this view. 
Most of the participants were of the opinion that legal trade in rhino horn will 
not have other negative impacts on the conservation and well-being of the 
species. This view is also supported by Biggs et al. (2013:3), Eustace 
(2011:4) and Eustace (2014:2). 
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5.7.1.5 Will South Africa be in a position to meet demand in rhino horn 
on a continuous basis? 
The study revealed a concern, mostly by NGOs, about the ability of South 
Africa to meet the demand in rhino horn on a continuous basis. However, 
most of the participants (rhino owners and custodians) were of the opinion 
that South Africa would be able to meet the demand, on condition that the 
current stockpiles are used as well. This view is also supported by ‘t Sas-
Rolfes (2012:15). 
The study has also revealed that little is known about the market for rhino 
horn, and further research in this regard will have to be done. This is also in 
line with the opinion of ‘t Sas-Rolfes (2015:6), who stated that the immediate 
effect of potential trade legalisation cannot be predicted, as not enough is 
known about the current markets for rhino horn. 
5.7.2 Conclusion regarding pro-trade arguments 
The study revealed that legalising international trade in rhino horn can limit 
poaching. The majority of participants supported this view – which is also 
supported by experts in rhino conservation (Biggs et al. 2013:2; Eustace, 
2014:2; Hanks, 2015b:11; Mander, 2012:1; Reilly, 2015a:6; ‘t Sas-Rolfes, 
2012:14; ‘Sas-Rolfes, 2015:26; Thomson, 2012:3). 
The following advantages of legalised trade were raised by participants, and 
confirmed by experts in rhino conservation: 
(i) It will give incentives for people to protect rhino again, as the 
animal will be worth more than the horn. 
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(ii) It could help communities to take part in conservation, as 
opposed to being recruitment grounds for poachers. 
 (iii) Supply will increase, forcing prices to drop. 
(iv) If trade is legalised, the value of illegal stockpiles will drop, 
forcing illegal investors to sell. 
(v) It will provide the necessary funds for conservation, which can 
also be used for anti-poaching. More resources will be available 
to protect the rhino. 
(vi) If crime syndicates are provided with a more convenient and 
reliable supply, they will gradually move to the legal trade route. 
(vii) If the price of rhino horn drops, the reward for the poacher will be 
too low compared with the risk, hence the poacher will be 
discouraged from taking the risk. 
The literature review (Ferreira et al., 2014:6) indicated that rhino poaching 
may be best addressed by management strategies that generate benefits at 
least equal to, or higher than, the associated risks involved in the supply of 
horn to the market. Overall, unrestricted international trade in rhino horn 
produced the best risk-benefit score, while the worst case scenario, in which 
risks substantially exceeded benefits, was provided by the ban on 
international trade. 
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5.7.3 Community conservation 
The research revealed that community conservation plays a prominant role in 
anti-poaching, especially that of neighbouring communities of national parks 
and provincial game reserves. These protected areas usually have 
disadvantaged and underdeveloped local communities as neighbours. These 
communities are currently excluded from the benefits derived from the 
neighbouring protected areas, making them susceptable to being recruited as 
poachers. 
The research further revealed that economic alternatives to poaching should 
be created within these communities. The example of the Balepye and 
Selwane communities in Limpopo shows that it is possible for communities to 
become involved in rhino conservation, and to generate income in order to 
alleviate poverty. 
5.8 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
(i) The first research question of this study was whether the CITES ban on 
the international trade in rhino horn provides an effective measure to 
stop/prevent poaching. A literature study was conducted, in order to establish 
the effectiveness of the CITES ban. Most of the participants in this study were 
of the opinion that the CITES trade ban was a failure. This view was also 
supported by experts in rhino conservation. 
The irony is that as CITES measures are progressively implemented and 
tightened, the trade becomes even harder to monitor and control – which 
leads to calls for even tighter restrictions (‘t Sas-Rolfes, 2011a:19). According 
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to ‘t Sas-Rolfes (1997b:27), it is likely that the CITES ban created a perceived 
supply shortage, which, in turn, led to the dramatic rise in prices in the late 
1970s. Asian traders and traditional doctors, fearing that their supplies of horn 
were now under threat, probably stockpiled in anticipation of future shortages, 
placing considerable upward short-term pressure on prices. 
According to ‘t Sas-Rolfes (2011a:18), a trade ban does not end trade. Making 
it illegal simply raises the risks – and, therefore, the costs of trading. In theory, 
if all consumers are law-abiding, a trade ban should reduce demand. In 
practice, consumers are not always law abiding. If demand for a product 
persists after a trade ban, the black market supply will continue if the price is 
right. 
Trade bans do create a measure of control over commodity trade: they place 
it in the hands of organised crime. In the wildlife trade, bans can create illegal 
industry structures that are more concentrated and powerful, harder to control, 
and more likely to overexploit the resource than before (‘t Sas-Rolfes, 
1997b:23). 
Supporters of the ban argue that there has been insufficient regulation of 
internal markets in individual consumer countries, and that additional 
resources are required for anti-poaching measures to protect remaining 
populations. If sufficient effort is made, and the necessary resources are 
made available, these measures should succeed (Martin & Martin, 1991; 
Vigne & Martin, 1993). 
‘t Sas-Rolfes (1993:7) argues that it has been a number of years since the first 
anti-trade measures were taken, and considerable resources have 
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subsequently been spent pursuing this strategy, but they do not appear to 
have been sufficient. 
According to Emslie and Brooks (1999) and Milliken and Shaw (2012), trade 
in rhino horn is continuing, despite the ban on commercial trade. CITES trade 
bans have not succeeded in stopping the rhino horn trade, and a considerable 
reduction in the populations of black rhino has occurred, even though it is 
included in Appendix 1, indicating that the international trade bans alone have 
not been effective. 
According to Conrad (2012), while trade bans can work in the short term, they 
can have the reverse outcome to what was intended, if perpetuated beyond 
their utility and in “perfect storm” circumstances. The conditions for the 
“perfect storm”, all of which are currently present in the case of rhino, are the 
following: 
- Price-insensitive buyers in the market 
- High commercial value 
- Development of trade, both legal and illegal 
- Public ownership reduces incentives to protect rhino 
- Conflict for resources with humans 
- Inadequate enforcement of trade bans 
‘t Sas-Rolfes (1993:62) is of the opinion that the existing policy of the CITES 
ban on the trade in horn certainly does not appear to be effective in 
preventing the overexploitation of rhinos. It is also economically inefficient, 
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because it denies the possibility of mutually beneficial trade between rhino 
custodians and consumers of rhino products. It is inequitable, because the 
potential beneficiaries are mostly citizens of developed countries where rhinos 
do not occur, while the costs are borne by the developing countries where the 
rhinos occur, and where the products are in demand (‘t Sas-Rolfes, 1993:62). 
A comparative study has also been done regarding trade bans in respect of 
other products. Anti-trade supporters usually refer to the ivory trade as an 
example; however, in the case of ivory, the elephant has to die from natural 
causes or be killed, in order to provide ivory to the market. In the case of rhino 
horn, the horn can be harvested on a sustainable basis. Vicuňa was on the 
brink of extinction until the trade ban on vicuňa was relaxed by CITES. The 
prohibition of alcohol in the U.S. between 1920 and 1933, caused an increase 
in alcohol consumption instead of a reduction. The deer numbers in New 
Zeeland have grown because of sustainable use (legal trade). 
The research therefore revealed that the CITES ban on international trade in 
rhino horn does not provide an effective measure to stop/prevent poaching. 
(ii) The second research question of this study asked if the lifting of the 
ban on international trade in rhino horn can discourage poaching and save the 
rhino from extinction. In order to contextualise this research question, one of 
the advantages of a legalised trade as mentioned by the pro-trade supporters, 
must be borne in mind: If the price of rhino horn drops, the reward for the 
poacher will be too low, compared with the risk, hence the poacher will be 
discouraged from taking the risk. 
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This research revealed that the anti-trade supporters were of the opinion that 
the trade ban and demand reduction campaigns were the only methods of 
preventing or reducing poaching; however, no supportive evidence could be 
submitted in this regard.  
Pro-trade supporters, however, submitted reasons why a trade ban and 
demand reduction campaigns did not succeed in reducing poaching. On the 
other hand, anti-trade supporters submitted reasons why a legal trade in rhino 
horn would be ineffective, while pro-trade supporters provided various 
counter-arguments. The latter also based their arguments on the economic 
principles of supply and demand. A comprehensive literature review in this 
regard was done in section 2.10. 
The research revealed that pro-trade supporters would rely on current 
stockpiles, in order to level the playing field between illegal and legal supply, 
whereafter rhino horn will be supplied on a sustainable basis. An increased 
and sustainable source of supply should also reduce the incentives for 
speculative stockpiling by criminals, because a legal supply would deliver 
rhino horn more reliably and cost-effectively than the illegal trade. 
Most of the participants and experts in rhino conservation were of the opinion 
that a legalised trade would make more funds available for rhino owners, 
custodians and government. These funds could be utilised to provide for 
increased security and law enforcement, and to address the lack in capacity 
as identified by participants in this research. Funds would be available for 
rhino owners, custodians and government, instead of for the poacher, and at 
the same time the risk for the poacher would increase. 
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 As indicated in section 2.10, South Africa still needs to establish a credible 
trading partner. All the former rhino horn consumer countries in Asia, as well 
as Vietnam, have effected legal bans against the trade in rhino horn, and most 
have moved to completely remove rhino horn as an approved ingredient in 
their traditional medicine. This issue has been identified as an obstacle in the 
way of legal trade, which will have to be investigated by an organisation such 
as the PROA or WRSA, in collaboration with the South African government. 
The research suggested that the trading partner country should: 
- agree to a legalised trade under strict conditions, and 
- abide by regulations in respect of dealing in legal horn.  
The research indicated that on condition that South Africa find a credible 
trading partner, the lifting of the ban on international trade in rhino horn, can 
discourage poaching and save the rhino from extinction. 
(iii) The third research question reads as follows: “How can legal trade be 
regulated?” The research identified this as a concern raised by the anti-trade 
supporters. It has already been indicated in section 5.7.1.2, that most of the 
participants in this study (owners and custodians) were of the opinion that 
South Africa will be in a position to regulate trade, on condition that such a 
system is – 
- transparent and accountable.  
- free of corruption. 
- developed in order to prevent laundering. 
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Corruption was identified as one of the most important reasons for an 
increase in poaching, and is a concern to the participants to this study, the 
experts in rhino conservation, as well as the NGOs; hence a system of legal 
trade needs to be developed in such a way that it will curb corruption. 
Participants and experts in rhino conservation showed support for a regulated 
trading system through a Central Selling Organisation (CSO) and the 
establishment of a centralised database. It was also revealed that rhino 
owners and custodians are prepared to participate in such a system and 
provide the necessary information required. A number of participants have 
confidence in the system that is currently being used in the diamond trade. Du 
Toit (2013b:10) has developed a process called the the Bicornis Process, to 
ensure that the product is legally obtained and sold as blood-free horn. The 
cornerstone of this system is traceability, and this system can be used as a 
basis for further development. 
5.9 SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear from the research that the CITES ban on international trade in rhino 
horn is failing to stop or limit poaching of rhino. 
Currently, under the trade ban, the poachers and criminal syndicates are 
taking all the profits, while the rhino owners and custodians carry all the costs 
of keeping and protecting rhinos. This disparity is causing a disinvestment in 
rhinos by the private sector. The poaching pressure has caused rhinos to 
become a liability, instead of an asset, to private rhino owners. 
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An evaluation of the concurrent strategies to prevent poaching revealed that 
some of these strategies (dehorning and translocation) can help to limit 
poaching; however, these strategies in themselves do not represent a solution 
to the poaching crisis. A concern regarding law enforcement has been 
identified – especially a lack of capacity, which leads to poor investigations. 
The research indicated that the risk to the poacher must be increased, while 
the reward to the poacher must be reduced. The risk can only be increased by 
increased security and effective law enforcement, whereas the reward can 
only be reduced by lower prices for rhino horn. Prices can be lowered by an 
increase in supply, by means of a legal trade – in other words, sustainable 
use.  
The research revealed that poverty was one of the reasons for an increase in 
poaching, as the poaching crisis is facilitated by poverty. Poverty reduction 
depends on sustainable resource use. The research therefore identified a 
need for local communities to be involved, and share in the benefits of 
sustainable use.  
This research has identified legal trade as a possible solution; however, legal 
trade will only reduce, not eliminate, the incentives to poach; hence 
preventative security measures and effective law enforcement are also 
prerequisites. Legal trade can never be dealt with in isolation. It is clear that 
there is still a need for concurrent strategies such as preventative security, law 
enforcement, translocation and dehorning. 
Legal trade should be transparent and free of corruption, and this research 
suggests the establishment of a CSO and a centralised database, managed 
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by the private sector in collaboration with the South African government. The 
literature contains a number of examples of how such a system could be 
implemented and managed. The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), 
appointed by the Minister of Environmental Affairs in 2015, is mandated to 
investigate the potential models/mechanisms for trade. 
The success of a legal trade will depend on how the legal market is 
established. The demand for rhino horn is currently unknown. If trade is 
legalised, demand can be monitored relative to supply, enabling rhino owners 
to respond immediately to changing market conditions related directly to 
consumer demand. The establishment of a well-managed legal market in 
rhino horn would enable conservationists to monitor market trends, whereas 
the present situation, under a trade ban, is creating uncertainty. 
This summary can be concluded with the following statement by Child 
(2012:3):  
The sustainable use approach suggests that rhinos (and South 
Africa’s economy and employment figures) would benefit by 
replacing a failed no-trade regulatory approach with a carefully 
designed policy experiment to trade rhino horn through carefully 
configured and simple (not simplistic) institutions. 
5.10 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The CITES ban on international trade in rhino horn has failed to stop or limit 
rhino poaching, hence a legal trade deserves consideration as an alternative 
approach. Legal trade is in line with the strategic vision of CITES. In order to 
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approve a legal international trade in rhino horn, South Africa will have to 
submit a proposal to CITES and obtain a two-thirds majority vote from 
member countries in favour of the proposal. 
South Africa will also need to establish a credible trading partner. It is 
suggested that an organisation such as the PROA or WRSA, in collaboration 
with the South African government, investigate this matter. 
An effective trading system needs to be developed, in order to prevent 
laundering and to distinguish between legal and illegal products. The trading 
system should make provision for a CSO and a centralised database, as well 
as trading protocols to be used in both South Africa, as the source country, 
and in the consumer country. The necessary legislation will have to be 
drafted, in order to make provision for the enforcement of the aforementioned. 
In this regard, a legal analysis should be conducted, in order to identify the 
necessary control measures. 
One of the main arguments by pro-trade supporters was the fact that legal 
trade will make more money available for conservation, hence a trading 
system should make provision for a certain amount of money to be allocated 
for conservation. 
The research revealed a lack of information pertaining to stockpiles. A system 
needs to be developed, in order to encourage rhino owners and custodians to 
provide this information to be kept in a centralised database. Participants in 
this research have already indicated that they are prepared to provide all the 
necessary information, on condition that international trade is legalised. 
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Corruption has been identified – not only as one of the reasons for the 
increase in poaching, but also as an obstacle in regulating legal trade. The 
South African government will have to focus on the eradication of corruption, 
in order to establish a well-regulated market for rhino horn, should the 
international trade in rhino horn be legalised. Furthermore, law enforcement 
and intelligence will have to be improved.  
Legal international trade does not mean that concurrent strategies such as 
security, law enforcement, dehorning and translocation can be thrust aside. 
As far as law enforcement is concerned, South Africa’s focus has, in the past, 
largely been on reactive strategies. These should be changed to a more pro-
active strategy. This will only come about through an increased focus on 
improved intelligence collection, its analysis, and the resultant implementation 
of strategically focused activities. The lack in capacity should also be 
addressed, in order to ensure better investigations, better prepared 
prosecutions, and a more efficient judicial system.  The risk to the poacher 
must be increased. 
Property rights in live rhino will have to be strengthened, in order to facilitate 
the involvement of local communities, and to create economic incentives for 
communities adjacent to protected areas. A controlled legal trade should 
encourage local communities to obtain and maintain their own rhino 
populations, which should help to increase rhino numbers. This is also in line 
with the South African government’s Integrated Strategic Management 
approach. 
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5.11 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In answering the research questions (section 5.8), the need for research of 
the market in rhino horn was identified. No formal research has been done in 
this regard. Experts in rhino conservation, owners of rhino, and custodians, 
are all speculating about the size of the market. The fact that the current 
market is illegal, makes it difficuIt to establish a reliable figure. It should also 
be borne in mind that the current (illegal) market probably differs from the 
potential legal market, if international trade is legalised. 
A lack in confidence in some of the NGOs, especially those involved in animal 
rights and anti-poaching, has been identified. According to Child (2015:210), 
uncomfortable questions need to be asked about how much money was 
raised, by whom, and what happened to it:  
We need to remove the parasitic burden on wildlife conservation that 
this massive ‘industry’ represents and make sure that every cent of 
this money is reinvested in wildlife conservation at ground level, 
especially where it benefits communities and landholders who live 
with wildlife. 
The said questions need further investigation, in order to address the 
concerns raised by participants, and which are also shared by experts in rhino 
conservation. 
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5.12 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
The purpose of this research is to contribute towards rhino conservation by 
exploring an alternative approach to limiting rhino poaching, and saving the 
rhino from extinction. 
The possibility of legalising national (domestic) trade in rhino horn has already 
been investigated by the Department of Environmental Affairs (Taylor et al., 
2014). No formal study has been done pertaining to the legalisation of the 
international trade in rhino horn. 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the viability of legalising the 
international trade in rhino horn, and to interpret, as well as add some value 
to, the arguments already raised by experts in rhino conservation and other 
role players in this regard. 
Legalisation of the international trade in rhino horn is a controversial issue; 
hence this research compared the arguments in favour of a legal trade with 
those against a legal trade, and investigated the effectiveness of the current 
approach, namely a trade ban. 
5.13 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the conclusions to the research, as well as 
recommendations in mitigation of the research problem. 
The research problem, research objectives and research questions, as 
identified in Chapter 1, were dealt with in detail. The chapter concluded with 
suggestions for future research, and the contribution of this research to the 
conservation of the rhino populations of South Africa. 
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APPENDIX "A" 
 
QUESTIONS 
 
1. In your opinion, what is the reason for the increase in poaching? 
 
 1.1 Most important reason: 
 1.2 Second: 
 1.3 Third: 
 
2. The current global approach to fighting illicit wildlife trafficking is failing. 
Do  you agree? If yes – what do you think is the reason for this 
failure?  
 
3. Can legal trade in rhino horn limit poaching of rhinos? Short motivation: 
 
4. Can dehorning limit the poaching of rhinos? Short motivation: 
 
5. Can poisoning limit the poaching of rhinos? Short motivation: 
 
6. Can increased law enforcement limit the poaching of rhinos? Short 
motivation: 
 
7. What type of security do you have and what is the annual cost in this 
regard? Did  you experience any increase in security cost over the last 
3 years? 
 
8. How has financial COST of keeping rhino changed since 2008? 
 
Significantly 
Decreased 
Moderately 
Decreased 
Small 
change 
Moderately 
Increased 
Significantly 
Increased 
More than 
10% 
Between -
10% and -
5% 
Between  
0% and 5% 
Between  
5% and 10% 
Greater than 
10% 
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9. How would you describe the NET PROFIT made from having rhino on 
your property for the last financial year? 
 
Costs 
greatly 
exceed 
benefits 
Costs 
slightly 
exceed 
benefits 
Costs similar 
to benefits 
Benefits 
slightly 
exceed costs 
Benefits 
greatly 
exceed costs 
 
 
 
    
 
10. Can translocation limit the poaching of rhinos? Short motivation: 
 
11. Is our legal system effective enough to deal with poaching? What do 
you suggest in this regard?   
 
12 (a)  Does the punishment fit the crime?    
  
 YES   
  
 NO    
 
12 (b) Do you think that stricter sentences would deter “would-be” poachers?  
 
 YES   
  
 NO 
 
13. If trade were legalised either nationally or internationally, would you buy 
or sell  rhino horn? 
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14. If trade were legalised, would you consider dehorning your rhinos on a 
regular basis to sell horn? 
 
 YES   
  
 NO 
 
 If the answer is No, give reasons:        
 
15. In order to legalise trade, South Africa needs a trading partner. Do you 
think that this is possible and what do you suggest in this regard? 
 
16. If a centralised database would be a prerequisite of legal trade, would 
you be prepared/willing to provide the following details:  
 
 16.1 number of animals 
   
  YES   
   
  NO    
   
 16.2 records of reproduction 
   
  YES   
  
  NO 
 
 16.3 mortality 
  
  YES   
  
  NO 
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 16.4 sales 
 
  YES   
  
  NO 
 
 16.5 purchases 
 
  YES   
  
  NO 
 
 16.6 hunting 
 
  YES   
  
  NO 
 
 16.7 poaching 
 
  YES   
  
  NO 
 
17. Will South Africa be in a position to effectively regulate a system of 
legal trade nationally and internationally?  (Give reasons) 
 
18. Do you have any suggestions regarding a Centralised database? 
 
19. Who should be responsible for keeping such a database? 
 
20. Will it be possible to keep illegal rhino horn out of the legal market? Any 
 suggestions in this regard? 
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21. Will legal trade of rhino horn have other negative impacts on the 
conservation and well-being of the species?  (Give reasons) 
 
22. Do you support the lifting of the moratorium on domestic trade? 
Motivate: 
 
23. If yes, do you think that domestic trade will still be viable if the 
international trade ban is not lifted? 
 
24. Do you think that South Africa will be in a position to meet the demand 
in rhino horn on a continuous basis, bearing in mind that there might be 
an increase in demand? Motivate: 
 
25. Do you have any suggestions on how to stop rhino poaching? 
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APPENDIX "B" 
 
Dear sir/madam 
Research Project: W de Beer: PhD Environmental Management 
Our recent telephone conversation refers. 
I am currently registered for a PhD in Environmental Management at the 
University of South Africa. The topic of my research project is: “The Viability of 
legalising international trade in rhino horn and the possible effect on rhino 
poaching in South Africa.”  
Rhino poaching has become a huge concern globally, particularly in the 
conservation fraternity. Rhinos are threatened with extinction because they 
are being poached for their horn. The common view is that rhino poaching is 
morally wrong, and associated with greed and evil intentions. 
Everybody is in agreement that rhino poaching must be stopped. However, 
there are two schools of thought regarding two main approaches (usually in 
association with certain other techniques) to be used in order to prevent rhino 
poaching. 
The first school of thought refers to those who believe that the rhino horn 
trade is wrong, and therefore has to be stopped. This can only be achieved by 
eliminating demand, mainly through the restrictions on trade. This attitude 
towards the problem, which is the same as that which motivated the ivory ban 
in 1989, is referred to as the “conventional approach”. 
The second school of thought follows an alternative approach and sees the 
overexploitation of biological resources as the result of underinvestment, and 
argues that any solutions to the rhino poaching problem must address the 
underlying economic forces driving the process. This point of view is also 
referred to as sustainable use. The promoters of this school are in favour of 
legal trade in rhino horn. In South Africa, the cabinet has approved the 
development and submission of a proposal by the Department of 
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Environmental Affairs to the seventeenth Conference of the Parties of CITES 
in 2016 to lift the ban on international rhino horn trade and introduce it in a 
regulated format. 
Supporters of the two schools have raised various arguments in favour and 
against the schools of thought. 
The focus of this study will be to investigate the aforementioned approaches, 
more specifically the viability of the alternative approach. 
The possibility of legalising national (domestic) trade in rhino horn (within 
South Africa) has already been investigated by the South African Department 
of Environmental Affairs, hence the purpose of this study will be to investigate 
the viability of legalising the international trade in rhino horn and to comment 
and to add some value to the arguments already raised by experts and other 
role-players in this regard. 
As part of the research, I intend to conduct interviews with various role-players 
involved in the conservation of rhinos, for instance SANParks, Ezemvelo KZN 
Wildlife, DEA, WWF, EWT, WRSA, PROA, GRU, GRAA as well as a number 
of private rhino owners. 
My research proposal has already been approved by the University.  
I realise that it would be inconvenient for you to be interviewed, hence it would 
be appreciated if you could attend to the questionnaire attached hereto. 
 The Supervisor for my research project is: Professor W.A.J Nel 
Chair of the Department of 
Environmental Science  Unisa 
Tel: (011) 471 2324 
Email: nelwaj@unisa.ac.za 
Co-Supervisor is:     Professor R.M Hendrick 
Director:  School of 
Environmental Science 
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College of Agriculture and 
Environmental Science        
Unisa 
Tel: (011) 471 2346 
Email: rhendric@unisa.ac.za 
 
 I will really appreciate your cooperation in this regard. 
Regards 
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APPENDIX "C" 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Research Project: 
 
 
THE VIABILITY OF LEGALISING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN RHINO HORN AND 
THE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON RHINO POACHING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
Dear Mr/Mrs/Miss/Ms/Dr. ________________________________ Date: 
_____________  
 
NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this research project is to investigate the viability of legalising the 
international trade in rhino horn. A literature review has already been done and the 
focus is now on the opinions of stakeholders in rhino conservation. 
 
Research process: 
 
 1. The study requires all stakeholders to participate in individual 
interviews. 
 2. There is no right and wrong answers and all opinions will be valued. 
 3. You do not need to prepare for the interviews in advance. 
 
Your attention is drawn to the fact that the interviews will be tape recorded to ensure 
valuable information elicited during the interview is captured and the content of the 
information can be reviewed in detail. Following the interview, the recorded material 
will be transcribed. You may peruse the transcription of the recording of the interview 
in which you participated at any time. 
 
Your opinion is viewed as strictly confidential. No data published in the thesis and 
journals will contain any information through which you may be identified, unless you 
agree expressly to the contrary. 
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The potential benefit of this study is that a contribution can be made in order to 
find a strategy (probably a combination of strategies) which could benefit anti-
poaching of rhinos in South Africa. 
 
WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE 
 
I understand that I may withdraw from the focus of the group at any time. I therefore 
participate voluntarily until such time as I request otherwise. 
 
CONSENT 
 
I, the undersigned,  ……………………………………………………………… (full 
name) have read the above information relating to the project and have also heard 
the verbal version, and declare that I understand it.  I have been afforded the 
opportunity to discuss relevant aspects of the project with the project leader, and 
hereby declare that I agree voluntarily to participate in the project. 
 
I indemnify the university and any employee or student of the university against any 
liability that I may incur during the course of the project. 
 
I further undertake to make no claim against the university in respect of damages 
to my person or reputation that may be incurred as a result of the project/trial or 
through the fault of other participants, unless resulting from negligence on the part of 
the university, its employees or students. 
 
 
I have received a signed copy of this consent form. 
 
Signature of participant:  ....................................... Signed at ………………………….. 
on ………………………………… 
 
 WITNESSES 
 
1 ................................................................................................................ 
2 ................................................................................................................ 
